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Abstract 
The Tactics of the Trinket presents a material geography of the £1 commodity, following the 
trinket‟s journey from its beginning as raw material on a Chinese rubbish dump, to factories, 
international trade hubs, state-of-the-art distribution networks, over-flowing high street stores, 
and finally the homes of the consumer. This trajectory is used to uncover the places and 
operations of the typical £1 commodity and the ways in which it utilizes and creates a 
complicated array of tactics. 
Each of these tactics is explored in turn; from the embedding of a culture of immediacy, to the 
intrinsic necessity of disposability, to the creation of agglomerative logic, to the over-powering 
presence of abundance. Immediacy is explored in relation to the consumer and traditional notions 
of desire and mystification unpicked. Disposability is questioned in the context of the 
possibilities of entanglement with objects rather than possession of them. Agglomeration is 
analysed as a practice both contributing to, but in some ways hors de, capitalism, as well as a 
phenomenon carving out new types of spaces. Abundance is picked apart as one half of a double-
edged relationship with scarcity and a way of understanding current rhetoric on fast capitalism. 
The trinket is considered as part of both micro situations (for example, the solidarity of 
manufacturers in China‟s „commodity city‟ of Yiwu) and macro geo-political movements (the 
impact of China‟s growth on the relationship between China and the EU). Its tactics are 
considered in the light of current capitalism and some initial principles for a new material 
manifesto are discussed. 
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Introduction 
i) Trajectories. 
The story of the £1 trinket is the story of how the simplest and cheapest of commodities creates 
and changes cultures, enforces specific ways of surviving, and affects geo-political relations 
across the globe. Its journey uncovers places ranging from global show-pieces of capitalism to 
the hidden raw edges of it; players ranging from global entrepreneurs to dump-dwellers. 
Uncovering these places and people brings to light new ways of operating and surviving through 
new tactical maneuvers. 
What defines the £1 trinket? It is frequently ornamental, although sometimes combines this with 
a functional everyday use in way that tends to play down the original gravity of any attached 
symbolism (e.g. Jesus‟ face on a clock). Often, it is an inexpensive version of a well-known 
cultural „treasure‟ and this usually requires it to be a miniaturization of that treasure (e.g. the £1 
Buddhas). If not an attempt to exactly recreate famous effigies, it tends to pick up on well-
established symbolism, traditions and legends (e.g. pirates, „tribal‟ Africans, Rastafarians), often 
turning these into caricatures. Most crucially, it is united with its sibling „one pound items‟ and 
its myth lies in the cultural potency of its price. It is part of a system of objects that is at one and 
the same time democratic and totalitarian - it can be anything on the planet as long as it can retail 
for £1. Yet, within this system, there are of course distinctions between £1 commodities, which 
cause some to be considered better purchases than others. Georg Simmel describes these 
differences within a sameness, as levelling and uniformity due to the environment of the same on 
one hand, and the accentuation of the individual as an independent whole on the other (1991: 
122). As Ben Highmore points out, Simmel uses this description to describe not only 
commodities, but also the modern individual in society (2002: 41). 
It is the „how‟ of the £1 commodity‟s genus, its ability to exist for the necessary price, is what is 
at stake here, and this involves a journey crucial to understanding new modes of capitalist 
relations. Briefly, and by way of grounding what is to come, this journey of the £1 commodity is 
as follows. It begins, and indeed often ends, in places of waste. Places such as the peddlers 
quarters within large Chinese cities, or the so-called „dump towns‟ which have emerged along 
the main manufacturing areas of the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas. It is here that private 
individuals or small recycling „factories‟ collect and sort through mountains of rubbish, 
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separating according to material and classifying according to value, in preparation for sale to 
manufacturers. This waste is melted down and formed into small pellets, which in their turn, and 
in a moment conjured well by Roland Barthes, are melted and molded to form the basis of the 
commodity:  
 
 
 
From here, the journey takes us into the heart of the Yangtze River delta, to Yiwu – a 
„commodities city‟ and the place with the highest concentration of the world‟s small 
commodities on the planet. Our trinket is displayed alongside others in a two metre square stall, 
situated on an aisle of identical stalls on the second floor of an immense wholesale market. 
Sometimes its virtual counterpart is simultaneously being displayed on alibaba.com - a business-
to-business website which directly connects wholesale buyers to Chinese manufacturers and 
which is the highly successful brain-child of celebrity businessman Jack Ma. 
These techniques of display lead to the purchase of the £1 trinket and the long journey from 
Yiwu to the port of Felixstowe, UK, begins. It will involve the implementation of highly 
sophisticated software to plan packing, loading, unloading and storing, as well as the risks (still) 
associated with container shipping. Eventually, the trinket will arrive in a pound store and 
quickly be purchased by a consumer. Its life once consumed may be long, but most probably will 
not be. It will find itself temporarily enjoyed before being jettisoned. It may even find itself on a 
ship full of waste heading back to China to begin its process all over again. 
Along its journey the £1 commodity has typically left the factory in China at the price of 22p, 
travelled 'free-on-board' a shipping container (with shipping, customs duty, insurance, and 
unloading paid for by the buyer), so has a gained a 'cost landed' price in the UK of around 31.5p.  
The wholesaler who bought it from the factory has sold it to a retailer for 45p, making a profit of 
around 15p per unit. After Value Added Tax has been subtracted, the retailer has sold it for 
around 82.5p in net terms. The retailer's share is therefore the largest, the manufacturers share 
generally the smallest, but all fall between 10p and 40p profit margins per unit sold.   
„..plastic… is in essence the stuff of alchemy. ..the magical operation par excellence: the 
transmutation of matter. An ideally-shaped machine, tubulated and oblong… effortlessly 
draws…. At one end, raw telluric matter, at the other, the finished, human object; and 
between these two extremes, nothing…‟ (1973[1957]:97) 
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The journey is mapped, its key sites identified, yet the stories attached to that trajectory are 
multiple and contain a plurality of perspectives. There are the micro stories, laid before us in a 
kind of Perecquian
1
 inventory; simultaneous events in distanced places, as the enactment of 
chaos theory par excellence:  
A peddler pushes his rickety cart, piled high with cardboard boxes, through a partially 
demolished quarter of Shanghai.  
A port employee checks the coloured rectangles on the computer screen in front of him before 
moving a giant crane into action to unload another container from a ship. 
A store owner arranges a bulk-load of plastic vases on a shelf, under a sign that says „£1 your 
choice‟. 
A woman smiles as she decides upon a home for „Gerald‟, the garden gnome, by the heather on 
her rockery. 
A wholesale buyer taps figures into his calculator whilst agitatedly fingering the sample mobile 
phone cover he has been handed. 
Viewed in this way, the commodity‟s journey becomes heroic, romantic, imbued with a sense of 
its own pioneering spirit. As Georges Perec himself said of such inventories, they are somehow 
idealized, and therefore reassuring and even comforting. This remains true, almost regardless of 
the nature of their content; it is the form that makes them romantic, not the substance; there is 
something small-world and cosy about being told of other humdrum lives running counter to 
one‟s own (2003) [1978]. 
In truth of course the commodity chain in question is harsh and unforgiving, fraught with risks 
and claustrophobically relentless in its pursuit of survival. To fully appreciate this, a macro view 
is needed alongside the micro: China as the great manufacturing dragon, the heroic factory of the 
world, a nation behind the impetus for the fastest ever industrial revolution, a nation insisting on 
doing capitalism differently, struggling with individualism whilst wholly embracing Deng‟s call 
                                                          
1
 Georges Perec was a notable influence upon Henri Lefebvre. In particular his 1978 work Life: A Users’ Manual 
which was to most effectively use the inventory as literary technique in describing the daily lives of various 
characters within a Parisian block of flats. Meanwhile Things: A Story of the Sixties, shows a nuanced understanding 
of the (false) promises of commodities along similar lines to Lefebvre. 
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that „to get rich is glorious‟2; the West as a conceptual entity, heavy-handedly playing the voice 
of reason role, pressurising China to „clean up‟, „behave ethically‟ and adopt capitalism as we 
know it, whilst proving itself desperately reliant upon „China Price‟ commodities; the mass flows 
of people, commodities, waste, pollution, money, and ideas. These differing macro and micro 
stories, weave in and out, around and over each other, sometimes travelling side by side, 
sometimes avoiding each other, sometimes colliding. As John Law suggests, such conflicting 
narratives and ambiguities may require the making of a fair amount of „mess‟ with method 
(2004). 
 
ii) Influences 
During the course of this research, as I tread my own path through material culture, I have been 
informed by certain key areas of thought. The most fundamental of these is the body of theory on 
the everyday, especially the thinking of Henri Lefebvre, which is tackled in detail in chapter one. 
The latter‟s personal and philosophical journey through life, and indeed through various political 
movements (Dada-ism, Surrealism, Communism, Situationism, etc.), provided prisms through 
which to view the work of various others who have engaged with material things. For me this 
engagement with the theory of the everyday began with Louis Aragon‟s gas-lit forays (1994 
[1926]), Benjamin‟s loyalty to the fragmented, disregarded mundane, and Baudelaire‟s 
dalliances as poet of the everyday. It continued, thanks largely to Lefebvre, to unceremoniously 
topple the Surrealists along with Baudelaire as their inspiration, and to embed itself firmly within 
the everyday as and for itself.  
Others are worth mentioning briefly here too. Siegfried Kracauer‟s (1995) assertion that 
boredom ought to be seen as a critical refusal of banality, rather than its outcome, was useful; 
specially when applied to consumers‟ enjoyment of kitsch in the realm of £1 commodities. For 
Kracauer, those who do not experience boredom are „pushed deeper and deeper into the hustle 
and bustle until eventually they no longer now where their head is, and the extraordinary, radical 
                                                          
2
 This refers to a line in Deng Ziao Ping‟s 1978 speech in which he said socialism should not be equated with 
poverty, and that „to get rich is glorious‟, calling it „socialism with Chinese characteristics‟. The phrase „to get rich 
is glorious‟ has become synonymous with Deng‟s general ethos and specific opening-up policies. 
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boredom that might be able to reunite them with their heads remains eternally distant for them‟ 
(1995: 331). That said, the extent to which boredom can truly be seen as critical refusal, rather 
than post-modern apathy, remains highly debatable, and here Debord and Lefebvre‟s 
„colonisation of everyday life‟3 was key. Kracauer‟s emphasis on the „tiny catastrophes‟ that 
make up daily life was arguably the starting point for an interaction with the concept of „flow‟ 
which reformulated it as made up of constant small ruptures, and necessarily (for the survival of 
capitalism) bound up with risk.  
Erving Goffman‟s (1959) classic study of life on the Shetland Islands and his understanding of 
self as a collection of performances given in ‟back‟ and „front‟ spaces of the everyday enabled a 
much-needed escape from the cul-de-sac of the authentic/inauthentic dichotomy. In fact Goffman 
can be likened to Lefebvre as the latter was also concerned with dramaturgy
4
 as method and the 
idea of life as an acting-out, a play. This sits alongside Lefebvre‟s ideas on the ludic as a way of 
living and his thoughts on festival as life earlier in his career; these were to be somewhat 
reformed and down-played later. It also compliments de Certeau‟s notion of tactics as the 
creation of different disguises to enable evasion. Goffman‟s emphasis on micro interactions was 
perhaps the inspiration for my „shadowing‟ of wholesale buyers in Yiwu and my analysis of 
conversation snippets in Deptford‟s pound stores. De Certeau himself, was inevitably a huge 
influence, not only in relation to his thinking on tactics in everyday life, but also his emphasis on 
the trajectories of the everyday and his understanding of spaces as mapped by everyday routines 
and coloured by memories and emotions, most specifically in „Walking in the City‟ (1984).  
My own choice of „thing‟ was no doubt influenced not only by a personal commitment to 
studying complicated social relations through the ephemeral and mundane, and a determination 
not to simply translate anthropology‟s fetishism of people to a fetishism of „classic‟ (read exotic) 
                                                          
3
 I attribute this notion to both Debord and Lefebvre here as Lefebvre‟s claim to it was later to be a point of 
contention between the two. It was originally coined by Debord during a talk he gave in 1961 to the Research Group 
on Everyday Life which Lefebvre had set up. Lefebvre quoted and expanded upon it in volume two of Critique of 
Everyday Life. Habermas later adopted the term as the title of a chapter on that theme in his Theory of 
Communicative Action, although for him the culprit of oppression was language and communication rather than the 
(Marxist) focus on economics and alienated labour. 
 
4
 The plays of Alfred de Musset were a great influence on Lefebvre, who wrote a book on the author.  Of specific 
interest to Lefebvre was the way de Musset wrote characters who struggled with which versions of themselves to be 
in which contexts. De Musset tended also to play himself out in his writing, tackling questions of personal 
„authenticity‟, often by writing characters struggling with their sexuality – he himself was gay. This was perhaps 
most famously the case in the play Lorrenzacio, based in De Medici Florence. 
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things, but also by John Hutnyk‟s growing body of work on trinketization (see Hutnyk 1996, 
1998, 2005). Hutnyk‟s thinking began with a frustration at the poverty of theorizing on 
commodities (as he says, „grinning at the shiny trinkets ain‟t enough‟), as much as with the 
desire to find a term that could describe the desiccation of all life to the commodity form. For 
him, the concept can be applied far more widely than the material thing; encompassing virtual 
things, ideas, whole countries and people - i.e. Madonna‟s use of „Indian‟ dress (see Postcolonial 
Studies, Sharma and Hutnyk, Vol 1 No 3, 1998:355) and Crispin Mills‟ use of South Asian 
„sounds‟ (see Travel Worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Politics, eds Kaur and Hutnyk, 
1999). 
Hutnyk‟s first use of the term appears in reference to James Clifford‟s use of anthropological 
detail (see Hutnyk in Critique of Anthropology, 1998, 18 (4) p.364). However, the concept had 
been even earlier worked out in his Rumour of Calcutta (1996). Perhaps most influential for my 
own study of the trinket form was the idea of „going native‟ by taking pieces of a culture in the 
most mundane form possible, i.e. tourist paraphernalia (see Diaspora and Hybridity, eds Kalra 
and Hutnyk, 2005). This latter was the trinketizing of cultures through low-value objects in such 
a way that it allowed global wanderers to feel themselves immersed and somehow different from 
their „normal‟ selves simply by having in their possession a material thing from the „other‟. This 
is also, perhaps strangely, what many £1 trinkets attempt to satiate the consumer with.  
More importantly, the belief in this (apparent) satiation is precisely Lefebvre‟s concern 
throughout The Critique of Everyday Life (CEL) - that escape from the everyday cannot lead to 
its recapture as an arena for the social. Trinketization, perhaps, works in the opposite way to 
surrealism, but with the same result. Rather than making mundane items strange as surrealism 
did, trinketization makes „strange‟ items unthreatening, pocket-able and cute enough for 
consumers of the global (at home and abroad) to feel life is briefly more exciting. Both aim to 
up-end the everyday by using novelty against it. Both fail to realise the flaw in attempting to 
enliven the everyday by singling out apparently external novelties. As Lefebvre argues 
throughout his oeuvre, the attempt to change everyday life cannot look to solutions outside of 
itself; the battle must be fought through the everyday itself. 
The second area was the anthropological thought stemming from Arjun Appadurai and Igor 
Kopytoff‟s (1986) classic work on the life-cycles of things. More specifically, it was the 
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alternative to value-based Global Commodity Chain analysis (GCC) arising in the work of a 
small groups of scholars inspired more by classic commodity studies such as Sidney Mintz‟s 
Sweetness and Power (1986) than by Immanuel Wallerstein‟s World Systems Theory (1974, 
1993), and who were beginning to call themselves „thing followers.‟  
My entry into thing-following was, effectively, born out of a nagging discontent with existing 
GCC analysis. My concerns about the latter fell into two camps, one structural the other more to 
do with my own motivation for being interested. In the structural camp sat the issue of polarising 
production and consumption. It was not that I did not agree that certain places along the chain 
were chiefly consuming or producing, it was just that the operations of the chain as a whole 
meant that what we understood as „consumption‟ and „production‟ was changing in nature and 
required a far more nuanced understanding. Consumption was creating the raw materials for 
production, by way of disposing of what was consumed soon after purchase. Production was 
cheapening and quickening itself in order to make smaller the gap between consumption and 
disposal/re-consumption and so allow for increased growth, in order to feed itself. Furthermore, 
this production/consumption binary tended to sit alongside others, such as „core‟ and „periphery‟. 
Core/peripheral to what, who, when? 
GCC‟s reliance upon the paradigms set up by World Systems Theory bothered me. The 
assumptions regarding „core‟ and „periphery‟ seemed increasingly problematic as part of a 
skewed Western discourse, which the emergence of new non-Western hub cities - Sao Paolo, 
Mumbai, Shanghai - belies. I felt that the simplistic equating of profit with power missed many 
of the crucial nuances and tactics of the £1 commodity chain; GCC had often been utilised as a 
way of berating the West for scooping off excess profit along the commodity chain, creating 
huge disparities between „periphery‟ and „core‟ / „producing nation‟ and „consuming nation‟, but 
it had begun to simplistically cast „producers‟ as the geographically peripheral binary opposite of 
consumers.  
In the motivational camp sat the issue of charting value across the chain. Certainly, value was 
added, as would be expected, as the commodity went from its place of manufacture to its place 
of consumption. But why re-make this (already established) point when the entire chain was 
operating under a logic which attempted to keep the price down? And what was the point in 
charting economic value per unit without taking into account the wider picture? When China has 
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such a monopoly on maintaining cheapness that the biggest economies in the world buy its 
products, giving it billions of foreign reserves whilst they fall further into debt, there is 
something else happening to profit above and beyond a simple flow from „periphery‟ to „core‟. 
Besides, classic GCC analysis had little to say about the on-the-ground effects of these profits 
and how they may have drastically different influences in different places irrespective of their 
financial value. 
What I was more concerned with was a kind of anthropology of the £1 commodity; a tracing of 
the commodity chain in order to stop at its key sites and dig into what was going on there and 
find out how (and if) these sites related to, impacted upon, or were even aware of each other. I 
started to engage with material geographies, such as sugar (Mintz, 2007), garments (Prentice, 
2008), flip-flops (Knowles, 2009), T-shirts (Rivoli, 2006) and fruit (Cook and Harrison, 2007), 
writers who had taken Appadurai‟s call to „follow the thing‟ head on.  
 
 
 
Teamed with George Marcus‟s (1995) call to engage in multi-sited fieldwork, involving oneself 
in ethnographies in which commodities and their biographies are the organizing principles, this 
made for a vibrant new governing principle of „doing Anthropology‟. It also had the added 
benefit of tackling Anthropology‟s age-old guilt in regard to its colonialist past, as allowing the 
commodity‟s trajectory to  determine „sites‟ broke with more „traditional‟ modes of 
anthropological enquiry in which „communities‟ were studied as bounded entities. Finally, the 
method was given a political imperative by taking on David Harvey‟s (1990) concern with 
allowing the thing to reveal everyday exploitations and reliance upon unseen others across the 
globe. This was part of a broad attempt to „de-fetishize‟ the product by exposing its making, and 
had refreshingly little to do with the thorny and increasingly irrelevant issue of added (financial) 
value.  
The last of the material geographers mentioned above, Ian Cook, had for a few years been 
gathering around him a group of people – scholars, students, colleagues, artists, – whose research 
„Even if our own approach to things is conditioned necessarily by the view that things 
have no meanings apart from those that human transactions, attributions, and motivations 
endow them with, the anthropological problem is that this formal truth does not illuminate 
the concrete, historical circulation of things. For that we have to follow the things 
themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories.‟ 
(Appadurai, 1986: 5) 
 
15 
 
involved following an object. He called this collective (of which I am part) „Ian Cook et al‟ and 
used it as a vehicle to experiment with collective writing methods. Throughout 2008-2009 Ian 
Cook et al authored three key pieces on thing-following in Progress in Human Geography and 
cemented their micro-discipline with a panel entitled „Following the Thing‟ at the Royal 
Geographical Society conference in Manchester, 2009.  
Yet despite the obvious common nature of our projects, the things I was following seemed to be 
part of commodity chains that did not display the same classic followability as my fellow thing-
followers. The more I followed, the more I found that the chains, just like the objects they 
produced, were highly disposable. Not to confuse matters, what I mean to say is that the key 
places of the chains were firmly ensconced (the manufacturing cities, the areas for collection of 
raw materials, the neighbourhoods containing unusually high numbers of pound stores), as were 
the infrastructural elements (freight trains, container shipping ports, etc.), but many of the 
players along the chain were highly spontaneous, moving in and out of different chains (waste 
peddlers who returned to rural provinces, factory owners who switched production, pound store 
owners who became „bargain‟ stores as they could not compete with the large £1 chain that had 
just arrived on their street). In other words rupture was playing a key part in „flow‟; the „career‟ 
of the commodity was an unreliable and fretful journey in which breakages occurred, re-
positionings were forced, and collateral damage was integral. The £1 chain‟s „flow‟ was made up 
of numerous micro psycho-social, geographical, economic ruptures for the person. Globalization 
as highlighted by the £1 commodity chain was far from the slowly-spreading homogenous ink-
stain that „flat world-ers‟5 would have us believe, but rather a phenomenon strengthened by 
constant rupture.  
However, this understanding of flow as constant rupture must not be read as a suggestion that the 
commodity chains in question were somehow therefore necessarily challenging to the systems 
they existed in. As Zygmunt Bauman argues in Liquid Modernity (2007a), flows do not 
challenge capitalism, but rather are the breaking down of a previous order to form one in which 
capitalism simply operates differently. For Bauman, for example, whilst liquid flows may have 
                                                          
5
 I use the term „flat world-ers‟ here in a derogatory sense in reference to Thomas Friedman‟s book The World is 
Flat. This is not to dispute Marx‟s idea that the bourgeoisie would spread across the face of the earth, but rather to 
critique Friedman‟s false reading of Marx, which tends to result in a re-interpretation that supports a neo-liberal 
celebration of globalization as an un-problematic democratic process. 
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melted Weber‟s „iron cage‟, they came as a result of deregulation, liberalization, and a „releasing 
of the brakes‟ so should not be seen as synonymous with radical opposition to older capitalistic 
state „solids‟(2007: 5). 
This said it did seem that due to the constant rupture, the more specific my thing-following 
attempted to be, the less the specific elements seemed to matter. So what if I could find the actual 
factory that made the £1 plastic Buddhas? (Incidentally, I did). By next month they will be 
making something else and a neighbouring factory will have bought their equipment, so now 
they will be making the plastic Buddhas. It became clear that not only did it not matter which 
factory made the product at any one time, as it did not change the story, but that indeed a more 
telling story was the one which explained why it did not matter. In other words, what was it about 
the £1 commodity chain that made it so changeable, so spontaneous, (or perhaps volatile?), so 
fundamentally un-followable? What were the characteristic features of the chain? This story had 
much more to say.  
I began to „do‟ my thing-following as an exercise in tracing the „typical‟ £1 commodity chain -  
the global path which sees the greatest flow of these items - as a way of examining its features as 
paradigmatic of certain forms of capitalism. Thing-following, for me, had suddenly got bigger, 
and yet had attached itself more determinedly to the micro-mechanisms of everyday life. I toyed 
with words to describe the chain‟s features and how they operated and considered how these 
related to everyday life in the places along the chain - shop signs that read „£1 your choice‟, 
consumers who enjoyed „not having to worry about it [the commodity] lasting‟, wholesale 
buyers frustrated by manufacturers „sharing the wealth‟, global internet entrepreneurs boasting 
they could raise profits simply by „adding another server‟.6 I began to find real links - cultures 
within cultures that were creative of, and created by, this chain and its paradigmatic features. I 
also began to realise that what all these features had in common was that they operated tactically.  
 
 
                                                          
6
 This refers to Jack Ma‟s comments during an interview published in the Guardian newspaper in 2006 in which he 
extols the virtues of the Internet, saying „alibaba is more powerful than Yiwu. We don't have to buy land to build; 
nobody has to travel. If we want to add 1,000 new companies, we simply add another server‟. Ma is the founder of 
alibaba.com - the largest business-to-business website in the world for small commodities. 
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iii) Tactics 
The characteristics of the chain are tactics because they operate in ways which wilfully play 
upon the existing operations of capitalism, sometimes smoothing their progress, sometimes 
creating stumbling blocks. Tactics thus became an essential concept in attempting to understand 
people and places along the £1 chain and the daily activities of those for whom there remain 
small choices to be made and windows of opportunity.  
These were usefully understood by the ways in which they use what Michel de Certeau called „la 
perruque‟ (the wig), as a way of pursuing their own interests whilst appearing to comply with 
another agenda (1984:29), or, similarly, by the ways in which speakers within the chain make 
use of language in ways fitting to their personal needs, as de Certeau outlines in The Capture of 
Speech (1998). Both recognize the conscious will to innovate, an ability to put imagination into 
action, and a desire to avoid pitfalls and exploit availabilities. On a macro level, as Brenner 
(2003) argues, the long-term squeeze on profits has meant that new practices are being forced by 
a certain kind of desperation. Especially in the wake of the global financial crisis this desperation 
has meant that such practices become increasingly tactical. Furthermore, in taking tactics as a 
prism, it is possible to carve out a kind of anthropological commodity chain analysis whose 
concern is the specific characteristics of the chain, the frictions they cause, and the potential for 
change these frictions create; this stands in contrast to the more traditional aim of charting value, 
in the form of profit seen as directly representative of and equal to power.  
The tactics of the £1 commodity chain feed into one another in a cyclical manner. Thus the 
structure of all that follows is designed to explore life in the specific sites along the £1 
commodity chain, whilst drawing from those sites a characteristic of the chain without which it 
could not operate. This structure is unusual in that effectively it could be written in any order due 
to the way in which the tactics interrelate; hence an intentional use of allowing „fragments‟ of 
ethnography to be juxtaposed with the theoretical arguments throughout as a way of moving 
from micro to macro and back.  
As a literary technique, this draws upon a reading of Michel Serres‟ The Parasite (1982), in 
which he describes the „quasi-object‟ which allows us to swoop from micro to macro yet without 
necessarily making the former representative of the latter, thus enabling a description and 
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understanding of the commodity chain as contemporaneously micro and macro. The specific can 
be viewed alongside an awareness of the entirety, through the object, or as Serres explains, the 
quasi object can unlock the truths of the collective nature of the chain, whilst giving us specific 
information about the places it settles (1982). To clarify how this operates, Serres uses a 
description of the game of „passing the furet‟ (similar to pass-the-parcel):- 
 
 
Interestingly, the word „furet‟ translates as both a noun- ferret, and as a verb- fureter, to seek out 
or investigate. This is therefore to see the object not only as exposing cultural relations, but as 
ferreting them out, and in the process weaving together both collectivities and individualities. 
The furet therefore can be imagined as a conceptual tool which allows us to seek out information 
in the places it lands, much like when the music stops all attention is focused on the un-wrapper 
in a game of pass-the-parcel. The furet acts as the parcel, landing with individuals, and acting as 
a kind of view-finder; but also being passed through the air and enabling a birds-eye perspective. 
It can be used to see things from above, a birds-eye view, or from very close up. It is simply 
passed around the journey, and around the places and people, becoming a tool to enable what 
Holmes and Marcus call „para-ethnography‟- the using of the anecdotal from strategically 
positioned informants. (2005) 
I have appropriated this concept as a literary tool, one which allows the text to switch from micro 
to macro descriptions, as the „furet passes‟ through the stories on that particular version of the £1 
commodity‟s journey- this emerges in the text as scattered vignettes. This is to juxtapose the 
survival mechanisms of individuals and groups of individuals, with those of the global 
commodity chain and the supra-national systems through which it operates. It is to understand 
that the tactics of people and places are constantly interacting with societal systems - usually 
with a certain degree of friction and fall-out.  
In fact, these discrepancies between the tactics of individuals and the movements of larger 
„systems‟ leads one to consider the distinction between strategy and tactics – a question whose 
origins will be further explored in the following chapter. The distinction allows us to 
differentiate between a longer-term view and that of day-to-day survival, as well as between the 
„He who is not discovered with the furet in his hand is anonymous, part of a monotonous chain 
where he remains indistinguished. He is not an individual; he is not recognized, discovered, cut; 
he is of the chain and in the chain…The moving furet weaves the „we‟, „the collective‟; if it stops, 
it marks the „I‟ (1982: 225). 
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activities of groups working together with a plan for future gains and individuals. However, these 
neat delineations become more problematic when applied to the £1 commodity chain. At first 
glance, it seems obvious to suggest that the operations of individual waste peddlers, 
manufacturers, or consumers along the chain should be defined as tactics, whilst the ways in 
which these are drawn out as characteristics of the chain should be seen as strategy. However, 
this makes a number of false assumptions.  
Firstly, the defining criteria of a tactic ought be the extent to which those using it have power in 
the context of their actions, as well as the extent to which they are acting „together‟ and 
„consciously‟. It cannot be argued that one person‟s struggle for survival disenables them from 
working towards a joint outcome with others; the two are not mutually exclusive. The inherent 
suggestion that tacticians are lacking knowledge of the bigger picture quickly becomes 
patronizing; the issue is rather that they understand the bigger picture but are powerless to 
engage in anything other than tactics. 
Secondly, defining the characteristics I have drawn out of the chain as strategy, suggests that the 
entire chain acts as one organism, always in agreement with what its next move ought to be. This 
would be to paint over the highly specialized and localized parts of the chain, and more 
importantly to fail to acknowledge the way in which it is precisely the ruptures between different 
tactics which give the chain its character and increase its strength. Whilst, it is certainly the case 
that the characteristics identified enable us to understand the nature of the chain in general, it is 
not the case that these characteristics are equally as powerful as each other at all times, or in all 
parts of the chain; rather they are constantly changing and coming to the fore or falling back.  
Finally, the characteristics I have identified are sometimes those of less powerful localized 
cultures (e.g. the agglomeration of Yiwu), and sometimes those of established, embedded 
cultures (e.g. the expectation of immediacy from consumers). In other words, they are sometimes 
operations of the weak(er) within the chain, and sometimes those of the strong(er). Therefore, the 
question of power must be considered differently in the light of each characteristic. This is to 
acknowledge the way in which capitalism continuously re-appropriates operations to its own 
ends.  
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For all the above reasons, one cannot posit these characteristics as strategies; instead they must 
be understood as tactics (the tactics of the trinket) which are constantly battling to carve a path 
through capitalism, sometimes being appropriated by it, sometimes finding alternative ways 
through it.  
 
iv) A Brief Note on the Fieldwork and Methodology 
This research has involved fieldwork in four key sites – the waste peddlers‟ quarter in Shanghai, 
the „small commodities city‟ of Yiwu, the main shopping street in Deptford, London, and the 
docks in Felixstowe, Suffolk. Each of these came with its own advantages and challenges, and 
the fieldwork carried out in each followed slightly different methodological lines. The work in 
Shanghai and Yiwu was carried out over the course of three months from September to 
December 2008. The Felixstowe research was the result of three short trips from 2007 to 2009, 
each lasting three to four days. The work with consumers and store owners in Deptford was 
continuous from 2006 to 2009 and involved on average two days a month spent in the site and 
numerous online exchanges. 
Researching the waste peddlers in Shanghai was the most problematic in the traditional sense – it 
was tiring, dirty, confusing and potentially risky. Local authorities do not deem peddlers quarters 
the kind of places that „tourists‟ ought to be seeing, and whilst I was never told to leave by 
anyone in authority I did receive many questioning looks from local people throughout my time 
there. Furthermore, many would not talk to me for fear of being seen encouraging my presence 
and getting into trouble themselves. Yet others were convinced I was a Western journalist and it 
was only after my continued presence over three weeks or so, and my consequent reappearances, 
that they began to believe I was not writing a derogatory article. It undoubtedly helped that 
during the second week I returned with a local Chinese student who could explain to people that 
I was not a journalist and that I was here because I was interested in the way they were carving a 
living out of waste. Although sometimes incredulous that a „tourist‟ would find this interesting, 
people tended to accept it - perhaps due to the historical connotations of „hard work‟ and 
„respect‟ that peddling has in China. 
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Whilst I could never hope to become accepted in such circumstances, it did become the case that 
certain familiar faces began to regard me with what I would describe as friendly bemusement 
and would wave to me or say hello and engage with me when they saw I had my student 
translator with me. However, I quickly learned that any sign of a recording device or camera 
would cause them to completely close up, so I had to rely on taking notes immediately after 
interactions and recording more general observations at the end of the day.  My reporting of 
interactions with the peddlers is based on the translation of my student helper and my own 
memory. 
Many of those I spoke to in the peddlers‟ quarter were far more interested in asking me about 
David Beckham, Big Ben, red buses and „Lady Di‟ than they were in answering my questions 
about their own lives. Perhaps this was not surprising as my fieldwork came directly after the 
Olympic handing-over ceremony from Beijing to London. On the other hand, this „handover‟ 
also inspired much warmth towards me as „English‟ (as opposed to American or any other 
„Westerner‟) - people were feeling a connection to England due to the Olympics and the way in 
which they perceived England had praised their hosting of it and was aspiring to be as good as 
them. My Mandarin being only basic was of course limiting, but my attempts to engage with 
them were all the more appreciated because of it, which often meant people opened up to me 
more readily because they put a high value on my linguistic efforts.  
In Yiwu things were easier in practical terms - it was smaller, cleaner, safer - although in other 
ways it seemed harder to get through „layers‟ of what people were saying and try to understand 
situations. As an „international market‟ Yiwu was far more used to seeing Westerners and my 
presence did not attract the attention it had in the peddlers‟ quarters. Furthermore, Yiwu is a 
place authorities want Westerners to visit as they are proud of its success.   
I was able to shadow various international wholesale buyers (Westerners), so the stall-holders 
they spoke to assumed I was a buyer as well and I did not have to qualify my presence. On the 
other hand, I had to be careful not to visit the same market areas too many times with different 
buyers. The interactions were often brief, as once a stall-holder and buyer think there is no deal 
to be made, they very quickly close up and move on. It would have been unethical for me to 
pretend to want to do a deal in order to talk to the holders for longer, and fortunately this was out 
of my hands anyway as I was simply watching the „real‟ interactions of buyers who were 
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potentially interested in doing deals. This said, sometimes the briefest of interactions were as 
telling as the longer ones. As in Shanghai, no sign of a recording device was tolerated, and even 
cameras were viewed with suspicion by some sellers anxious about industrial espionage from 
outside Yiwu. However, at least here I could walk around the markets with a notebook and pen 
(as many of the wholesale buyers did) so my reporting of interactions with the stall-holders is 
based on the written notes I took at the time and at the end of each day.  I had also chatted in 
online wholesale forums before leaving the UK for China in order to glean information on the 
attitudes of wholesale buyers. 
On the whole in Yiwu, whilst it was easier to witness daily lives and walk around casually, it was 
in many ways harder to penetrate that community as their only interest in talking to me was 
connected to financial gain - having become used to international visitors, they did not ask where 
I was from nor have a fascination with all things London/English. I also felt that I was 
awkwardly placed between two worlds. When shadowing, I was a „business‟ person who could 
penetrate „business‟ relations far more easily than everyday relations of the stall-holders. Yet, to 
the buyers I was an „academic‟- something many of them had little respect for - and they could 
not understand why I would find what they did interesting. Ironically, like the peddlers, many of 
them initially suspected that I was a journalist and would write a derogatory piece about their 
lack of ethics. I did not fit anywhere.  
The story was, of course, much different in the UK field sites.  Felixstowe workers were keen to 
tell me about how the docks had changed and pound shoppers were often delighted that someone 
thought they were an interesting subject for study. In both London and Felixstowe I also had the 
added advantage of being able to speak with the local accent (as I am originally from Norfolk -  
the neighbouring county to Suffolk, but have lived in London for over ten years). This reassured 
people and made them feel I was not just an academic „looking down my nose‟ at them.  
The Felixstowe work consisted of around twenty informal interviews, most of them conducted 
spontaneously in whatever environment the respondents happened to be. Some were done with 
groups, some with individuals. All were unstructured. When people seemed confident in front of 
a recording device and were happy for me to record them I did so; on other occasions my 
intuition told me not even to attempt to raise the subject, so I made key notes immediately 
afterwards. The same was true in Deptford, although here I also employed a methodology that I 
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termed „binaural walks‟. This involves using binaural microphones, which look exactly the same 
as small headphones and pick up sound according to the direction in which one turns. This 
results in a recording which displays the movements of the wearer as much as it does the 
surrounding activity. These soundscapes, as I wandered around pound stores over-hearing 
peoples‟ comments to each other, were effectively a kind of aural One Way Street. (Benjamin, 
1997) Finally, I conducted online chats with consumers I had sourced from chat rooms and 
consumer review websites. 
In many ways my shadowing of wholesale buyers, observation of peddlers, and „binaural walks‟ 
have a common root in the tradition of the flaneur. This said, it is unfortunate that the 
connotations of the flaneur are to some extent those of dandyism, pleasure-seeking and a post-
modernism nonchalance towards on-the-ground actions. Such connotations lead to derogatory 
contemporary descriptions of the method as that of the „intellectual tourist‟, especially in 
circumstances where one does not speak the language fluently. This is problematic as it posits 
the „intellectual tourist‟ as the direct contrast to the „participant observer‟, yet views both with a 
cynical disdain – the former for wandering on the outskirts of understanding; the latter for 
assuming that being within guarantees the understanding of a „native‟. Furthermore there are 
implicit assumptions here about the nature of tourism as something done by someone „outside‟ a 
culture, to people and places presented in contrast to the outside and as a homogenous whole. A 
more useful view acknowledges that places themselves are made up of people who feel both 
„insiders‟ and „outsiders‟ or a hybrid of the two. (Ien Ang‟s 2001 work On not Speaking Chinese, 
is instrumental in exploring this quandary). This was particularly true in Yiwu, a place built to 
accommodate visitors from the global and workers from other provinces; in fact it could be 
argued that as someone who understood the extent to which the products made there were part of 
everyday life in the West, I was wandering through familiar territory, whilst the workers were 
eyeing international visitors rather as a tourist would eye „natives‟. 
 
v) Synopsis 
Chapter one provides an overview of Lefebvre‟s oeuvre, outlining his thinking on tactics and his 
relevance to a study of material culture. Major themes, such as alienation, mystification and 
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entanglement are tackled and placed within the context of current established material culture 
theories.  
Chapter two centres on the tactic of immediacy and the ways in which the desire for 
„spontaneity‟ leads to the dissemination of the concept of the bargain and operates to induce 
certain behaviours. The „bargain‟ commodity is considered as part of practices which serve to 
(re)create the schizophrenia of the Western consumer, and in the light of theories of the object 
and its fetishization.  
Chapter three analyzes the tactic of disposability and explores the livelihoods of waste peddlers 
in Shanghai. It attempts to pick apart the twin paradigms of waste and profit, placing them within 
the context of the notion of thrift as both a cultural influence on the personal level and a macro-
economic movement. It explores the tactics and spaces of Shanghai‟s waste and the ways in 
which these are being utilised by various forces in the furious race for economic growth. 
Chapter four focuses on the tactic of agglomeration, examining practices of solidarity in the 
„commodity city‟ of Yiwu. Wealth-sharing is then compared to risk-sharing, „flow‟ is re-posited 
as numerous micro-catastrophes, and the £1 commodity chain is seen as characterised by 
constant rupture which works to strengthen its fabric by increasing the efficiency of its coping 
mechanisms. The nature of Yiwu as a transportable spatial and social model is also discussed. 
In chapter five Felixstowe harbour provides a case study for the analysis of „fullness‟ and the 
tactic of abundance is discussed. Rhetorics of „speed‟ are contrasted with Lefebvre‟s notion of 
rhythms and the theory of moments is explored in relation to time/space along the £1 commodity 
chain. Finally, abundance is considered in the light of quantitative versus qualitative growth and 
the impacts on development. 
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Chapter One 
A Manifesto of the Mundane: Things in a Levebvrian framework 
 
Just under a century ago, a young Henri Lefebvre had taken summer walks in the French 
countryside, encountering ancient Gallic hilltop crosses featuring a circle centred on the cross, 
Celtic-style. To him this was not a scene of the crucifixion of Christ, but one of „le soleil 
crucifié‟ – the crucifixion of the sun. His mother‟s fervent Catholicism and father‟s bourgeois 
aspirations had eventually caused him to revolt
7
 and this symbol of a circle cut through with a 
cross was to be the defining image of that rebellion. For the young Lefebvre the circle was sun; 
sun was life - passion, adventure and liberty; life was himself; and therefore le soleil crucifié was 
a crucifixion of himself and all that he desired. Those hilltop crosses can be seen as a constant 
reference point in Lefebvre‟s life-long attempts to understand the alienation of everyday life; an 
alienation increasingly heightened by the presence of things. They are perhaps the material 
objects at once most responsible for, and most representative of, his thinking as a whole. 
What follows is a rationale as to how Lefebvre‟s work relates to a study of the £1 commodity 
chain and why it provides particularly valuable insights. This falls into two sections; the first 
explores his thinking on tactics and strategy, the second explains how his work relates to material 
culture, how each of the themes he struggled with throughout his life has an impact on how we 
think about things. This is, unapologetically, fairly biographical, as it is impossible to explore 
such themes without putting them in the context of the national and international events which 
occurred throughout Lefebvre‟s life. Furthermore, as Lefebvre himself was to denounce the 
written word (see chapter one of Everyday Life in the Modern World, 1968), and quote Plato as 
suggesting anyone who put down thoughts in such an immutable form was a fool, it seems likely 
that he would not have wanted his thinking to be interpreted solely through his books, but also 
within the context of his life and the wider political climate. This is also only a beginning; each 
theme will of course be further explored throughout the chapters that follow.  
 
                                                          
7
 This revolt is of course apparent in all his work which followed, but it is worth specifically noting his studies at the 
time under Maurice Blondel  (1918), a Catholic heretic who, in Lefebvre‟s opinion later, did not go far enough in 
rejecting Catholicism. 
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i) Lefebvre and Tactics  
Lefebvre had first decided to apply himself to a study of tactics and strategies during his military 
service from 1926 to 1927. Determined to make strategies positive, realistic and revolutionary, 
he had covered his notebooks with information on strategy theories and had started to read Carl 
von Clauswitz (On War, 1976; Historical and Political Writings, 1992). However, it was not 
until 1938 that the influence and guidance of a French colleague, Charles Hainchlin, would cause 
him to re-take up Clauswitz and read him with academic rigour. This later reading of Clauswitz 
caused Lefebvre to argue that the concept of strategy had become obscured, taken over by 
mathematicians and subsequently, therefore, by game theoreticians (including Guy Debord), and 
removed from its original military concept. For Debord, the use of strategy in the context of the 
theory of games centred too heavily on the idea of „stakes‟ (enjeu), alongside winning and losing 
(partly through luck), and had therefore become banal (banalisé) (see Hess, 1988: 70 and 
Lefebvre, 1989). Debord‟s retort was to criticize Lefebvre‟s thinking for allowing tactics to fall 
too much to chance. Specifically he cited Lefebvre‟s „theory of moments‟ as „romantic‟ in that it 
made no attempt to contrive the moment or to create the situation, but spoke of moments almost 
as if they would arise „naturally‟. Despite this Debord‟s own version of strategy was one 
arguably built far more on chance than on a positive control of events, as reflected in his use of 
the dérive – the exploration of everyday life in the built environment through allowing oneself to 
wander aimlessly through the flow of acts, gestures and encounters. 
Debord‟s critique of Lefebvre‟s take on tactics and strategy was one which painted the latter as 
merely reformist, hoping to abolish certain elements whilst retaining and bringing to the fore 
others. However, this evaluation of Lefebvre‟s stance may be somewhat simplistic. Lefebvre‟s 
insistence on the non-destruction of everything that exists, was probably part of what he had 
advocated around twenty five years earlier when writing La Conscience Mystifiee (1936), 
namely the destruction of certain things in order to save others as part of a dialectical approach to 
revolution. This approach may also have had great personal resonance for him as he had 
effectively gone through a similar process in order to come to terms with his own upbringing. As 
he explains in La Somme et le Reste (1989), because of his mother‟s fanatical religion, he had to 
reject the qualities and ideas that came to him from one side in order to keep that which came to 
him from the other - his father‟s irony and passion. Arguably, his was simply a more subtle 
strategy than that of Debord and the Situationsts. 
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It is worth briefly mentioning Debord‟s take on tactics here as he and Lefebvre were to enter into 
a series of philosophical projects, which are often seen, in hindsight, as part of the run up to the 
events of Paris 1968. Debord‟s notion of the tactical was based on „detournement‟, which 
translates directly as „diversion‟, but which the Situationists defined also as a negation of what 
had previously existed in order to search for the new. Detournement was therefore diversion/play 
that negated in order to create, and so sat in contrast to Lefebvre‟s desire to dispose of some in 
order to keep other parts. The best example of detournement is the very first line of Debord‟s The 
Society of the Spectacle in which he plays on Marx‟s opening words in Capital, saying: „The 
whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as 
an immense accumulation of spectacles’ (Debord 1995: 12, original emphasis). Debord and the 
Situationists were to employ detournement throughout their texts, films and imagery. 
Debord‟s strategy, defined by detournement, provides a clear link between the much earlier 
tactics of the Surrealists and those of the Situationists - the Situationists‟ notion of the 
'constructed situation' owing much to Dada and Surrealism. Lefebvre provides a connecting line 
between the two, albeit perhaps a reluctant one. In fact it is tempting to argue that Lefebvre‟s 
eventual discrepancies with the Situationists were born out of the same frustrations he had had 
almost forty years earlier with the Surrealists. Debord was still, fundamentally, attempting to turn 
the everyday on its head, to re-shape it through detournement, rather than reclaim the mundane 
as Lefebvre believed was necessary. Perhaps it was always the case that when Debord spoke of 
the „colonisation of the everyday‟ he had in mind pre-conceived binary opposites, that is, 
boredom overcome by excitement. For him, colonisation meant that the everyday had overcome 
more „spontaneous‟ and „unusual‟ moments as part of a strategy of capitalism; there was for him, 
no distinction between everydayness (boredom) and the everyday, as there was for Lefebvre. 
Furthermore, excitement, for Decord, was to be lived on a personal level, the situation was to be 
a moment of life designed and lived as art, shaped according to the experiencing subject's own 
wishes. This therefore constituted a return to the romantic revolution Lefebvre had shunned in 
favour of a public one. In fact it becomes clear from un-picking Debord‟s tactics, as 
detournements lived out through „situations‟, that the apparent similarities between „situations‟ 
and Lefebvre‟s „moments‟ were and are merely surface. 
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Lefebvre‟s own use of the concept of tactics is first properly outlined in volume two of Critique 
of Everyday Life (CEL). Here he points out that the social unity and consciousness of any group 
of people is never more than „intermediary states, mediations or means to an end‟. And crucial, 
for Lefebvre, is that it is tactics and strategy which determine (and are determined by) these ever-
shifting states (2008[1961]: 109) Furthermore, it is the phases with the most intermediary nature 
which Lefebvre believes it is most important to study, because in phases of turmoil and extreme 
tension the existence of a group becomes historical and everyday life is suspended or shattered, 
while in phases of relaxation and stagnation everyday life shows only its most banal and trivial 
side. Intermediary phases however, provide „privileged testimony‟(2008[1961]:109). 
For Lefebvre this intermediary phase provides just such a privileged window to analysis because 
it represents times when a group is neither completely penetrable, nor completely impenetrable. 
Therefore there are some choices open to people, but the choices made during these times must 
involve tactical decisions as they do not have complete ability to choose. Alongside this, and key 
to an understanding of Lefebvre‟s concept of tactics, is the extent to which a person can make 
these tactical choices from a position of seeing or knowing. If a person cannot see into a space 
and the space is impenetrable, „aléa‟ is complete; if a person can see into a space and the space is 
penetrable, „agon‟ is complete. Between these two extremes „stretches a vast mixed region where 
the agon and the aléa, opaqueness and transparency, fear and daring, risk and chance, combine in 
a variety of ways‟ (2008[1961]:131). This is the intermediary. It contains a kind of chiaroscuro; 
and furthermore one can witness how various individuals and groups utilize that chiaroscuro to 
satisfy their own agenda of hiding and display. 
For Lefebvre the fact that we have tactics and strategies and that they do not fail to enter all 
aspects of everyday life, is explained by the fact that we face uncertain futures of one sort or 
another, futures which will be impacted upon by processes, forces and events. And because we 
have uncertain choices, there will always be individuals within any group who show the group, 
through their actions, what is possible. Thus, for Lefebvre strategy gives a sense to groups and 
their lives. That said, Lefebvre was careful not to be utopian about the possibilities afforded by 
strategy and tactics, aware of the difficulty in separating strategy from idealism.
8
 For Lefebvre, 
                                                          
8
 The Dutch artist Constant Nieuwenhuys‟ plans for „La Nouvelle Babylon‟ were perhaps one of the more idealist 
creations of the Situationist movement. They can be seen today in the Musee National de la Haye.  
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the realm of the everyday is that of tactics, as it lies between the level where there are no more 
actions and triviality dominates, and the level of decision, drama and upheaval where strategy 
reigns. The ways in which groups tend to minimize the chances of maximal gains for their 
adversaries, or maximize their own minimal game is, however, strategy (2002[1961]:133-135).  
A clear link can be seen between Lefebvre‟s thoughts on tactics and strategy in The Survival of 
Capitalism (1976) and those expressed in La Production d’Espace (1991), on the ability of 
actors with agency to create social space through conquering physical space. Furthermore, 
according to Lefebvre, the occupation of social space, crucially, allowed for (capitalistic) growth.  
 
 
Occupying space (and thus producing social relations) began to be posited by Lefebvre as the 
ultimate tactic of capitalistic systems, because whilst it enabled growth (and had been born out of 
the desire for growth), it also enabled power in the form of control. In fact, Lefebvre argued that 
with space occupation came a profound qualitative alteration in social relations, as now they 
were not only the basis of exploitation, but essential to its‟ existence (1976: 85).  
Thus power and tactics became symbiotically reliant within Lefebvre‟s thinking. For him there 
was no total system uniting sub-systems; rather, their cohesion was the object of strategy. As he 
says, „…there is no logic of reproduction in social and political practice, nor is there a „logic of 
power‟. There is a strategy, and this strategy applies general (formal) logic to certain objects, to 
an end, a perspective‟ (1976: 28). However, this strategy was not to be understood as a master-
plan - „strategy does not reside in the conceptions held by some genius… nor is it the application 
in detail of some pre-existing doctrinal system‟ – but rather to spring from „an interconnection of 
chances and necessities which are always particular ones: confrontations between diverse and 
unequal forces…‟ (1976: 79). Here, the influence of Clauswitz is most evident; the vision of the 
total, inaccessible to each participant separately, but potentially visible to the whole, defines his 
notion of strategy. For Lefebvre, this inability of each individual to see the whole results in the 
„actions of the participating „agents‟ oscillating between, on the one hand, empiricism and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
„… what has happened is that Capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its 
internal contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since the writing of 
Capital, it has succeeded in achieving „growth‟. We cannot calculate at what price, but we do 
know the means: by occupying space, by producing a space [original emphasis]‟ (1976: 21).   
 
30 
 
opportunism in the immediate, and, on the other, a so-called strategic conception which never 
amounts to an exhaustive knowledge of the ensemble…‟ (1976: 79). 
Lefebvre‟s (via Clauswitz) positing of strategy as a confluence of times and places and peoples  
was of course taken up  by Michel de Certeau, for whom any given player could only have 
tactics at her disposal due to her inability to see the entire picture. Indeed, my application of the 
idea of tactics as personal ability, whilst leaning most heavily on Lefebvre, also takes much from 
the development of his ideas by de Certeau, specifically the latter‟s concern in The Practice of 
Everyday Life (1984) with the inventiveness of the everyday, or ways of using. (The original 
French title ‘L’Invention du Quotidien‟ and its translation into „The Practice of Everyday Life‟ 
in fact gives away the extent to which for De Certeau „practising‟ was inventing).  
Like Clauswitz, and Lefebvre, de Certeau distinguishes between strategy and tactics, as perhaps 
most classically documented in „Walking in the City‟ (1984). Here however, de Certeau differs 
subtly from Lefebvre‟s conviction that strategy is not born from an all-knowing master-plan, 
using the city as seen from a god-like position above the streets as an analogy for strategy, whilst 
the same city from the walker‟s point of view is analogous to tactics. For de Certeau, whilst 
strategies describe the operations of institutions and structures of power, tactics are the domain 
of less empowered, and therefore always involve a process of poaching on the territory of others. 
The tactician, for de Certeau, is something of a figure of hope, for, while she cannot escape the 
dominant cultural economy, she can adapt it to her own ends. This interpretation of the tactician 
as personally potent can be related to Francois Jullien‟s (1995) attribution of practices of efficacy 
in China to the strategic use of „shi‟ - meaning power or potential. By tracing the historical 
appearance of shi from military strategy, to aesthetics, to literature, to politics, Jullien underlines 
the way in which Chinese culture attempts to perceive every situation or deployment of things as 
something to be worked to one‟s advantage. 
 
To clarify, there are two crucial defining characteristics of tactics according to de Certeau, both 
of which are useful in explaining their use in the context of this work. Firstly, unlike strategy, 
tactics do not own space. Strategy „postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve 
as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets and threats … can be 
managed‟, therefore defining itself in contrast to an „other‟ with invisible powers. It is in this 
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sense Cartesian and typical of modern science, politics and military strategy (1984:36). 
Meanwhile a tactic is „a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus; it plays 
on a terrain imposed upon it by a law which is not its own, unable to withdraw out of enemy 
sight'. It takes advantage of opportunities and depends on them, being without any base where it 
could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. What it wins it cannot 
keep.‟ It makes use of „cracks‟ and „poaches‟ in them. (1984:36) 
 
For de Certeau tactics are therefore the tool of the placeless, the actions which remain possible 
for the weak (1984: 34). Admittedly, the word „weak‟ here requires scrutiny. The truly weak - 
those incarcerated unjustly, those trapped in war-torn areas, those trafficked under threat of death 
- clearly do not have tactics available to them. The problem here could be one of translation at 
least in part: the French „faible‟ translates most directly as „weak‟, but also relates to 
„disadvantaged‟ or „disabled‟ - words describing sectors which may well still have the option of 
tactics to some extent.  However de Certeau was attempting to find revolutionary means outside 
of revolutionary times, and as such his insistence on the ability of the un-empowered to find 
tactics, and more importantly the ability of those tactics to forge change ought perhaps to sustain 
criticism in regard to its naivety. Applied practically, it tends to fall short in many of the same 
ways that James Scott‟s Weapons of the Weak (1985) does; hopefully (but foolishly) pitting 
tactics such as foot-dragging, feigned ignorance, false compliance and petty acts of sabotage 
against state-sponsored imprisonment, torture and killing. 
The second defining characteristic of tactics for de Certeau is that unlike strategies they are not 
able to be productive, only to manipulate what is already there. Where „strategies are able to 
produce, tabulate, and impose …Tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert …‟ (1984:30). 
Again, this requires some scrutiny. Whilst it can be accepted that tactics, unless employed in a 
united manner on a mass scale, cannot „overthrow‟ strategies enforced from above, de Certeau‟s 
assertion that tacticians are disempowered by their inability to see the whole (being the „walker‟ 
in the city as opposed to the „viewer‟ from above) needs questioning. Firstly, this view of the 
tactician as unable to see the whole, must not be confused with the suggestion that there is a 
„lack‟ of knowledge at play - the type of thinking which „Circuits of Culture‟ theorists have 
attempted to undo, by arguing that what is seen as a „lack‟ from one angle, is specific expert 
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knowledge from another. Du Gay et al
9
 suggest that „taken together, representation, identity, 
production, consumption and regulation complete a sort of circuit … through which any analysis 
of a cultural text ... must pass if it is to be adequately studied‟ (1997). Secondly, positing the 
„walker‟ as tactician, does not automatically confer strategist status upon the „viewer‟. Indeed, to 
follow Lefebvre‟s thinking, whilst an over-view may be useful to the strategist, strategy itself 
arises from a confluence of places, people and ideas – and so we are returned to the notion of the 
„moment‟. 
 
ii) Lefebvre: the uncelebrated material culturalist 
Although more known for his work on „space‟, or on „the everyday‟ in more general terms, 
Lefebvre‟s oeuvre and the questions it raises are precisely those which contemporary material 
culture theorists are attempting to tackle. What kind of entanglement do we, and ought we, to 
have with things? How do things force us to change the rhythms of our lives? What role can 
things play in the attempt to banish alienation and live life as fully as possible? As Highmore 
writes, Lefebvre‟s everyday „is one orchestrated by the logic of the commodity, where life is 
lived according to the rhythm of capital‟ (2002: 113). Throughout the course of his life‟s work 
Lefebvre returns to these issues time and again, each time from a slightly new angle. As Rob 
Shields says, he is a theorist who conducts ideas like an electric wire from movement to 
movement, generation to generation
10
 (1999: 29). Yet this conduction is not straight forward; 
rather appropriately, considering Lefebvre‟s belief in dialectics, his life should be seen as a criss-
crossing of paths – that of a boat tacking from one side of the river to the other whilst charting its 
course.  
Let us begin with a little-quoted but absolutely formative paragraph from Lefebvre, taken from 
volume one of CEL: 
                                                          
9
 Du Gay et al were the group of theorists who in 1997 devised „Circuits of Culture‟ whilst studying the Sony 
Walkman. The theory suggests any study of a cultural text or artefact must examine its representation, identity, 
production, consumption and regulation. Gerard Goggin (2006) openly uses this framework in „Cell Phone Culture: 
Mobile Technology in Everyday Life‟ by splitting his book into five parts based on the above terms. 
 
10
 His work influenced movements as wide-ranging as the Situationists, the UK Punk activities of the 1980‟s, and 
the Green Party in Germany. 
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They do not know that they are alone, and that the „world‟ is their work. In this one sentence 
Lefebvre effectively posits not only his understanding of the totality of objects as an integral part 
of human reality, but places this within an un-compromising vision of the world as a place of our 
own making. The statement appears bleak – man is alone. It appears frustrated – everything 
happens as though there were external powers. Yet it is also incredibly hopeful. Lefebvre is 
acknowledging oppression, whilst placing it firmly as the creation of man, therefore positing 
social man as responsible for that which surrounds him and fundamentally able to change it. It is 
an expression of social-ism (the social), atheism, and deep philosophical belief in the potential 
for change. In placing this potential for change in the context of „work‟ (and here I believe him 
to be using the word in the French sense of „oeuvre‟, rather than the Anglo sense of „job‟/wage 
labour), Lefebvre glues social transformation to the object. The world is our work; by producing 
we are creating the human – „they think they are moulding an object, a series of objects - and it is 
man himself they are creating‟ (2008 [1947]: 167). For Lefebvre, the human world takes shape 
around us in what we do - in humble objects - and man‟s approach to the object is man‟s 
relationship with reality. It is for this reason that I have used his work throughout as key to 
understanding the impact of the everyday £1 trinket, and that I believe him to be not only the 
philosopher of everyday life as he is currently celebrated, but also an as yet un- (or at least 
under-) celebrated philosopher of material culture. 
It must here also be emphasized that Lefebvre‟s was a quintessentially Heraclitean line in which 
the reality of objects was understood as one of constant flux and transformation. It was therefore 
in direct contrast to the Parmenidian vision of change as an illusion and objects as existing 
outside of time and change, being, at some level, fixed and perfect forms. For Hereclites objects 
were processes defined by their potentials and this understanding can be seen to have led to the 
dialectics of Hegel and Marx, and thus to Lefebvre. 
 
„Only man and his activity exist. And yet everything happens as though men had to deal with 
external powers which oppress them from outside and drag them along. Human reality - what men 
themselves have made - eludes not only their will but also their consciousness. They do not know 
that they are alone, and that the „world‟ is their work‟ (2008 [1947]: 167).  
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iii) The everyday, Alienation and Mystification 
Following the outbreak of the First World War, Lefebvre was moved from Brittany to the 
relative safety of occupied Paris. Here he was influenced by the work of Nietzsche, Spinoza and 
Schopenhauer and his idea of „vécu‟ (the lived) was formulated: it was to remain with him until 
his death. His growing dislike for Bergsonsim and its emphasis on linear time, rather than time as 
experienced, cemented this interest in „vécu‟. (Later this was to flourish into the „theory of 
moments‟ – arguably a direct opposite of Bergson‟s „durée‟.) Alongside this his early work on 
„young Marx‟ (pre- Capital) was to form his thinking as decidedly un-economic and his 
framework as that of a „humanist Marxist‟ whose main concern was with enabling people to live 
life fully. For Lefebvre this ability was connected to the idea of „poesis‟ – a sense of creating a 
„work‟ (oeuvre) and living life as a work of art – but had its roots in Marx‟s notion of the total 
person as described in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1988).  
Marx had, in turn, built his total person based on both the Hegelian version of alienation and, to 
some extent, Feuerbach‟s concept of the unalienated person; a vision of „humanity proper‟ made 
up of three aspects – reason, will and heart (Feuerbach, 1987). As Zawar Hanfi argues, 
Feuerbach‟s was a quintessentially anthropological materialism (Hanfi, 1972), although one 
which was to come under critique from Marx for not realising that these human qualities were 
either mere abstractions, or the collection of actual living situations in which humans find 
themselves. For Marx, humans and their self-alienation had to be understood in concrete social, 
political terms; the reasons for self-alienation – such as oppression – had to be understood and 
tackled.  
Here the „total person‟ is in direct contrast to the idea of man as „partial‟ – for example Adam 
Smith‟s idea of man as a solely „economic animal‟. I would argue that this early determination to 
explore needs as beyond the economic represents a continuing engagement with Marx‟s 
statement at the beginning of Capital regarding needs of the stomach and needs of the 
imagination. It is almost as if, for Lefebvre, this first line closes a door on the „humanist Marx‟ 
and begins an era of concentrating on the economic (or „stomach‟), as the imagination is not 
mentioned by Marx beyond this initial acknowledgement. 
35 
 
Lefebvre was to hone in on the needs of the imagination initially, aligning himself with ideas 
such as „constant festival‟, which suggested a form of „spiritual‟ revolution. It was an 
engagement which was to inform his struggle with both the Surrealists and later the Situationists, 
to shape his political activism, and perhaps even to enable him to understand his ambivalence to 
(yet undeniable position within) his own middle class up-bringing. For him, despite a strong 
(perhaps over-powering) inclination to the needs of the imagination, the needs of the stomach 
could not be ignored if he was to be able to face himself as a Marxist and social activist. This on-
going quandary was perhaps most agonisingly realised during the Paris 1968 uprising when, 
having been an ideological father, Lefebvre stepped back from proceedings, perhaps not quite 
knowing how to negotiate a way through the ideological revolution of the students vis-à-vis the 
pragmatic one of the workers.  
The imagination versus stomach question can also be seen to influence his attitudes towards 
objects. During his earlier life and the period of alignment with the Surrealists, Lefebvre seemed 
at least to tolerate the idea of objects having revolutionary potential. Whilst he disagreed with the 
idea that everyday life should be turned upside down rather than changed from the inside, he had 
no particular qualms about the use of objects to do so – although this was by no means along the 
lines of conceiving of them as Benjaminian „ur-phenomena‟11. Later, as France became a 
„consumer society‟, he increasingly saw (commercially marketed) objects as part of the 
mystification and colonisation of everyday life. By the end of volume three of CEL Lefebvre is 
returning to the seeds of an argument first sown in volume one which attempts to propose 
„entanglement‟ with objects, rather than possession. It may well have been these thoughts which 
inspired his assistant, a young(er) Jean Baudrillard to expand on the false freedoms offered by 
credit arrangements (see Le System des Objects,2005). 
This period was one of „immense fermentation‟ following the First World War; one that was not 
only to impact upon the entirety of Lefebvre‟s future intellectual life, but which was also perhaps 
                                                          
11
 For Benjamin, although he never specified how, objects could possess revolutionary powers. Benjamin called 
these objects ur-phenomena – a term he borrowed from Geothe‟s writings on the morphology of nature. The 
symbolist, Ludwig Klages, who Benjamin came into contact with as part of the „George Circle‟, was instrumental to 
Benjamin‟s thoughts on the object. Klages believed the object could actively contribute to how people perceived it; 
in other words it was semiotically active. His was a philosophy of sensory attributes as opposed to linguistic 
formulations, senses not intellect, aesthetic empiricism over the rational. Key here is the idea of anamnesis, (that 
„triggers‟ can enable us to „remember‟ a truth that is always „out there‟) originally found in the work of Plato but 
arguably most commonly (and crudely) understood through Freud. 
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typical of post-war France‟s desire to rebuild from the ground up, erasing the conformism of the 
past. It was the formation of the Philosophes
12
 which was to see „the lived‟ formulated as „the 
everyday‟. The concept of the everyday, as understood by the Philosophes, drew upon 
Heidegger‟s notion of „alltaglichkeit‟, and their reading of Heidegger probably owes much to the 
translation of one of their members - Norbert Guterman
13
. That said, Heidegger had in turn been 
influenced by Lukacs‟ writing on the triviality of life in Metaphysik der Tragodie (1911). For 
Lefebvre however, the everyday was not only a concept in its own right, but one which he saw as 
forcing a new path between classic anthropology and what could perhaps be called high 
philosophy. He sees the everyday as having either been „filed away‟ under headings such as 
„family‟, „sociology‟, „consumption‟, or been ignored completely as part of a philosophical scorn 
for the mundane (1971:26-27)
14
.  
Lefebvre portrays this divide as a crossroads, saying, „behind us ... are the way of philosophy and 
the road of everyday life. They are divided by a mountain range, but the path of philosophy 
keeps to the heights, thus overlooking that of everyday life; ahead the track winds, barely visible, 
through thickets, thornbushes and swamps‟ (1971:17).  For Lefebvre this crossroads depicts an 
erroneous isolation of philosophy from what is falsely perceived as the „contamination‟ of 
everyday life; it wrongly suggests that the quotidian is an obstacle to the revelation of truth. In 
contrast he posits the everyday as crucial to the transformation of non-philosophical reality and 
the solution as „a philosophical inventory and analysis of everyday life that will expose its 
ambiguities – its baseness and exuberance, its poverty and fruitlessness – and by these 
unorthodox means release the creative energies that are an integral part of it‟ (1971: 13). 
Quintessentially, for Lefebvre, studying the everyday was not simply about acknowledging it as 
an object of study, or even providing a diagnosis of it, but was also about reclaiming its critical 
                                                          
12
 The Philosophes were made up of those Lefebvre had met at the Sorbonne in Paris around 1917-1919. Core 
members were Pierre Morhange, Georges Politzer, Georges Friedmann and Norbert Guterman, who was to prove a 
life-long close friend and confident of Lefebvre. Paul Nizan and a young Jean-Paul Sartre formed a peripheral circle. 
 
13
 Guterman came from Poland and was to become Lefebvre‟s closest confidant and intellectual ally of all those 
involved in the Philosophes. He was, according to Lefebvre in La Somme et le Reste, the most „finement intelligent‟ 
and became the moderator of the group.  
 
14
 Of those whom Lefebvre felt to have isolated the everyday were the authors Don H Zimmerman and Melvin 
Pollner, who had written „The Everyday World as a Phenomenon‟, published in Pepinsky‟s People and Information, 
Pegamon Press, 1970. 
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potential. With Lefebvre, the everyday was not simply analysed as an immovable constitution, 
but also drawn up as a manifesto for change; the „rehabilitation‟ of the everyday could not 
happen without a battle against capitalism, as it was capitalism which caused alienation and thus 
the degradation of the everyday and along with it the degradation of social beings: 
 
 
 
His project was simply, but no less than, to transform everyday life, which was for him, at its 
core, the stuff of potential, and the only arena in which life could be lived. He said, „Man must 
be everyday, or he will not be at all‟ (2008 [1947]:127). This was also of course, an early pledge 
of firm allegiance to Marxism
15
 as it supported Marx‟s cry in the Thesis on Feuerback, that 
philosophers must not only interpret the world, but must transform it (Marx, 1998). 
It was perhaps inevitable that having placed such great revolutionary potential on the everyday, 
Lefebvre would later be criticised (largely in the rift between him and the Situationists) for not 
explaining exactly how this potential would live out. However, in volume two of CEL he gives 
as clear an idea as he was ever likely to as to precisely what the great change to the everyday 
would look like. Here he says „the idea of a possible transformation of the everyday and 
consequently of a radical critique of everyday life is the equivalent of opting for a decentralized 
socialism which would subordinate production to social needs [my italics] which have been 
recognized and detected preferentially, thus placing knowledge and the recognition of other 
people, desires, creative freedom and the poetics inherent in social practice at the top of the 
hierarchy …‟ (2008[1961]: 130) This is the „south American‟ style socialism that Shields argues 
Lefebvre is a proponent of, as opposed to the centralized communist socialisms of Europe and 
the then USSR of course.  
However, the concept of the everyday evolved throughout Lefebvre‟s work. As Rob Shields 
points out, in the early works such as La Conscience Mystifiée, it is merely the „tedious and banal 
reality of daily living‟ (1998: 66), but during and certainly by the end of CEL it had emerged as 
                                                          
15
 It must be remembered that Marxism had come late to France, perhaps due to a strong national culture with its 
own philosophers and perhaps due to lack of translations.  
„Homo sapiens, homo faber and homo ludens end up as homo quotidianus, but on the way they 
have lost the very quality of homo; can the quotidianus properly be called a man? It is virtually an 
automaton, and to recover the quality and the properties of a human being it must outstrip the 
quotidian in the quotidian and in quotidian terms‟ (1971:193). 
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the ground of resistance and renewal, essentially to potentially revolutionary „moments‟. This 
was in no small part because Lefebvre differentiated „everyday life‟ from the „everyday‟ or 
„everydayness‟. This distinction was partly lost due to a less than perfect translation into English: 
„everyday life‟ (in English) is the standard translation of „la vie quotidienne‟, but it is not a 
perfect translation as „quotidian‟ refers to the repetitive nature of daily life. Many years after his 
concept of everyday life had found its way into discourse Lefebvre explained the distinction 
between the terms by making the following separation: „The word „everyday‟ [quotidian] 
designates the entry of everyday life [la vie quotidienne] into modernity … the concept of 
„everydayness‟ [quotidiennete] stresses the homogeneous, the repetitive, the fragmentary in 
everyday life‟ ( 1988: 87). It is in this way that Lefebvre could be against the repetitive nature of 
everydayness, which he blamed on the nature of capitalism‟s operations; but for the everyday as 
the ground of renewal and revolution. It is important to note, however, that Lefebvre does not 
make a Cartesian division however between the two categories, making one always alienated and 
the other always full of „moments‟ and potential – rather he portrays them as two overlapping 
sets. (This was also to inform his stance on „leisure time‟ as potentially further alienating, due to 
its being defined in contrast to work.) 
What was to drive Lefebvre‟s insistence upon the importance of the everyday was his conviction 
that alienation stemmed from it (rather than emphasising alienation in the workplace as Marx 
had). As Shields says „By transposing the philosophical critique of alienation into a sociological 
critique of the arrangements of daily life, he allowed Marx‟s notion of alienation to be brought to 
the forefront of a distinctive political project: no longer simply a demand for economic change 
but a demand for meaningful lives for all‟ (1998: 99) – again the needs of the imagination were 
fighting for space amongst the needs of the stomach. Much as Marx had
16
, Lefebvre talked of 
alienation as being estranged from work and activities, other people, and our own human-ness 
and saw it as all-pervasive in everyday life. However, Lefebvre (along with Norbert Guterman) 
saw alienation as to do with mystification; the covering over of life with myths in order to 
                                                          
16
 It is important to note that in La Conscience Mystifiée (1999[1936]) Lefebvre uses only the French „alienation‟, 
ignoring Marx‟s various terms – Entfremdung, Verwirklichung, Verselbstandigen, Entausserung, Verganglichung. 
With Guterman translating Marx‟s German for him, this can hardly be attributed to a lack of linguistic 
understanding or indeed a lack of motivation to understand the subtle differences between Marx‟s various terms; 
rather it ought perhaps to be seen as part of Lefebvre‟s attempt to write alienation as penetrating all realms in all 
ways and perhaps as an indicator of his refusal to accept structuralism.  
 
39 
 
convince people they were living „the good life‟. (In fact Lefebvre seems melancholic about the 
appropriation by the mainstream of the phrase „changer la vie‟.)17 
The concept of mystification, which will arise in the following chapters in relation to £1 
shopping and the desire for the „bargain‟, ought perhaps to be given context within Lefebvre‟s 
life. The concept was first formulated between 1933 and 1935 in La Conscience Mystifiée 
(1999[1936]), a book jointly credited to Lefebvre and Norbert Guterman and partly written in 
New York where Guterman was exiled. Due to the nature of its contents, the book was refused 
publication by the PCF as the Soviet censure deemed the problems it posed in regard to the 
inability of a collective conscience to grasp the real, irrelevant to the interests of the movement 
(and perhaps too negative in regard to the achieving of a pragmatic creation of socialist States). 
Furthermore, at the time, the party did not see the rise of Fascism as something that would last. A 
few years later it was to be destroyed by the Nazis and form part of Lefebvre‟s oeuvre (not least 
Hitler au Pouvoir, 1938, of course) which would force him into hiding during the occupation of 
France.  Therefore, partly because it not actually receive publication until 1979, when the 
sociologist Reginaldo Di Piero re-edited it, and partly because it is still only available in the 
original French, the concept of mystification is often better known through volumes one and 
three of CEL, and in volume three as specifically applied to consumer society.  
The book and its ideas were formative for Lefebvre, both intellectually and personally. It was in 
many ways the beginning of his disillusionment with the PCF, which he identifies as pursuing a 
crass form of Marxism, whose dogma could not provide the answers and which was too aligned 
with - „la planification Sovietique‟ (1999: 21). For him revolutionary thought must not be brutal 
and dogmatic, but all-encompassing (1999: 38). This means that the incompatibility of creative 
forces and capitalistic forms must not result in the destruction of everything, but rather in the 
destruction of the forces in order to save the forms (1999: 29). What is required for this task is a 
process of abolishing and conserving; a „dialectique materialist‟; a „marche en spirale‟ (1999: 
36). This was not only an acknowledgement of change as taking in elements of the past and 
tripping back upon itself in a spiral, which was by its nature reflective of Lefebvre‟s deep 
                                                          
17
 „Changer la vie‟ (change life) was originally an expression used by those seeking mass political and social 
upheaval and a reclamation of non-capitalist (or at least non-consumerist) modes. However, by the mid-1970s it had 
become a casual figure of speech often used in connection to a change in „lifestyle‟, such as a move to the country. 
The de-politicised, individualistic use of the phrase remains today – „change life‟ simply means „change some 
elements in my life‟. 
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antipathy to Bergson‟s duree, but can also be interpreted as an early conceptualisation of what 
was to become the theory of moments. In discussing the spiral movements, Lefebvre argues that 
each „moment‟ is at one and the same time, condition, cause, antecedent, element, and aspect of 
ulterior moments of development (1999: 36). Perhaps most telling though, is his phrase „le 
moment, reste enveloppé dans le devenir‟ – the moment remains enveloped in that which is to 
become. Thus the concept of the moment as full of revolutionary potential is born. 
Lefebvre and Guterman‟s summing up of the book in hindsight in the preface captures well the 
frustration and hope of the young(er) Lefebvre and perhaps also a certain climate of the times in 
a France re-building itself but with a nagging fear that the threat (of Fascism) was far from 
banished. They argue that the book represents a sad contradiction – a tenacious confidence in the 
truth finally unveiled, and an enormous power, terribly efficient, of the non-truth (1999: 23). As 
part of this they see their younger selves as perhaps still a little naive in viewing Stalin as a 
„bouffon plutôt qu‟un criminal‟ (a buffoon rather than a criminal) (1999: 20). Yet they also admit 
the text is utopian and see it as one of the first cries of distress and appeals to truth, both in the 
context of Facism and philosophy in general (1999: 21). It is deemed an incredibly optimistic 
text in that it is not limited by politics or ideology, but goes „jusqu‟aux racines‟ (to the roots). 
The concept of mystification does of course bare striking resemblance to the Marxist concept of 
„false consciousness‟18, which in turn was to provoke Sartre‟s „mauvaise foi‟19 (bad faith) 
(1993). However, mystification emphasizes a process more than false consciousness does; it is 
the reassuring overlay of what was previously deemed „the worst‟, in order that it may be 
adapted and gradually accepted as „the best‟.20 Podgorecki (1986) calls this state of being 
entangled in that which we had found disgusting, „dirty togetherness‟. It differs importantly from 
                                                          
18
 There is no evidence that Marx himself actually ever used the phrase „false consciousness‟. It appears to have 
been used - at least in print - only by Engels, as documented in the „letter to Mehring‟ (1893) in Marx and Engels 
Correspondence, International Publishers (1968). 
 
19
 The concept finds voice in Sartre‟s Essays in Existentialism (1993). Here he explains „bad faith‟ as the ways in 
which people make „free decisions‟ to deny themselves „freedoms‟, thus pretending that possibilities are denied to 
them. Sartre gives the example of a café waiter, whose movements and conversation are a little too „waiter-esque‟ 
and whose exaggerated behaviour illustrates that he is play acting, whilst obviously aware that he is not (merely) a 
waiter. Thus mauvaise foi differs from false consciousness or mystification in that the subject consciously deceives 
himself.  
20
 In fact Lefebvre attempted to argue that the mystified consciousness was a pre-condition of Facism. See 
Nationalisme Contre la Nation, 1937 and Hitler au Pouvoir, 1938. 
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„false consciousness‟ in that it is not pegged to ideas of class and domination, but rather to 
concerns about possessive individualism and the tendency of people to define themselves by 
things. (Benjamin cites the concept of mystification in relation to the primitive and profane 
nature of the collector in Passagenwerk.) Mystification is in fact a concept far more informed by 
material things than false consciousness ever was; here we see the way in which alienation was a 
constant theme throughout Lefebvre‟s work and can be seen as tying together his various 
positions on everyday objects. In fact his differentiation between „entanglement‟ with objects 
and „possession‟ of them has everything to do with extricating them from the process of 
mystification and allowing them to potentially conquer alienation and re-invigorate the everyday.  
 
iv) Surrealism, Adventure and Romantic Revolution 
It is perhaps not at all surprising that Lefebvre‟s first philosophical „home‟ was that created by 
the Surrealists. His already brewing conviction of the importance of the everyday, alongside his 
relentless desire to break away from the conventions and limits of his parents (and indeed for 
society to do the same), provided a potent combination for which to engage with their agenda of 
poetic adventure through everyday objects and forms. Following the end of war in 1918 
communism grew in France as did industrialization – and by the mid 1920‟s the two were 
inevitably clashing. Where Taylorism caused an emphasis on repetition and dullness, surrealism 
(which had undergone a rapprochement with communism around this time) attempted to 
challenge this by making the everyday ridiculous. In addition surrealism had captured a feeling 
of the era, its restless political questioning teamed with its penchant for the banal proving an 
attractive mix for a post-war France yearning for frivolity. For Lefebvre, who had written in the 
first editions of the Philosophes journal - Philosophies (1924) - that to live one‟s life as a work of 
art was to live a philosophy and was therefore related to the idea of praxis, the attraction to the 
Surrealists was almost inevitable. (In fact the „pranks‟ and agitating of the Philosophes were in 
many ways a prequel to the „scandals‟ of the Surrealists.)  
For Lefebvre, living life as art meant „adventure‟. This saw him embark upon a series of torrid 
love affairs which pre-empted the sexual liberation of the 1960s and linked lust and philosophy 
in a way which was perhaps so formative for him it was never truly undone. As his official 
biographer Remi Hess argues, this lusting after women as linkers between the world and ideas, 
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as much as purely physically, may well have created the template for his later typist-muses 
(Hess, 1998). This period certainly saw him create a framework which could be interpreted as 
privileging „adventure‟ and seeing it as the domain of the masculine. 
However, adventure for Lefebvre, was also linked to the idea of the constant revolution in the 
form of carnivalesque challenges to everydayness; the Bacchanalian „revolution‟ often promoted 
by the Surrealists. Note the use of everydayness not everyday here, as Lefebvre saw festival and 
everyday life as two parts of the same whole, rather than opposed opposites – it was 
everydayness which was opposite to carnival. He describes festivals as „like everyday life, but 
more intense; and moments of life – in the practical community, food, the relation with nature – 
in other words work – were reunited, magnified in the festival‟ (2008 [1947]: 221). For Lefebvre, 
festival declined the more everydayness took over.  
As Highmore points out, this emphasis on „la fête‟ seems difficult to reconcile with Lefebvre‟s 
equal emphasis at the time on the emergence of total man. However, „it is the articulation of 
these ideas together that allows Lefebvre to navigate a path that avoids a simple nostalgic and 
romantic celebration of la fête on the one hand, and a dogmatic assertion of social homogeneity 
… on the other (2002: 119). Thus, as Highmore argues, the total man is re-posited as festive and 
la fête is placed at the Hegelian „end of history‟ (2002: 119). Furthermore, Lefebvre‟s version of 
carnival neatly avoids the usual arguments between those who interpret carnival in the pure 
Bakhtinian sense of turning the world upside down, and those who see this inversion as simply 
re-enforcing the dominant and mainstream. For Lefebvre, la fête itself does neither; rather it 
provides a moment of potential for societal change, and in order to transform life, must precisely 
become the whole, rather than being simply a few moments of escape (2008 [1947]: 251). (This 
idea was to find further form in his writings on „permanent cultural revolution‟ in An 
Introduction to Modernity, 1995). 
This view of a creative, carnivalesque end of history lent itself far more to the anarchism of 
Tristan Tzara (generally thought of as the father of the Dada movement), who had brought 
surrealism from Zurich to Paris, than the faith in the ridiculous of Andre Breton, who had 
become its chief proponent in France. The Theatre of the Absurd, the notorious Cabaret Voltaire 
and artists such as Man Ray and Marcel Duchamp held firmly to a belief in the transformative 
power of the ridiculous, whereas Lefebvre‟s inheritance was to do with surrealism‟s challenge to 
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authority and old hierarchies. As Shields suggests, Lefebvre, whose primary interest was in the 
way surrealism may unleash the un-alienated, un-rule-bound person, found himself disagreeing 
with Breton‟s desire to create a new dogma, preferring Tzara‟s inclination towards anarchy21. 
His sympathy tended to lie more with Dada culture than the staged „scandals‟ of the Surrealists 
(such as inciting bar brawls and denouncing celebrities at their press conferences) (1999: 55). 
This was problematic considering the Surrealists and the Philosophes had by this time written a 
joint manifesto entitled „Revolution d‟Abord et Toujours‟ (commonly translated as „Revolution 
Today and Always‟) which was published in Clarté. At the time Lefebvre interpreted the 
Surrealist‟s stance as seeking to transcend the alienation of the everyday, in contrast to his own 
desire to banish it completely, and this formed the crux of his difference with them. From his 
point of view, they were attempting to liberate the magical and strange from the everyday and 
therefore make the everyday marvellous, whilst he himself was a vehement celebrator of 
everyday life‟s mundane fabric and sought only to eliminate everyday-ness in order to be able to 
celebrate the everyday.  
Later in life, in his autobiographical work La Somme et le Reste (1989), Lefebvre admitted he 
had perhaps misunderstood the Surrealist project and that their celebration of the marvellous was 
more a questioning of reality. This misunderstanding had perhaps come about as Lefebvre‟s 
relationship with the Surrealists was largely conducted through Clarté and it was not until 
relatively late on in the surrealist movement that the Philosophes were invited to join them. 
However, at the time, these differences in the appreciation of the everyday unwound gradually as 
part of a broader rift between the Marxists of Clarté and those within surrealism
22
, and as it 
became clearer to Lefebvre himself that despite having revolutionary aspirations and a concern 
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 In number 4 of The Philosophes journal Lefebvre had written a piece which prophetically announced that Dada 
had broken the world, but that the broken pieces were good. As Shields relates, in Lefebvre‟s Le Temps de Meprises 
he tells how every time he had encountered Tzara, the former had asked, „So, you‟re collecting the pieces … to stick 
them back together …?‟, to which Lefebvre had always replied, „No, to finish smashing them‟ (Shields, 1999: 57). 
 
22
 The rift between Marxists and Surrealists was triggered by differing takes on the Soviet film, „Road to Life‟, 
based on a book by Anton Makarenko called the Pedagogical Poem. Makarenko‟s work was a fictionalised account 
of his most famous self-governing child collective, the Gorky Colony, whose ideals were as much respect for the 
person as possible, the use of positive peer pressure on the individual by the collective, and the rejection of physical 
punishment. The Soviet establishment came to hail his colonies as great successes in communist education. 
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with the everyday in common, his project and that of the Surrealists were fundamentally 
opposed
23
.  
This difference between Lefebvre and the Surrealists can be seen in his praise and yet disdain for 
the poet Charles Baudelaire. While he is very much in favour of Baudelaire‟s immersion in the 
everyday as a position for writing from, he despises the way in which Baudelaire attacks the very 
substance of it from within:- 
 
 
 
For Lefebvre, Baudelaire‟s desire to tear through the everyday in order to liberate the strange, is 
not only ill-conceived as there is no „strange‟ to liberate, but also displays an excess of 
intellectualism, a cerebralism, and an attempt to think the everyday instead of perceiving it.  
Lefebvre sees Baudelaire‟s „modern marvellous‟  as no more than  „a bit of metaphysics and a 
few myths in the last stages of decay … some psychoanalysis, some Bergson-izing … an 
eclecticism, an impenetrable doctrinal confusion, together with a remorseless Parisianism …‟ 
(2008 [1947]: 119). He goes on to describe him viciously as a „dandy‟, a „buffoon‟, and a 
„cabotin24 bourgeois du deuxieme republique‟, who whilst denouncing the forms his class were 
imposing upon life, was himself an „important dealer in narcotics‟ (2008 [1947]: 122), by which 
he meant through the themes and motivations of his poetry he made people seek the bizarre like 
a drug. The fundamental fraud of Baudelaire for Lefebvre was that, unlike metaphysicians and 
mystics, he promised „this life‟, but was only seduced by its (fake) lining. 
According to Lefebvre, this attempt by Baudelaire to think the everyday, rather than living it, 
brought the „hinterland‟ of Platonic „ideas‟ into the world- „In other words, he has put the cat 
amongst the pigeons, the maggot in the fruit, disgust in desire, filth in purity …‟ (2008 [1947]: 
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 Arguably this opposition did not „develop‟, or „emerge‟, but was inherent in Lefebvre‟s thinking from the start 
and apparent from his initial re-appropriation of Lukacs‟ concept of alltaglichkeit (everydayness) (see Lukacs Soul 
and Form). Everydayness for Lefebvre was far from the trivial existence, devoid of meaning, which stood in 
contrast to authentic existence, as Romanticism saw it. 
 
24
 The word „cabotin‟ is translated in the English edition as „ham‟ in the sense of ham actor. In French, the word 
certainly has theatrical connotations, but also emphasizes the element of „posing‟ or „showing off‟ in a pretentious 
manner, in a similar way to the expression „arrête ton cinéma‟- literally stop your cinema/theatre. 
 
„With Baudelaire alone does the marvellous take on a life and intensity which were totally 
original: this is because he abandons the metaphysical and moral plane to immerse himself in the 
everyday, which from that moment on he will deprecate, corrode and attack, but on its own level 
and as if from within‟ (2008 [1947]: 106). 
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123). In the process of putting too much mind into the matter, Baudelaire had, under the pretence 
of „pure‟ beauty, smuggled in ugliness and impurity, and for Lefebvre this meant things could 
only now fascinate if given a (fake) magical lining: „Since Baudelaire, the world turned inside 
out has been deemed better than the world the right way up‟ (2008 [1947]: 123).  
Whilst Lefebvre was crystallizing his belief in the everyday as marvellous in and for itself; as an 
entity that did not require turning upside down or making magical, but simply relieving of the 
alienating „everydayness‟ resulting from capitalism, the Surrealists were holding fast to André 
Breton‟s original assertion in the first Manifesto of Surrealism (1924) that only the marvellous 
could be beautiful. It was this belittling of the real in favour of the „magical‟ which Lefebvre 
rallied against. For him surrealism marked the end of the long methodological disparagement 
with real life and the stubborn attack on it which nineteenth century literature had initiated.  
What Lefebvre could not accept was the way in which surrealism, in emphasizing the weird and 
marvellous, had become so far removed from the lived reality of everyday life and the very 
practical and real issues (lack of warmth, food, etc.) that people faced. (Again, his empathy for 
the needs of the stomach began to turn him against the pure pursuit of needs of the imagination.) 
For him the bizarre and exotic was no more than a „game for aesthetes‟ which provided a 
clumsy, dangerous and thoroughly negative critique of everyday life (2008 [1947]: 119-120). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in their attempt to transcend alienation the Surrealists put forward an intensely 
private experience of individual poesis which was effectively personal, romantic revolution, as 
opposed to the mutual, public one that Lefebvre advocated. What Lefebvre was attempting was a 
radical form of pluralism, later using the Situationist slogan „the personal is the political.‟25 In 
fact at the time Lefebvre was arguing for the public festival as a form of joyous revolution along 
the lines of a Nietzschean or Bakhtinian celebration. (In an interview with Hess in 1988 he said 
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 One of Lefebvre‟s more obscure works is a short book on Alfred de Musset. Lefebvre was interested in de 
Musset, and in particular his work on Lorenzaccio, as de Musset presented the latter as having a double interior and 
also wrote Lorenzaccio in such a way as he appeared to represent de Musset‟s own life struggles. Thus, he showed 
how individuals experience an internal conflict between themselves and society and how the individual and the 
social play out. 
 
„Our search for the human takes us too far, too „deep‟, we seek it in the clouds or in mysteries, 
where it is waiting for us, besieging us on all sides. We will not find it in myths… all we need do 
is simply open our eyes, to leave the dark world of metaphysics and the false depths of the „inner 
life‟ behind, and we will discover the immense human wealth that the humblest facts of everyday 
life contain‟ (2008 [1947]:132). 
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that at the time of his involvement with the Surrealists he had seen revolution as never-ending 
popular festival the aim of which was the end of work.) Lefebvre was perhaps essentially a 
Marxist with romantic urges in regard to repressed spontaneity; in fact, in La Somme et le Reste 
(1989), he declared „I adhere to Marxism in the name of a revolutionary romanticism‟. But 
whilst adventurism may fulfil some more „spiritual‟ needs, it did not change material 
circumstances. Perhaps as Shields suggests, Lefebvre was „not so much a romantic 
revolutionary, as a Marxist without the reassurance of a future revolution‟ (Shields, 1998: 93).  
What resulted from Lefebvre‟s falling out with the Surrealists was a re-considering of his early 
adventurism, which he recognised was not about the collective (at least not in its Surrealist 
form), and fell too easily into the realm of individual liberation and self-exploration. This was 
everything he was to distrust about Sartre and Existentialism in years to come - that it was 
inward-looking, emotional, individual and led only to romantic protest (2008 [1947]:82). In fact 
when Lefebvre attacked Sartre in 1945 it was only partly because he felt the Philosophes had 
already communicated those ideas between 1925 and 1928; his other motivation was that he felt 
individual anarchism to be idealist and even dangerous. Perhaps there was also an element of 
Lefebvre struggling with his own bourgeois tendency to pursue private adventure, a recognition 
of himself as one of those middle-class individualists trying to find his own version of living life 
as a hybrid of the Nietzschian „total man‟(1969) and Marx‟s „complete person‟26 (1988). 
Furthermore, Lefebvre, along with other members of the Philosophes, had joined the Communist 
Party of France (PCF) in 1928
27
; a move which would see him embark upon a prolific period of 
„worker sociologies‟ in factories and telephone exchanges and to some extent sacrifice his 
romanticism for the party line. However, he remained „humanist‟ and continued to separate Marx 
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 The „complete person‟ is understood in contrast to the alienated person and was identified by Marx in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (also referred to as The Paris Manuscripts), a series of notes 
written in 1844 but not published until 1932. Here Marx posits communism as the transcendence of private property 
as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man. 
Communism is therefore seen as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being - a „complete 
person‟.  The „complete person‟ thus represents the entire wealth of previous development and the resolution of the 
conflict between man and nature, objectification and self-confirmation, freedom and necessity, and the individual 
and the species. 
27
 Lefebvre‟s decision to join the PCF must also be seen in the light of his being ferociously against the war in 
Morocco – as were the PCF. Having recently completed his military service, this issue must have been very much 
alive for him. 
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from Stalinism – thinking which went against the predominant philosophy of the PCF and which 
it seems likely was the reason behind the disappearance of many of his texts from this time, 
thought to have been destroyed by the PCF. 
Lefebvre‟s personal circumstances (and, ironically, his own needs of the stomach) may also have 
been an influence at this time. His youthful „adventure‟ had resulted in various children from 
various liaisons, all of whom needed supporting and had meant him working as a taxi-driver and 
college (lyceé) teacher up to his enforced hiding during the Second World War, when all 
members of the PCF were ordered to be arrested. (And Lefebvre was no ordinary member, 
having written on Facism and Hitler in the past.) Lefebvre had escaped to Aix-en-Provence and 
joined the Resistance, but his clandestine life had caused him considerable concern and heart-
ache over not being able to see his children. He now recognised that „adventure‟28 did not 
provide a firm enough plan of action and ethics for revolutionary change. The novelty of 
surrealist objects now, in the wake of yet another devastating war, seemed an immature, paltry 
form of revolution. 
 
v) Rhythms, Moments and Situations 
Following the war, during which he had been dismissed from the teaching profession by the 
Vichy administration, Lefebvre was briefly reinstated as a teacher in Toulouse before being 
seconded to the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) – set up by the staunchly 
socialist George Gurvitch. It was an awkward transition. Despite having been the „official‟ 
communist party philosopher, Lefebvre‟s disagreements with the party and fierce battles with 
other communists while working for the resistance displeased the PCF, yet simultaneously he 
was deemed „too communist to teach‟. He attempted to re-think Marxism, publishing two articles 
in the short-lived Arguments journal which pondered „alienation‟ vis-a-vis the young Marx, 
Lukacs, Roland Barthes‟ Mythologies (1973), and Lucien Goldman‟s Hidden God (1964). 
                                                          
28
 The word „adventure‟ is however difficult to analyse and Lefebvre‟s changing relation to it throughout his life is 
perhaps best understood by exploring linguistic nuances. The word in Italian, means „those who adventure‟, which 
re-translated into French suggests „those who invent‟. Perhaps Lefebvre‟s relationship with „adventure‟ went from 
pure (more literal) „adventure‟ in his youth, to a belief in „invention‟ and revolutionary potential later on. 
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This re-engagement with the on-going theme of alienation in the context of a much changed 
France was perhaps a decisive shift in his thinking on material things. If objects had been seen as 
potential vehicles for inciting revolution in the preceding years, with the post-war recovery and 
„les trentes glorieuses‟29 era‟s emphasis on household consumer goods fuelling an increasing 
commercialisation of French life, Lefebvre began to talk of objects in terms of their alienating 
potential. Material culture had become imbued with consumerist messages and thus was 
materialistic on the whole. By volume three of CEL Lefebvre‟s rallying against this had almost 
become the raison d‟être of the book – he spoke of taglines from adverts and the subliminal 
damage they did, the detrimental affect apparently labour-saving devices had on non-linear 
rhythms, and the false promises of modernity. Objects, in many ways, had become the enemy. 
For Lefebvre, things had become part of mystification, alienation and the colonisation of the 
everyday. They enforced linear rhythms on people and reinforced the moral corruption of 
capitalism‟s insistence on money. In 1960 Lefebvre set up the Research Group on Everyday Life, 
and it was through this that he began to work with Guy Debord. As Hess relates in his biography 
of Lefebvre (1988), Debord, thirty years Lefebvre‟s junior, was to spend long periods at 
Lefebvre‟s house in Navarrenx discussing their theories of everyday life, before setting up the 
Situationist International – a publication whose twelve issues would become increasingly 
antagonistic towards Lefebvre‟s thought. 
In many ways it is easy to see how the Situationists, with their surrealist-inspired tactics but 
emphasis on everyday life as potentially interesting and euphoric, were both a result of 
Lefebvre‟s influence, and the perfect combination through which Levebvre could express his 
political philosophy for a relatively long time. In fact Debord served to re-ignite Lefebvre‟s 
vision of the everyday as a site for the reclamation of the total person – Debord‟s „colonising‟ 
suggesting alienation of everyday life was not intrinsic, but surmountable, as it was effectively 
an external influence which could be rallied against. However, it was precisely the „situation‟ as 
opposed to the „moment‟ which was to be the crux of their falling out. 
                                                          
29
 „Les trentes glorieuses‟ are the thirty years from 1945 to 1975 following the Second World War in France. The 
term was first used by French demographer Jean Fourastie and is derived from Les Trois Glorieuses – the three days 
of the French Revolution from 27
th
 to 29
th
 July 1830.  During les trentes glorieuses the French dirigiste economy 
grew rapidly and the standard of living became one of the world‟s highest. This explosive economic growth slowed 
under Mitterrand and Chirac, bringing an end to the period. 
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Whilst the „situation‟ was by its very nature a creation, consciously brought into action by an 
individual or group of individuals; the „moment‟ occurred as a result of various historical un-
ravellings, and only became consciously acknowledged by people once they could see it was an 
opportunity to act. It was, if you like, a „natural‟ occurrence, and crucially for Lefebvre‟s public 
revolution, it was only recognised once a large-scale group had become aware it. A moment is 
perhaps best understood as an 
 
 
Lefebvre never explicitly linked his thinking on the moment with that on rhythms, but it is my 
contention that moments were effectively unusual occurrences of arrythmia or eurythmia in 
which it became apparent to society that there was an opportunity to act. I say this partly as it is 
the only way one can understand moments within the body of Lefebvre‟s other work, but also as 
„le vécu‟ remained crucial within rhythmanalyses, and linking the latter to the theory of moments 
allows that too to contain Lefebvre‟s beloved „lived‟ experience. This contention in not without 
compelling evidence: witness the following description of the rhythmanalyst and his drawing 
upon the lived. 
 
 
 
This depiction of the rhythmanalyst as a type of sensorially-heightened flaneur, tuned to 
movements rather than visuals alone, works well alongside more recent attempts to escape the 
primacy of the visual (see Bull, 2004; Back, 2007). Furthermore, the rhythmanalyst is by 
definition more engaged with her surroundings than the flaneur for „to grasp a rhythm it is 
necessary to have been grasped by it; one must let oneself go, give oneself over. Abandon 
oneself to its duration‟ (Lefebvre, 2004: 27). Importantly, and as Lefebvre acknowledges, this 
means that the rhythmanalyst not only changes that which she observes (as could be said of any 
physical presence), but she is aware of this fact - aware that she has „set it in motion‟ but 
simultaneously „recognising its power‟ (2004: 27).   
„The rhythmanalyst calls on all his senses. He draws on his breathing, the circulation of his blood, 
the beatings of his heart, and the delivery of his speech as landmarks. Without privileging any one 
of these sensations, raised by him in the perception of rhythms, to the detriment of any other. He 
thinks with his body, not in the abstract, but lived in temporality. He does not neglect…. Smell, 
scents ... Smells are part of rhythms, reveal them; odours of the morning and evening, hours of 
sunlight or darkness, of rain or fine weather‟ (2004: 21). 
 
„… instance of intense experience in everyday life that provides an immanent critique of the 
everyday; they are moments of vivid sensations of disgust, of shock, of delight and so on, which 
although fleeting, provide a promise of the possibility of a different daily life, while at the same 
time puncturing the continuum of the present‟ (Highmore, 2002: 116). 
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The above description of the rhythmanalyst remains remarkably close to an image first 
promulgated by George Perec who, it can be argued, here again had a large influence on 
Lefebvre, despite being his junior
30. In Perec‟s Species of Space (1997 [1974]), and especially in 
the pages on „The Apartment Building‟, we see how Perec links space to activities, and therefore 
to time, through an itinerary of everyday events happening contemporaneously in each apartment 
(1997: 40 -45). Similarly, in the section on „The Street‟ it is hard not to recognise the original 
inspiration for Lefebvre‟s rhythmanalysis when Perec suggests we should „decipher a bit of the 
town. Its circuits: why do the buses go from this place to that? Who chooses the routes, and by 
what criteria? … „The people in the streets: where are they coming from? Where are they going 
to? Who are they? People in a hurry. People going slowly‟ (1997: 52).  
Perec‟s emphasis on movements through space form part of a wider rhetoric which asserts time 
as peoples‟ positions in space and can thus be seen as informing Lefebvre‟s work on social 
space.  Contrary to simplistic interpretations, Lefebvre‟s idea of social space is not a „spatial 
turn‟ as such, but a rather more nuanced concept in which space is integrated with time as part of 
an attempt to escape theories (such as Henri Bergson‟s) in which time is paramount. For 
example, Perec suggests, „… interrogate yourself at some precise moment of the day about the 
positions occupied by some of your friends, in relation both to one another and to yourself ...‟ 
(1997: 83). In the current day this has of course been made possible by satellite technology, one 
sees oneself moving along as a red blob on a satellite navigation application on a mobile phone; 
there are dating applications in which one can see when a potential „match‟ is close by.  
Gaston Bachelard‟s influence cannot be underplayed here either. His Dialectics of Duration 
(2000 [1936]) introduced Lefebvre to the concept of rhythm, and the critique of Bergson 
contained within it fuelled Lefebvre‟s dislike of the latter‟s notion of the „long durée‟. For 
Bachelard, time could only be understood in instants and duration is experienced through these 
instants, which are both momentary and discrete, having no extension and being isolated from 
each other instant. Thus, for Bachelard, time has neither extension not flow, but rather is made 
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 Although Perec perhaps had more influence on Lefebvre than vice versa, there was undoubtedly a healthy amount 
of cross-pollination of ideas between the two in a more general sense, as Perec was a member of the group Ou-Li-Po 
(Ouvroir de littérature potentielle).  Founded in 1960 by Raymond Queneau and François Le Lionnais, the groups 
also took Lefebvre as one of their guiding influences.  
  
51 
 
up of an infinite succession of discrete instants. Bachelard‟s theory will be further explored in the 
final chapter. 
Admittedly, despite inspiring a small cottage-industry of literature, rhythmanalysis has never 
found great prevalence or success as a methodology, perhaps because whilst Lefebvre theorised 
about it at great length, he avoided setting out any „guidelines‟ as to how one might practically 
go about doing it. In Rhythmanalysis of Mediterranean cities, Lefebvre and Catherine Regulier
31
 
explain how they have chosen not to „painstakingly describe a privileged place‟, because they 
wanted to „introduce concepts and a general idea‟ (2004: 100). Whilst at that stage of the project 
this was perhaps acceptable, Lefebvre‟s desire to see rhythmanalysis as a „science‟ is not aided 
by his non-development of the „general idea‟ into a description of method.  What would a 
rhythmanalsysis look like or read like? Would there be a framework by which to always consider 
certain cyclical and linear features and map the clashings of rhythms? (This is perhaps what de 
Certeau got closest to in „Walking in the City‟.)  
 
vi) Commodities, Property and Entanglement 
Lefebvre is (perhaps wrongly) not generally considered to be a material culture theorist (and 
indeed he himself believed the project of the everyday to be a larger one, perhaps encompassing 
aspects of material culture) yet his work was punctuated and informed by his relationship with 
things and his belief (or not) in the role they had to play in changing and reclaiming the 
everyday.  
Essentially, Lefebvre toed a fairly classic Marxist line when it came to the commodity thing, 
explaining and agreeing with Marx that it tended to turn man into a thing himself, „just another 
commodity, an object to be bought and sold‟, and saying, „in short, individual and social man‟s 
relation to objects is one of otherness and alienation, self-realization and loss of self‟ (1972: 9). 
However, his attitude as to what the non-commodity thing could achieve was informed and 
influenced by those he engaged with politically and the times he lived in throughout his life. 
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 Catherine Regulier was Lefebvre‟s last wife, now his widow, and co-authored Rhythmanalysis of Mediterranean 
Cities with him. 
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He had begun his early career surrounded by the absurd objects of Dada-ism – the now iconic 
lobster telephone and lip-shaped sofa. Whilst he had never specifically written of those objects or 
professed a belief in them as revolutionary, he was, at the time, wholly engaged with the 
Surrealist Manifesto and had not yet formulated his dissatisfaction with the idea that the 
ridiculous could revolutionise the realm of the everyday. He had at this point, at the very least, an 
open mind as to the significance and potential of the thing within society.  
This tolerance only became tested as France gradually emerged from the shadow of the Second 
World War and began to enjoy the success of Les Trentes Glorieuses and a new spirit of 
consumerism. Partly, this was because he felt he witnessed a schism of sorts in these years, later 
saying that at the time of volume one of CEL (1947), „there was as yet no rupture between 
objects and people‟ (2008 [1947]:14). Partly, it may have been that despite a concern with 
„mystification‟ and his acknowledgement of that concept‟s similarities to Marx‟s alienation, his 
tendency to concentrate on the young Marx meant mystification had not yet been applied to the 
powers of things (as it would be later), but only to the powers of ideas and patterns that governed 
daily life. With the onset of fully-fledged consumer society Lefebvre found himself at odds with, 
and yet nostalgic for the post-war era‟s relationships between people and things. In volume three 
of CEL he attempts to explain this ambiguous position by acknowledging that in time past „The 
slightest object could be considered precious, to be preserved or offered up. These narrow values 
simultaneously hemmed people in and protected them. [my italics] There was no need for a sense 
of security imparted from on high or from without‟ (2008 [1962]: 8). What Lefebvre may have 
been struggling with was the appealing idea of simple, mundane things being precious, rather 
than disposable, alongside the far less appealing idea that having these things made people feel 
safe, respectable and perhaps most poignantly, gave them a fixed identity.  
In fact this quandary can be seen to inform his thinking on the difference between possession (a 
psychological „necessity‟ – erroneously) and entanglement (a coming together and becoming of 
object and person through lived experience). For Lefebvre entanglement meant enjoying an 
object, in the total, human meaning of the word enjoyment; it meant having a rich relationship 
with the object and knowing that through it one was moving into complex networks of human 
relations (2008 [1947]: 158). Entanglement, for Lefebvre, sat in contrast to possession and was 
to be strived for.  
53 
 
However, importantly it was not a banishing of the commodity, as many authors at the time were 
engaging in (see Vance Packard‟s The Waste Makers for example), but rather an attempt to 
fundamentally change our engagement with it. Thus the idealist notion of non-possession of 
property misunderstood the issue according to Lefebvre as „objects are not simply important in 
so far as they are goods, but also as a shell for man‟s objective being‟- their human relations to 
other people, their social behaviour, etc. (2008 [1947]: 155). Therefore, to argue non-possession 
as superior to possession, situates „profound‟ human reality within the absence of human 
relations.  
Yet Lefebvre was certainly not pro-possession either, arguing that engaging in the debate on 
possession results in the argument for equal possession for all - a bourgeois form of socialism. 
Within this system each person would own a miniscule part of socially important things, instead 
of social wealth being increased for everyone; that is, not to own part of a plot in the mountains, 
but that the mountains be open to all (2008 [1947]: 158). Lefebvre‟s concern here was 
privatization (and privation); he was seeking an end to the retreat of the individual – a retreat into 
the bourgeois family, into the longing for a lifestyle as opposed to „changer la vie‟ and therefore 
into romantic individualist revolution, and into the comfort of the object as protection. He said: 
 
 
 
This view is one of objects as compensation, as false security and, within the context of his 
oeuvre, of a disengagement with the social. When Lefebvre speaks of the „shell‟ surrounding 
people, it is with a disquiet, rather than the broadly celebratory acceptance we see in Daniel 
Miller‟s The Comfort of Things (2008). Entanglement was not to be understood as simply a 
greater love or respect for the object. Lefebvre‟s thought is therefore not as aligned as it may at 
first appear to the concept of „enchantment‟ proposed by Jane Bennett (2001). For her, the 
defining narrative of modernity is disenchantment, alienation and dearth, leading to the 
discouraging of „affective attachment to the world‟ (2001: 3). Therefore, her call is for a greater 
enchantment with life‟s experience which may breed a greater concern for human and non-
„To be attached to objects, to privilege them affectively, is today, as in the past, to create a shell or 
a bubble – that is to say, a protective layer against the assaults of a hostile world. This protection 
is simultaneously apparent and real, lived and valued as such. The more threatening the outside 
world becomes, the greater the importance and continuity of the interior – that which surrounds or 
protects subjective interiority.‟ (2008 [1962]: 60) 
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human others. Enchantment, for her, entails a sense of wonder mixed with fear and „is to be 
struck and shaken by the extraordinary that lives amid the familiar‟ (2001:3).  
Whilst this desire to see the extraordinary in the everyday looks very Lefebvrian at first glance, 
Bennett‟s concern is with fostering a greater sense of being in love with things, whereas 
Lefebvre‟s entanglement could be better described as a learning to love. Importantly, 
entanglement therefore includes a sense of necessity, of engaging with things due to life‟s 
necessities. This means that, unlike enchantment, entanglement posits a far more grounded 
relationship with things, one rooted in their use in our lives rather than our attraction to them, 
and therefore one that can never become merged with fetishism – after all, where does 
„enchantment‟ end and fetishizing begin? Entanglement is not the lustful 'enchantment' of the 
visual, or the desire solicited by the „look but don't touch‟ object; rather it is the love that creeps 
up on and grows on until one suddenly realizes one‟s love for that object. In short, entanglement 
cannot be love at first sight, as enchantment can; it insists upon having been lived (vecu) in the 
Lefebvrian sense. 
What Lefebvre sought was an engagement that made the person‟s own sense of themselves and 
their lived experience indeterminable from the object. Nick Thomas‟ understanding of objects as 
„not what they were made to be, but what they have become‟ (1991: 4), is therefore far closer to 
the Lefebvrian concept of entanglement, acknowledging that a thing is not stable, but rather open 
to our interaction with it and part of a lived experience involving the slow un-winding of self 
with object, the creeping up/rubbing off/entering in of things.  
Boris Arvatov‟s (1997) position is not dissimilar to Lefebvre‟s in that Lefebvre strongly 
emphasizes the need to escape from a lexicon in which the standard arguments are between those 
against possession and those in favour of possession for all. Arvatov cites the „socialist objects‟ 
of his study as constituting a fundamentally changed relationship between object and subject in 
which possession becomes an irrelevant concept. For Arvatov, this changed   relationship is 
nothing less than a complete psychological upheaval in how one interacts with and perceives the 
object, above and beyond the fact that one may have attached sentiment to it. Arvatov‟s concern 
is the deep rupture he sees between things and people, which according to him, is brought on 
because the kind of potency things have is not of a variety that causes people to respect them or 
feel responsible for them, but simply one which breeds fetishism. He maintains that by making 
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things more animate and people therefore more connected to them, a new kind of rapprochement 
between subject and object could replace the fetishized relationship.  
What emerges as a constant here is the way in which building a positive relationship with the 
object is specifically not about possession, but rather about a deep entanglement in which object 
and subject become part of one another, neither possessing the other. Lefebvre‟s position is best 
summed up by his words, „A human being only is (only exists) through what he has; but the 
present form of „having‟, the possession of money, is merely an inferior, narrow, limited one. 
Conversely, a human being only completely has what he is‟ (2008 [1947]:159).32 This 
entanglement is achieved by our consciousness of these things being transformed by a deep 
understanding of them and their relationship to us, through which they lose their banality and 
triviality (2008 [1947]: 134). Therefore, in order to „be‟ at our fullest we should „have‟ things in 
an entangled way – we should „have‟ what we are. For Lefebvre this was a quintessentially 
Marxist standpoint as it was key to ridding subject-object relationships of mystification, and 
therefore crucial to achieving a life of alienation
33
. 
It is tempting to speculate on what Lefebvre would have made of engagement with immaterial 
things in the twenty first century – YouTube and myspace content, e-cards, ringtones, wallpaper. 
Would he have seen this as a way of escaping the issues of disposability and possession? Would 
he have considered it possible to be appropriately entangled with digital things? Or would he 
have maintained his inclination that there is no guarantee that non-material things can dispel the 
commodity? (2008 [1947]: 158) Despite it being „social content‟ (as we call it) would he have 
felt that the „socialization‟ brought by digital things was not „socialist‟ but individualist? This 
latter notion is hinted at in volume one of CEL as he refers us back to the problem of „socialism‟ 
now not being social (2008 [1947]: 158). 
                                                          
32
 This notion of having as being, appears in volume one of CEL, yet was perhaps either a purely abstract point, or 
more a prediction of the future or premonition than statement of the way things are, as in volume three Lefebvre 
states that at the time of writing volume one (1946) „there was as yet no rupture between objects and people…‟ 
(1981:14). 
 
33
 Notwithstanding the link between entanglement and dis-alienation as a way of understanding how Lefebvre‟s 
argument can be interpreted as Marxist; let us not forget that Lefebvre was still inclined towards the work of the 
young „humanist‟ Marx, who had in fact written his doctoral thesis on Epicurus. Perhaps Lefebvre‟s thinking on 
things, in terms of its respect for the beauty of everyday simplicity, could be described as partly Marxist-Epicurean! 
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During his lifetime Lefebvre had moved from rural to urban studies, in and out of communism
34
, 
and from an emphasis on individual spiritual revolution to a vehement determination towards 
mutual social action. This emphasis on the mutual was, I would argue, always likely to emerge in 
Lefebvre‟s thought due to his determinedly culturalist outlook. His policy by his own admission 
was one of „cultural revolution with economic and political implications‟ (1972: 197); its 
objective – to create a culture that would be a style of life rather than an institution (1972: 203). 
His own emphasis on the cultural fundamentally coloured his reading of Marx. He argues that 
Marx was never an economic determinist as he has often been interpreted, but rather saw 
capitalism as a form of production where economics prevailed and therefore felt it was 
economics that had to be tackled. Explaining his own project in the light of Marx, he was clear 
that everyday life had taken over from economics – was imbued with it and served it – so it was 
now everyday life itself which must be addressed (1972: 197).  
By the end of his life, Lefebvre had engaged in the century‟s key debates and been present at its 
key events. He died in 1991 at the age of 90 in the Haut-Pyrénées. He was living in his mother‟s 
ancestral home, amongst the Celtic crosses which had provided the initial fervour for his 
engagement with living everyday life to the full. They were perhaps the things that had most 
formed him.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 His suspension from the PCF in 1957 was long due. He had always disagreed with Stalinist policies and regime. 
Key to this was his belief in Lenin‟s (and indeed Marx‟s) argument that revolution would bring about the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the withering away of the State. Many have asked why Lefebvre even remained 
with the party. Remi Hess‟s answer is a good one in my opinion. He argues that Lefebvre enjoyed playing his 
engagement as a heretic; as a „sorte de funambule qui traverse le ravin en utilisant l‟oeuvre de Marx pour balancier‟ 
(1988: 129). This depiction of Lefebvre as a tight-rope walker who uses Marx as a balancing pole, describes well the 
difficult paths along which his thought took him.  
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Chapter Two 
The Tactic of Immediacy: Shopping for the Ubiquitous to the Exotic in £1 
Stores. 
 
‘In Capitalism, the definition of the ‘proper price’ is a discount price.’ (Slavoj Zizek, 2001: 44)  
‘Bargains never go out of fashion … and once you realise you can save money you’ll never go 
back.’ Hussein Leilani, (Owner of 99p Stores), You and Yours, Radio 4, 8th May 2009 
‘Oh, they’ve got my dress, for only thirty cents! I paid 99 cents. I’d better take three!’  
(Marge Simpson, in episode of The Simpsons) 
 
A pedestrian crossing bleeps out its signal and six or so people on either side of New Cross Road 
move to step off the curb, hesitating only to check that a nearby siren will not imminently be 
followed by the emergency vehicle emitting it. I round the corner onto Deptford High Street. 
Despite the on-going regeneration of this area of south-east London, which has seen the creation 
of semi-glamourous apartment blocks around the canals and docks, the High Street continues to 
reflect the multifarious minorities who have settled here and the low level of income. Its shops 
are Halal butchers, African beauty outlets, small vegetable stalls, and pound stores. The latter are 
crammed and sprawling, their contents spilling out onto the street; a vast and often bizarre array 
of artifacts, from feather dusters to garden gnomes, washing baskets to model Tibetan 
monasteries. Chinoiserie, islamery, household drudgery; the exotic and ubiquitous are held 
together in these places, levelled by the £1 price tag that causes them to be classified as equals. 
As I make my way along the left hand side of the street, past the market stall piled high with off-
cuts of material, a woman laughs to her friend in front of me, „He must‟ve got a job-lot of those 
Buddhas! Who‟s gonna buy all them!‟ I turn to where she is looking and there, amongst piles of 
tea-towels and plastic bowls, a two metre stretch of shelf is devoted entirely to an array of 
buddhas. They are Sakyamuni, cross-legged in his classic mudra, adorned with a bright yellow 
£1 price tag which peels up at the edges where it will not stick to the fake-aged gold spray 
underneath. 
Squeezing past huge buckets of dishcloths, jars of spices, and flip-flops, a woman stops to 
examine the decorative plastic bonsai trees which sit in a line in front of the mock-china vases. 
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She looks intrigued as she peers at one in the form of a miniature fir tree; it has an over-sized 
white plastic bird perched in its branches and its scale is further confused by a tiny blue plastic 
teddy bear at its trunk. She turns to me sheepishly saying, „I‟m hopeless with plants… I couldn‟t 
go wrong with this one could I!‟ 
Passing further down the street a shop-front is piled high with pillows and duvets, sheets and 
table-cloths, topped by a large fluorescent cardboard sign upon which is written in black marker 
pen, „Duck-feather pillows only £2.99. Must end today.‟ From just inside the door, the owner 
shouts, „Nice linen, natural fibres, very nice, you will sleep well‟. Inside an elderly man shuffles 
his way down the narrow aisle towards the gloves, his trolley behind him. A woman grabs 
cleaning fluid and bubble bath and beats a hasty path to the till. A child points up to a high shelf 
where two clocks sit side by side, identical apart from the image on their faces, and asks „Can we 
get that Mickey Mouse clock Mum - next to the one with Jesus on?‟  
Here on Deptford High Street, unlike in neighbouring areas, the pound stores are generally 
family run; small narrow spaces which require careful negotiation, unlike those of the larger 
pound chain stores whose owners have knocked through walls, widened aisles and put in bright 
strip lighting (Figure 1). The effect is not dissimilar, in microcosmic form, to the 
Hausmanization of Paris. Just like the opening up and widening of streets, the Hausmanization of 
pound stores can be seen as part of a process which quickly reveals its allegiances with the 
aspirations of „modernism‟, and that „modernism‟ in turn can be easily pinned to the aspirations 
of market economics. Chains such as Poundland and 99p Stores are expanding at an astounding 
rate, especially following the onset of the global recession. 99p Stores, founded in 2001, now has 
108 stores across the UK and aims to increase this number to 200 during 2010. Its bright, easily 
navigable spaces are designed to allow as many people as possible within the store at any one 
time, and to enable those people to see products easily. 
This chapter tackles the way in which the tactic of immediacy and its emphasis on „spontaneity‟ 
has cemented the notion of the „bargain‟ as crucial to the operations of the £1 commodity chain. 
It explores how the idea of the bargain has in turn attached itself to other notions and become 
embedded in consumer mentality, how it uses display and its position amongst other things to 
gain potency, and finally how it operates as part of a wider rhetoric specific to the West and to 
consumptive market economies. The importance of the consumption-disposal cycle will then be 
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discussed, and some conclusions drawn about the schizophrenic nature of shopping for 
„bargains‟.  
 
i) ‘Impatience is a Virtue’. 
I walk with Linda, dodging the market stalls, the prams, and once, an apple that toppled from its 
precarious pile only to be scooped up and thrust to the ground by a trader whose movements 
spoke of the many years his body had known this work. Linda fluctuates between a nervous 
concern that what she says is of use to me and an animated pleasure that she can share her 
thoughts with someone. „I‟ve been doing this for years‟, she says, „years and years. Sometimes I 
hate it and sometimes I love it, but it‟s so familiar to me. I feel like I know every crack on the 
pavement. I do all my shopping on this street. I only go to a supermarket once a month. 
Everything else I need is here, on this one street.‟ Turning sharply she heads through a narrow 
opening between piles of plastic buckets and children‟s stools. The strings of plastic flowers 
above waft gently in the breeze created by her passing. Inside, she‟s looking for plastic cups, 
plates and cutlery for her young niece‟s birthday party which she has agreed to host. She spots a 
pack of ten plastic jumping frogs and takes those too saying „that‟ll keep them occupied for 
another ten minutes, won‟t it! There‟s no point spending lots of money; people think you have to, 
but kids are happy with the simplest of things, and it‟ll all get ruined anyway, so it‟s best to buy 
stuff you don‟t mind throwing away. After all, it‟s only stuff isn‟t it.‟ „Do you only feel like that 
about it because it‟s cheap though?‟ I ask. „Well, I guess if it was worth a fortune I wouldn‟t say 
that, but I choose not to care about stuff. I mean, it‟s not that the stuff makes me feel I don‟t have 
to care about it, it‟s that my feeling towards stuff means I only buy things I don‟t have to worry 
about. It‟s my attitude that determines it, not the stuff! 
The above phrase „impatience is a virtue‟, adapted from the original „patience is a virtue‟, was 
used by Samsung throughout 2009 to highlight the efficiency of its technology and encourage the 
consumer to demand more, and faster. It perfectly captures the way in which immediacy, and the 
ability to do what one wants, when one wants – immediate gratification – is seen as one of the 
pleasures, even rights, of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century. It is also a prime example 
not only of exactly the kind of consumerism that has come under critique from those theorists 
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about to be explored, but also of the way in which current capitalism has re-appropriated 
immediacy (originally born out of rebellion against an older type of capitalism) to its own ends. 
John Tomlinson (2007) highlights various aspects of immediacy, from the blurring of the 
distinction between home and work life, to the international resource that is the Internet, 
shopping hours, news coverage, „the shift in consumer demand from mere possession towards 
speed in delivery‟, just-in-time manufacturing, etc. He underlines the way in which there has 
been a shift from sheer speed to effortless delivery - „… there is a broad assumption underlying 
contemporary consumer culture that, whatever else may be taking place in our personal 
biographies and in the turbulence of global modernity, stuff arrives …‟ (2007: 81).  
Furthermore, as he argues, immediacy is a cultural principle; one not simply concerned with 
„mechanical velocity‟ (although technology enters into the discussion, of course), but rather 
connected to a culture of instantaneity, rapid delivery, ubiquitous availability and the instant 
gratification of desires [my emphasis] (2007: 74.) Crucial, for Tomlinson, to this culture of the 
instantaneous, is proximity, the sheer „connectedness‟ of people, and the ability to be in constant 
communication with others through various technologies – telepresence35.  
Immediacy is of course crucial in positing impatience as a virtue. It closes the gap between now 
and later, and thus between desire and satisfaction. In fact, as Tomlinson asserts, „the culture of 
immediacy ... involves as its core feature the imagination that the gap is already closed [original 
emphasis] … the sense of being without the intervening middle term. Immediacy – closure of the 
gap – is therefore most generally the redundancy or the abolition of the middle term’ [original 
emphasis] (2007: 91). The important factor for the consumer now, is not how many possessions 
she can amass, but the speed with which she can do so – in other words how immediately 
available commodities are (2007: 125).  
One could add that contemporaneously, (and consequently) the requisite immediacy has rendered 
the quality of manufacture of these items, whilst not necessarily inferior, less important, as they 
                                                          
35 Tomlinson‟s use of telepresence relates solely to the interactions between people. My own feeling is that the 
concept could be usefully extended to those between people and things. In fact these two types of „gap‟ are, 
precisely, becoming less distinguishable from each other as people are encouraged to become „friends‟ and „fans‟ of 
brands online for example.  
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are not required to last as long. In fact the consumer desire is for them not to last a lifetime, in 
order that they may be replaced with the latest fashion relatively frequently and the „pleasure‟ of 
purchasing may be relived ad infinitum. Gilles Lipovetsky describes this as a „second generation 
presentism‟ which is not pure hedonism (like its Sixties‟ forefathers whose desire was to break 
away from the traditionality of their parents), but rather „hyperconsumption‟ – a modernity in 
which „the politics of a radiant future have been replaced by consumption as the promise of a 
euphoric present‟ (2005: 35-37). Thus immediacy can be read as a rebellion against waiting, 
which was re-appropriated by capitalism for its own purposes.  
In theory, immediacy can also be seen as move against labour (as opposed to credit), or at least a 
shift in emphasis from productivist to consumerist. However, as Tomlinson points out, this shift 
must not be viewed simplistically because for most the necessity to work still exists. (Credit 
culture only attempts to create the feeling that spending is removed from labour.) What has 
changed, he maintains, is the belief in progress and betterment through industry, the dignity of 
labour and the virtues of providence and accumulation. In contrast, values are now consistent 
with the need for consumers to spend freely in the interests of avoiding systemic crises (2007: 
126). 
The danger in this argument is that it tends to lead to a moralizing discourse on the perils of 
consumer society, which berates consumption for its own sake, rather than seeing it as indicative 
of another feature – such as the enforced reliance upon credit and/or possession, for example. 
Despite affective description and explanations of capitalistic modernity, this is what Bauman 
tends to accomplish: 
 
 
 
 
That said, it is difficult to remove the concept of immediacy, in terms of spending behaviour, 
from the kind of rhetoric Bauman extolls. To some extent, a change in the culture of 
consumption inevitably requires an ability to compromise immediacy every so often; the point is 
‘The consumerist syndrome consists above all in an emphatic denial of the virtue of 
procrastination and of the propriety and desirability of delay of satisfaction . [the] consumerist 
syndrome has degraded duration and elevated transience. It has put the value of novelty above 
that of lastingness. It has sharply shortened the timespan separating not just the wanting from the 
getting … but also the birth of wanting from its demise … Amongst the objects of human desire, 
it has put appropriation, quickly followed by waste disposal, in the place of possessions and 
enjoyment that last … the consumerist syndrome is all about speed, excess and waste’ [original 
emphasis] (2005: 83-84). 
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not to allow immediacy to become inextricably linked to a moralizing discourse which berates 
immediacy for its own sake. As Tomlinson says, 
 
 
 
This highlights precisely the problem with making waiting, in itself, a moral crusade.  Waiting 
became moral largely out of necessity; there is nothing intrinsically „wrong‟ with not waiting. It 
is the link between immediacy and the ability to buy (and therefore possess) which is the issue - 
the way in which „contemporary consumption is characterised by the expectation of delivery 
rather than of satisfaction‟ (Tomlinson, 2007: 128). The culture of the bargain, and its embedded 
culture of immediacy, rests not upon the immediate gratification of the desire for an object which 
satiates a need or want, but upon the immediate gratification of the desire simply to possess it. 
The pleasure in bargain culture is one step removed from traditional consumer desire - the object 
itself is not expected to satisfy (at least not for long); satisfaction comes instead from the ability 
to have in a care-free manner. The failed promise of the commodity is an irrelevancy in bargain 
culture – the consumer realized long ago that commodities lie. What rules now is the false 
promise of the spending thrill. 
I try to get to what lies behind the spending thrill as Linda and I move on to another pound store. 
„Have you been planning your niece‟s party for long?‟, I ask. „Well, I s‟pose I had a rough plan‟, 
she says, „Why?‟ „You don‟t have a shopping list‟, I reply, „is it all in your head or are you 
making it up as you go along?‟ Linda laughs and says it‟s all in her head, and that she knew 
she‟d be able to buy things cheaply to entertain her niece‟s friends. „Do you think the fact you 
knew you‟d be able to buy them cheaply meant you could be more last-minute about the party?‟ 
„Well yes, I s‟pose it did… yes… „cos I didn‟t have to think about putting money to one side, I 
knew I‟d find stuff. That‟s the same with most of what I buy though, I mean, it‟s only really big 
things that I think of in advance… and I don‟t particularly have much money you know…  but, 
well, everyone can afford pound shop stuff can‟t they.. even when you‟re really skint you can 
buy a little something in the pound shop‟. We pause. „Is it nice to be able to buy something for 
yourself in the pound shop?‟ I ask. „Well… that‟s a strange question… it‟s always nice to be able 
„The value of anticipation has always been a subtle and an ambiguous one, somewhere at the 
border between a piquant pleasure and a virtue made of necessity. And so it is not unreasonable to 
think that it may quietly slip away if not reinforced by conditions of general scarcity, let alone 
being routinely undermined in our interfaces with impatient and immoderate technologies‟ (2007: 
133).  
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to buy yourself something, isn‟t it…? Guess I‟d rather buy myself something in Selfridges yes, 
but you‟re still treating yourself aren‟t you… even in a pound shop… even if it’s crap [my 
italics]… it‟s still nice to buy a little something…‟ 
Here, Linda shows that she is aware of the lie of the commodity, but still takes pleasure in the 
ability to buy it – pleasure is transferred to the moment of exchange, rather than the thing in 
itself. On another occasion Tracey eyes some cushions and ponders. „They‟d make a nice 
change‟, she says. „I get bored with how the house looks sometimes… you know… I want to 
change it in a little way… cushions are good for that… „cos I can‟t afford a new sofa. My mum 
and dad wanted to give me theirs, „cos they want a new one, but I feel weird about it „cos they‟ve 
had that all my life, you know, since I was a baby‟. She smiles fondly, „We were constantly 
being told not to put our feet on it and not to muck it up… „cos it had been expensive for them to 
buy, you know… but it‟s too much part of my childhood for me to have it in my house now…‟ 
Tracey‟s sentiments here provide a good demonstration of the way in which both steady 
accumulation (such as that of her parents) and continued accumulation and disposal (such as her 
own) were and are practices which emphasize possession, albeit the case that in the latter 
practice that possession is more momentary. Neither practice is embedded in an alternative to 
possession; thus a culture of non-immediacy is not per se any less detrimental than one of 
immediacy. The key difference is that immediacy has closed the gap, creating the ability for the 
consumer to buy without having to save first and therefore becoming attached to the notion of 
„consumer freedom‟. (Indeed, immediacy is classically linked to „fluidity‟: see Castells, 2000; 
Bauman, 2005, 2007a; Urry, 2000, 2003.) These notions of „freedom‟ and „fluidity‟ are often 
used in conjunction with that of immediacy, by theorists keen to overcome the classic criticisms 
of positing the consumer as a duped subject. Under immediacy, the consumer can be portrayed 
as knowingly buying things that will not last. Whilst this is a valid point, it fails to acknowledge 
the way in which immediacy brings with it a requirement for constant consumption and thus 
promotes the pervasive spread of consumption into all walks of life whilst creating the necessity 
for a reserve army of consumers (as well as one of labour). Patience, in contrast, means 
„deliberately leaving the gap open‟ (Tomlinson, 2007: 151), but is the antithesis of the driving 
spirit of immediacy.  
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For Lefebvre, this emphasis on the apparent necessity (practical and psychological) to buy is a 
defining quality of the „society of bureaucratically controlled consumption‟, as outlined in 
Everyday Life and the Modern World (1971).  This is specifically not „consumer society‟ which 
according to Lefebvre is simply born out of statistics whose raison d‟être is to show that the 
purchase of consumer „durables‟ has increased. For Lefebvre this is correct, but trivial, as it can 
easily be agreed that there has been a transition from penury to affluence, and from the man of 
few needs, to the man of many. Rather, what concerns him: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, in the society of bureaucratically controlled consumption, it is not „the consumer nor even 
that which is consumed that is important in this image, but the vision of consumer and 
consuming as art of consumption.‟ Therefore, as part of this process, man‟s awareness of his own 
alienation is repressed by the addition of a new alienation to the old (1971: 54-55). This is 
precisely the case with pound shop shopping – it is the ability to buy and to gain the sensation of 
spending which is key, rather than what is actually bought. £1 stores thus redefine poverty as 
freedom, telling even the £1 shopping „underclass‟ that they are „free‟ and others that they are 
enjoying „novelty‟ forms of consumption as they marvel at the price and enjoy the pretence of 
being poor. For Lefebvre, this sensation of consumption will always be disappointing as it is as 
much an act of the imagination (fictitious) as it is a real act; it is therefore metaphorical – 
containing „joy in every mouthful, in every perusal of the object‟ (1971: 90). Crucially, this does 
not matter in its own right, but because consumption is accepted as something reliable and 
devoid of deception (1971: 90). 
Importantly, the society of bureaucratically controlled consumption sees needs as clearly defined 
gaps, 
 
 
„… is the transition from a culture based on the curbing of desires, thriftiness and the necessity of 
eking out goods in short supply, to a new culture resulting from production and consumption at 
their highest ebb, but against a background of general crisis. Such is the predicament in which the 
ideology of production and the significance of creative activity have become an ideology of 
consumption [original emphasis], an ideology that bereft the working classes of their former 
ideals and values while maintaining the status and the initiative of the bourgeoisie. It has 
substituted for the image of active man that of the consumer as the possessor of happiness…‟ 
(1971: 54-55) 
 
„… neatly outlined hollows to be stopped up and filled in by consumption and the consumer until 
satiety is achieved, when the need is promptly solicited by devices identical to those that led to 
satiety; needs are thus incessantly re-stimulated by well-tried methods until they begin to become 
rentable once again, oscillating between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, both states being 
produced by similar manipulations‟ (1971: 79).   
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This incessant re-stimulation of needs is intricately connected to the de-longation of the 
consumption-re-consumption gap. As a result of, and in order to create, this gap, obsolescence 
becomes the norm (as the following chapter will explore in more detail), and not simply in literal 
terms, but in deeper psycho-cultural ones. Lefebvre explains this by describing how consumption 
is on the one hand material, and on the other theoretical - ideological and made up of signs and 
images etc). Thus, he says, it is complete (tends towards the rationalized organization of daily 
life) and incomplete (the system is forever unfinished and unclosed); it is satisfaction (of needs 
and therefore saturation) and it is frustration („only air was consumed so the desire re-emerges‟); 
it is constructive (we choose objects) and destructive („it vanishes in the centre of things, slides 
down the slopes of piled-up objects accumulated without love and for no purpose‟) (1971:142).  
This cycle is de-longated via obsolescence; and here we use the term both literally and 
conceptually. As Lefebvre argues, obsolescence not only became a carefully calculated science 
on the part of manufacturers, but this also caused the „obsolescence of needs‟, as those who 
manipulated objects to make them less durable also manipulate motivations, creating a „strategy 
of desire‟ in which new needs constantly take the place of old ones. Furthermore this strategy of 
desire creates a „cult of the transitory‟ which, rather than creating a fluidity of existence which 
could allow the everyday not to stagnate, is in total contradiction to the cult of, and the demand 
for, stability and permanence (1971: 82). It is this psycho-cultural side of obsolescence which is 
most crucial as part of the tactic of immediacy; the understanding that things (in themselves) are 
not to blame – the inclination here is not Luddite - but rather the terror of feeling one has 
constantly to seek out new things. 
 
 
 
 
For Levebvre this seeking out of new things is intrinsically linked to a logic of accumulation 
which runs contrary to everyday life, as the latter is not cumulative. He argues that the number of 
objects a person can actually use in a lifetime cannot increase indefinitely. Therefore, the effects 
of accumulation on everyday life are superficial despite the fact they cannot be completely 
„The so-called society of consumption is both a society of affluence and a society of want, of 
squandering and of asceticism (of intellectuality, exactitude, coldness). The ambiguities 
proliferate, each term reflecting its opposite … signifying it and being signified by it, they stand 
surety for and substitute each other while each one reflects all the others. It is a pseudo-system, a 
system of substitutes, the system of non-systems, cohesion of incoherence. The breaking point 
may be approached but never quite attained: that is the limit‟ (1971: 142). 
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eliminated - „accumulation and non-accumulation is resolved in the methodical subordination of 
the latter and its organized destruction by a rationality bordering on the absurd but excelling in 
the manipulation of people and things‟  (1971: 61-62). What is being suggested here is that the 
non-cumulative nature of the everyday is being over-run by a culture of accumulation, but that 
precisely because this culture is not natural to the everyday, the latter emerges as the crack 
through which the process of cultural revolution needed can be begun. By Lefebvre‟s own 
admission, this idea of cultural revolution is utopian, but necessarily so. 
 
ii) Bargaining for the Bargain 
£1 commodities represent a kind of underclass of commodity which cannot be advertised, but 
which are part of an ever more pervasive culture - the culture of the bargain. To some extent, this 
culture can be interpreted as an example of Adam Podgorecki‟s „dirty togetherness‟ (1986) as, 
initially at least, it required the presence of cliques and close-knit networks within the context of 
scarcity. However, unlike Podgorecki‟s notion which is hinged on distrust of the State, bargain 
culture was and is effectively a State-backed project designed to maintain the economic health of 
consumer nations. Never-the-less, the success of this culture is in some ways surprising, as it 
hinges upon a pride in the cheap, something which even thirty years ago may well have struggled 
to take hold. Whilst searching for bargains would previously have been the sole prerogative of 
the poor and associated with a certain level of stress, it is now celebrated as a national pass-time 
for all. The ability to spend is all-important and the truth of the spend is covered over with the 
myth of the bargain as providing „freedom‟. In fact bargain culture could be better understood as 
providing a kind of grimy glue (to draw upon Podgorecki‟s notion), which allows for the 
entanglement of social relations in things previously found disgusting. Thus people become 
attached to things in a relationship which constitutes a lie about the positions of both within 
capitalism. 
Public behaviour around the openings of new £1 stores prove how pervasive this culture has 
become and how deeply embedded the notion of the bargain is for the consumer. The following 
section from a newspaper article reports on the opening of a new 99p Store on the 25
th
 
September 2009 in Halesowen, near Birmingham: 
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(See figure 2) 
Similar scenes were reported following the opening of the ninety-ninth 99p Store in Ashford, 
Kent and the opening of a pound store in Catford, South East London. Both caused a queue half 
a mile long, with some people having waited since seven in the morning. Jean had set her alarm 
early especially to get up and join the queue in Catford. „My husband was appalled‟, she told me. 
„He just could not understand why I would get up so early to go and stand in a queue outside a 
shop. He said he could almost understand if it was the new year sales and there were designer 
labels and stuff, but that this was ridiculous … and embarrassing … he said it was 
embarrassing!‟  I ask her why he thinks it would be embarrassing. „Well, I s‟pose he was brought 
up to feel that looking too needy for things is shameful you know… almost like being seen to 
accept charity. He doesn‟t want our neighbours to see me queuing here. He thinks it looks 
desperate‟. „And you don‟t see yourself as needy or desperate‟, I say. „No I don‟t. I just like a 
bargain… and I don‟t really care how it looks to other people … anyway, it‟s normal, look how 
many people there are in this queue, and all sorts too.‟ 
If Jean‟s sentiments showed how behaviour her husband still found „shameful‟, had become 
perfectly acceptable and normal‟ for her – part of an accepted culture - Sue‟s attitude seemed to 
go even further. „I think it‟s great that people can queue like this outside a pound shop. I 
remember back in the eighties it wasn‟t as acceptable to buy cheap stuff, you know, it was all 
about having money wasn‟t it. But now, everyone wants cheap stuff, I mean everyone, not just 
people who can‟t afford expensive stuff. I would‟ve put my pound shop carrier bag inside 
another carrier bag to hide it back then. Not now.‟ For Sue, finding a bargain has become 
something everyone does, rather than remaining an activity limited to those with less money. She 
epitomizes the main-streaming of bargain culture and does not question the logic it asserts that 
the consumer is getting a „fairer deal‟. 
This logic of bargain culture often requires additional pieces of information to surround the 
commodity, usually in the form of information or tag-lines. In the case of the £1 commodity 
„POLICE are to be drafted in to control the crowds of bargain hungry shoppers expected to flock 
to the opening of a new discount store in Halesowen….  Bosses said they have requested a 
'friendly police presence' for 'crowd control' purposes as shoppers desperate to get hold of 
bargains including 17-piece tea sets and freeview boxes turn up.„ (2009, Halesowen News)  
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these are to be found in the form of signs outside pound stores which point not to the actual 
commodities themselves, but to how easily one‟s general concerns could be solved for only a 
pound. For example, „warm and dry for £1‟, or „personal alarms - be safe for £1.‟ Others target 
even wider ideas such as „choice‟- „something for everyone‟ and „£1 - your choice‟ - the culture 
surrounding the commodity becomes its mouth-piece. To put it another way, we have to become 
addicted to the idea of the bargain, in order for the pound commodity to be addictive … and we 
are. It is an idea because the bargain itself is indefinable: what we tend to mean is that we bought 
something at a cost lower than we feel we would „normally‟ have paid for it. However, as we are 
unaware of how much that commodity cost to manufacture, ship, etc., we cannot say whether 
what we paid was under the odds or not - „getting a bargain‟ is based on social context rather 
than the commodity‟s inherent truths. Pound store commodities are priced cheaply because they 
are made from cheap materials and do not last, or they are in fact over-priced but their context 
within the pound store convinces us that they must be cheaper than elsewhere. In reality, if the 
bargain commodity was as omnipresent as its idea, all pound stores would be out of business!  It 
is the idea of the bargain that is all-powerful. 
Sometimes bargain culture relates itself in casual ways to other ideas, partnering with deeply 
embedded social histories. For example, each year, in the run-up to Christmas, 99p stores begin 
to use a seasonal carrier bag with the slogan „99p stores – the spirit of Christmas‟ (Figure 3). 
Here, semantics play the role of causal factors in the psycho-cultural construction of the bargain 
by fixing together a notion with strong emotive connotations such as the „spirit of Christmas‟ and 
that of „99p‟. In this context, the bargain emerges as a way to return to a romantic vision of the 
past in which Christmas was less commercialized, and gifts were about considered thought rather 
than grand gestures or price. In actuality the slogan, and quite possibly the feelings of consumers, 
have little to do with not needing to spend, and everything to do with spending in a way that 
makes people feel the gift they give is worth financially more than what they paid for it. The 
bargain was insolently masquerading as „spirit‟, and in doing so increasing its potency as a 
concept.  
Of course the culture of the bargain is a global phenomenon; it can be applied on a macro scale 
from one part of the world to another, as well as on the level of the individual consumer; it can 
seep into the global rhetoric of East versus West in new and pernicious ways. This is particularly 
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relevant when looking at the Western consumer who is caught between the necessity to 
economize, pressure from media sources to spend in order to keep the economy healthy, and the 
expectation that products made elsewhere will reach us at very low prices. For this strange 
combination of reasons, the Western consumer is used to the bargain, in fact even expects it – as 
Slavoj Žižek says, „In Capitalism, the definition of the „proper price‟ is a discount price.‟ 
(2002:43-44. Original emphasis.)  
This syndrome has been further analyzed by Victor Alneng in his work on backpackers and 
Vietnamese traders (2007). He argues that backpackers seeking and expecting the „right price‟ (a 
low price) are part of a north-to-south tourism „which cannot be truly sustainable if the 
monstrous global geopolitical and economic inequalities that pave its travel routes are not 
sustained too‟ (2007: 4). According to Alneng the quest for this bargain price is not driven solely 
by pure economic concerns, but also by a desire for authenticity, and „a commodity can only 
have high value (authentically) if it has a low value (monetarily); it is only emancipated as a 
global souvenir if it is confined to the local in terms of price rate‟ (2007: 9). Thus „the souvenir 
cannot be authentic if the local who sells it is inauthentic, and an authentic local is a poor local‟ 
(2007: 9). 
Within the £1 commodity chain, the equivalent of the „right price‟ is the „China price‟. I first 
heard the phrase from a UK wholesale buyer who was explaining to me how he negotiated with 
Chinese manufacturers. He said it usually started with a manufacturer saying they could do a 
„good price‟; with some shaking of heads and imploring on his part „good price‟ then became 
„best price‟; a few sums tapped into a calculator, maybe a quick phone call (sometimes faked, a 
lot more shaking of heads from both parties, and if you were lucky the wholesaler would look 
stoic and say, „Ok, I‟ll do you a very special price - China price‟. There is an implicit hierarchy 
at play here. Unlike a „good price‟, which was nearly always followed by the phrase „good for 
you, good for me‟, „China price‟ seemed to contain more of a recognition on the part of the 
manufacturer, of the labour-rich industriousness of China and its juxtaposition with the addiction 
to cheap in the West. China price was „good for you‟, but not so „good for me‟. 
The embedding of the bargain concept into capitalistic relations is certainly pervasive, and can 
be interpreted, as Žižek does, as a set of assumptions on the part of the West as to their „right‟ to 
discount price. There is here a general truth regarding the expectations of consumers in the West 
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to purchase commodities at little more than it cost to produce them. This is as a result of the huge 
disparities between the price of labour power in different parts of the world, and the increasing 
ability of Western countries, since the late 1960s, to import goods in bulk at much lesser cost per 
unit than they could produce them for themselves. The boom in container shipping is no small 
factor in the unfolding of this situation, as Mark Levinson‟s The Box (2006) clearly 
demonstrates.  
However, the pragmatic truth of this situation, whilst certainly instrumental in fostering an 
expectation of the „bargain‟ among Western consumers, should not be used to easily characterize 
non-Western consumption as unconcerned with the „bargain‟. Žižek‟s phrasing rather suggests 
that whilst the West believes it has a „right‟ to the bargain, the rest of the world is not labouring 
(metaphorically and literally) under any such illusion. This results in the „rest of the world‟ only 
being able to be defined in contrast to the West (rather than in its own right), and denies a 
plurality of relationships and strategic uses of the bargain by geographically, economically and 
culturally diverse players. Interpreted in this manner, relationships with the bargain can be used 
to explain away the structural injustices of global commodity markets. The danger here is that an 
assumption on the psycho-cultural nature of non-Western consumption becomes embodied by 
structural features created by government and market policy, which serve to maintain 
exploitative relationships. If the non-West is perceived as not expecting to be able to purchase a 
„bargain‟, only to be given the opportunity to manufacture and sell „bargains‟, it becomes all too 
easy to type-cast non-Western countries as „producers‟ unconcerned with their own ability to 
consume the kinds of things Western countries want to consume.  
This leads to a plethora of policies largely concerned with finding ways to keep prices low for 
western consumers, apparently with the additional concern that their consumption is needed in 
order to maintain mass demand for commodities, which in turn allows for large companies to 
employ cheap labour on a mass scale. Such policies maintain and strengthen  exploitative 
structural relationships as they reinforce the dependency of „producing nations‟ on „consuming 
nations‟, in the process ignoring the issue of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). A „bargain price‟ is, 
after all, defined only by the purchasing power of consumers. I emphasize the word „apparently‟ 
as such policies are immediately hypocritical in nature, facilitating the import of large quantities 
of cheap commodities up to a point, but severely penalizing any exporting nation which becomes 
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too adept at reaching or surpassing this point, and therefore threatening domestic industries. For 
example, figures from the United States Trade Commission illustrate that the number of petitions 
against so-called „dumping‟ of cheap commodities has risen steadily each year, especially from 
2000 to 2006, (www.usitc.gov) in line with the increase in cheap imports. (Not surprisingly 
China makes an increasingly frequent appearance.)  
This „balance‟ expected of „producing nations‟ by „consuming nations‟, is mirrored by the 
policies of „consuming nations‟ towards their own consumption, creating what Bauman calls the 
„walking contradiction‟ consumer who must spend, but not over-spend, in order to be a good 
citizen (Bauman, 2007b). This balancing act on the individual‟s level reflects a macro 
phenomenon which Lefebvre (unsuccessfully) attempted to define as a „bureaucratic society of 
managed consumption‟ (1971). (It is a shame that this title was not embraced, but rather ignored 
in favour of the more generalized notion of „consumer society‟, as it emphasizes well the ways in 
which consumption is required up to a point, i.e. is managed).  
The same set of rationales that creates the „walking contradiction‟ consumer, also creates a 
convenient set of pretend enemies which allow consumerism to extol itself as the purveyor of all 
things good and reasonable - hence strange conflations of consumerism with democracy. For 
example, news reports during the cold war often showed USSR citizens queuing for bread and 
portrayed them as deprived of buying power, due (apparently) to their communist regime. 
According to these reports, they were not deprived of basic sustenance and resources; they were 
deprived of consumer choice and their right to buy. Consumerism became democracy and vice 
versa. Thus anything other than consumerism is totalitarian, which perfectly covers the totalizing 
(and pathological) nature of consumerism. For Lefebvre, this kind of myth-making is best 
understood as part of mystification.  
 
iii) Mystification and the ‘Bouleversement’ of the Real. 
It is worth exploring this (false) idea of freedom as the freedom to consume further, specifically 
within the context of Lefebvre‟s work on mystification (as outlined in the introduction). Initially, 
mystification was born from Lefebvre‟s witnessing of the rise of Fascism and the events leading 
up to the Second World War. However, he was later to also employ it to describe the rampant 
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onset of consumer culture and its impact. In fact the „neo-Marxism‟, for which he is often said to 
have been the inspiration, focuses on concepts such as „false consciousness‟ in a new light; one 
which emphasizes consumerist features of the „modern‟ age and the effect of marketing. 
Importantly, Lefebvre‟s emphasis in understanding alienation is on the lack of control 
experienced by the proletariat, rather than their position as part of the labour market or as 
(non)owners of capital. Consumerism, for Lefebvre, played a huge role in decreasing their 
freedom, as it gave them a false sense of freedom whilst further disenfranchising them. This is 
precisely the role of bargain culture – a false bringer of „freedom‟ to indulge in „leisure‟ 
activities and/or spend less time on drudgery.  
In volume one of CEL Lefebvre sets out his views on the way in which leisure serves capitalism, 
explaining how leisure must be seen to break with the everyday, to offer distraction, and 
liberation from worry and necessity – „liberation and pleasure – such are the essential 
characteristics of leisure…‟ (2008 [1947]: 31). As leisure was therefore, to be as far removed 
from what felt like „work‟ as possible, it is perhaps not surprising that consumption (namely 
shopping) has become the leisure activity par excellence since the latter end of the twentieth 
century.  
On one occasion, I spend time with Sarah and Mark. It is a Saturday morning, and Sarah informs 
me that coming to the High Street, wandering round the pound stores and then going for lunch in 
the café has become a casual tradition of theirs. „I dunno‟, says Sarah, „it just chills me out. I like 
the simplicity of it, you know, it‟s no big deal, it‟s not like I‟m off down Selfridges or something. 
We have fun looking at the nick-nacks and stuff. It‟s part of local life isn‟t it. It‟s something I 
like to do in my free time. I s‟pose I like it „cos it‟s easy… kind of mindless. I feel carefree when 
I know I can buy stuff. 
Tracey had expressed similar feelings, saying: „Wandering round here, you know, it‟s relaxing 
isn‟t it. No big decisions to make. No rush. I s‟pose I feel like when I‟m pottering round the 
pound shop, it‟s a bit of „me time‟ you know. This is how I relax. [she laughs]. That‟s kind of sad 
in a way isn‟t it!‟ 
For both Sarah and Tracey, this acceptance of shopping as leisure fails to recognize the ways in 
which spending is precisely tied up with the necessity for work and monotony. Her responses are 
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perhaps typical of society realizing only momentarily, if at all, that leisure too has been recruited 
to serve the purposes of capitalism. As Lefebvre argues, this is of course, as a result of the fact 
that leisure time (ironically sometimes referred to as „free time‟) is a capitalistic construct, 
designed to reassure the worker that she is not alienated.  
For Lefebvre, this notion of consumption as freedom is of course a myth (mystified), and one 
which not only attempts to displace alienation, but which also arises from the fetishization of 
merchandise, ideas, laws and rites (1999: 161). (In fact, Lefebvre is deeply sceptical of any 
notion of freedom throughout his oeuvre, as he sees it as inextricably linked to the individual’s 
right to property and freedom to „have‟, rather than society‟s. This is neatly summed up when he 
says that the rights of man were the rights of the idea of man, not man himself (1999: 51). 
However, this myth in itself is part of a greater one – that of Capitalism as „ordre naturel‟ and 
therefore objective and eternal. For Lefebvre this absolutely must be questioned, not least 
because, as he expresses it, „how can the so obvious disorder of the Bourgeoisie be indentified 
with Reason and Order?‟ (1999: 166)  
Fetishization and the myth of freedom (including freedom through consumption) is part of the 
wider process of mystification for Lefebvre. Mystification is aided by fetishization and alienation 
(not simply of the worker but of the conscience itself) and is therefore definitively not able to be 
reduced to an economic rhetoric but insists on being interpreted as also political and ideological. 
Hence, discussing the ideological power of the bargain and the ability to consume is not limited 
to an account of economic outcomes for society, but is a cultural and political discourse. 
Consumption portrayed as freedom is part of the mystification of everyday life (a vast 
mystification according to Lefebvre); it is part of the contradiction between desire and fact; an 
apparently bounteous existence which hides its unkindness - „une immense bonte douce à sa 
conscience [my italics] couvre sa mechancete‟ (1999: 118). 
Mystification is a concept fundamentally hinged upon the idea of consciousness. For Lefebvre it 
is more than a lie as a lie is given to one or many individuals, whereas this lie is generalised – a 
social lie expanding across the whole of society. It is also more than a manoeuvre, as 
manoeuvres are calculated in advance, whereas with mystification reality finds a mask as it 
unfolds (1999: 78). Mystification is when the real is substituted by an abstract representation, 
and when that representation inverts the real and „bouleverse‟ (turns upside down) the possible 
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(1999: 22). It is therefore that moment of the social conscience where its form hides its ancient 
contents; the moment when the social conscience itself becomes a liar (1999:79). Thus for 
Lefebvre, neither the private conscience, nor the collective conscience could criticise properly 
the truth as the conscience in all its forms is manipulated.  Succinctly it is put thus: „La clarté 
ment. La raison cache les forces absurdes. Notion presque tragique‟ - reason hides the absurd 
forces (of capital); it allows capitalism‟s disorder to appear rational and just.  
What fuels this ability? For Lefebvre it is „les valeurs‟ of capitalism – its „values‟ – which appear 
in various guises such as nationalism, individualism, rationalism. These present themselves as 
the opposite of what they are; being purportedly supportive of the individual, the nation and 
Reason, but turning them against themselves. For example, whilst Capitalism projects itself as 
the defender of the individual, it exults only the form of the individual – individualism – rather 
than the ability of that individual to be „total‟ in the sense of being her own person. For Lefebvre 
the person ought to be enabled to be individual and social – independent but mutual (1999: 100). 
It is precisely this misunderstanding of what it is to be individual (this mystification of the 
concept) which for Lefebvre means all people have become solitary whilst never being able to 
escape the mass: we are all part of individualism and so „solitary‟, yet we cannot escape mass 
mystified culture, which disallows us to be individuals (1999: 119).   
This hypocritical process is continually carried out by capitalism according to Lefebvre: when 
capital makes slaves of men, liberty becomes a value; when life becomes ugly, beauty is exulted; 
when the world is saturated and has been explored, adventure becomes the only choice. Even 
regret is presented as hope, as destroyed, tortured, crucified man becomes increasingly divine
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(1999: 119). Importantly, these ideologies are lead by people who are not aware that they are 
lying; who do not intend necessarily to be part of mystification – the best liars are those who do 
not know they are lying (1999: 132). Furthermore, their real destructive and totalising nature lies 
in the fact that they do not simply mystify the present but give an image for the future, thus 
disallowing alternative images and proving themselves to be „doubly mystifying‟ (1999: 120). 
                                                          
36
  This is undoubtedly a (not so) veiled reference to Lefebvre‟s struggle with his religious up-bringing and the 
Celtic crosses and crucifixes of his childhood. His frustration appears to come from an incredulity that the events 
preceding Jesus‟ death have been turned into a promise for the future, rather than acknowledged as a devastating 
image of what humankind are capable of – the ultimate mystification perhaps. For Lefebvre, the cross mystifies, re-
telling the story to suit its own ends and disavowing us of the hideous truth of human actions.   
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Suffice to say in current capitalistic society (globally) there is little alternative to the logic of 
consumption as necessary for a healthy economy; little challenge to the idea of spending as a 
type of freedom; little space to consider the possibility of a future not carved out by consumptive 
economic capitalism.  
In fact, it is often the case that even those purportedly against capitalistic mechanisms attempt to 
see the potential for change within its limits, citing purchasing choices as „working class 
freedoms‟ and suggesting „ethical‟ consumption as a means to reverse uneven development. This 
is perhaps an example of the most pervasive form of mystification in current times, coming as it 
often does, precisely from those who situate themselves in theoretical opposition to capitalism. 
Daniel Miller‟s take on consumption is perhaps typical here (See Miller, 2008, 1998a, 1998b.) 
For him, consumption brings us closer to realising our own link with materiality; it is the point at 
which goods are returned to the domain of personal relationships and taken out of situations of 
alienation (2006: 347). Miller in many ways espouses the opposite to the rhetoric typical of many 
60s authors including, famously, Vance Packard, who were stoically „anti-consumption‟, and in 
doing so creates a strange breed of argument which fluctuates from acknowledging the market 
does not contain personal relationships, to suggesting that we can talk in terms of the 
„responsibilities‟ we have to consume for others well-being.  
At first glance, this can be read as a valid attempt to re-cast consumption as a concern with 
gaining greater entanglement with the object. Yet, Miller places this dis-alienation and agency 
within a rhetoric in which Western consumerism unproblematically „solves‟ the problems of 
unseen others by providing a path out of poverty or representing the desire for development 
(2006:341). He gives little, if any, consideration to the argument that seeing consumption as the 
answer only embeds relations further within the market, allowing for the continuation of uneven 
development. Furthermore, he seems content to allow countries to develop in our wake and 
therefore under our control; in doing so he inherently assumes that „development‟ looks a certain 
way (capitalist) and can only happen along the same paths we in the West developed. 
He goes on to berate the way in which theories of consumption have largely concentrated on 
mass consumption as a negative trend, charting a path of „anti-consumption studies‟ through 
Veblen (1994), Lasch (1979), Marcuse (1964), all of whom he says are influenced by an 'ascetic 
version of Western Marxism' (2006: 342-343). By confusing the consumer‟s awareness of 
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materiality with the ability to mass consume, Miller simplistically casts ascetism as the enemy – 
a logic which would provide no choice but to conceive of entanglement as a form of ascetism 
also. Thus Miller succeeds in mystifying entanglement, by portraying it as an out-moded and 
unrealistic wholesale rejection of consumption, and by attaching it to neo-liberal policies on 
„ethical‟ consumption. 
This is to entirely mis-understand (and therefore distort and mystify) the ways in which „our‟ 
consumption bears upon the poverty or development of others. Whilst it may be the case that 
consumption in the West enables the survival of certain pockets of activity elsewhere across the 
globe, it is by no means a sustainable strategy as a whole. It is fundamentally reformist, requiring 
no great change on the part of the West or capitalism itself.  Whilst fair-trade movements have 
added the proviso that the „lifting‟ can only be achieved if the price on the commodity reflects 
the needs of the producer and, to some extent, denies the „right‟ of the consumer to a bargain, 
they are fundamentally in agreement with the concept of the West buying the „rest‟ out of 
poverty. The Western consumer is not asked to relinquish their „right‟ to the bargain whole-
heartedly, merely to re-prioritize their spending patterns in return for a warm feeling of having 
behaved „ethically‟, whilst the non-Western consumer has been able to bargain („bargaignier‟) 
with greater sway, but is still denied „the bargain‟.  
Why the continuation of this denial of the bargain to some? Because, bargaignier (to 
bargain/haggle/trade) is fundamentally at odds with „the bargain‟ unless relationships remain 
unequal. The seller can only earn a „fair price‟ for the commodity, at the same time as the 
consumer pays a discount price for the commodity if the bargain buyer‟s money is worth more 
than the bargain seller‟s. The familiar call of Chinese traders, „good price - good for you, good 
for me‟, captures this structure, whilst exposing the way in which bargaignier and bargain are 
caught in a set of structural inequities. Furthermore, this Western logic of spending our way out 
of trouble is applied to other nations who have chosen other economic paths. Hence the „saver 
nations‟ are blamed for financial downtowns, China comes under increasing pressure to spend 
some of its foreign reserves (or appreciate the value of the Yuan), and „Asian thrift‟ becomes a 
de rigeour term for economists attempting to make populist claims on who the bad guys are. It 
becomes increasingly ironic that the „thrift‟ carried out by Western consumers is seen as enabling 
everyone to do their duty and continue spending, whilst the „thrift‟ at the Chinese end is 
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apparently to blame for the global financial crisis. Being „thrifty‟ to spend is fine; being thrifty to 
save is not. Hypocrisy is served by mystification. 
 
iv) The Pound Store as Trinketorium: Elements of the Beguiling Display of Ephemera.  
If the first element of the bargain as tactic is to attach itself to other concepts, such as „spirit‟, 
„thrift‟ and „duty to spend‟, the second element is more bound up with its physical display. This 
has become all the more crucial in the light of the single price store as commodities have had to 
find ways other than their price tag to assert their „good value‟. 
Just as the department store established fixed price and so eliminated the human interaction of 
bargaining, restricting the act of consumption to a relation between consumer and merchandise, 
so now the single-price store eradicates even the need to seek out price and consider it, further 
emaciating the role of dialogue so that it is required neither interpersonally, nor intra-personally. 
One seeks a price, with an object conjoined. Sometimes one fails. The object we seek is not 
conjoined to that price, on that day, in that place. A customer asks the assistant the price of first 
one object, then another, then another, smirking to his friend. He does it to annoy, to play the 
fool, to call the bluff of the ghost of interaction, whilst knowing to do so is futile. It has become 
such an established joke, that the 99p stores have re-appropriated it for their own marketing, 
placing banners around the stores which read „Yes, everything is 99p‟. 
Yet this democracy of price does not mean that all £1 commodities are equal – far from it. 
Firstly, some create greater savings for the consumer than others, secondly (and less 
pragmatically) cultural connotations as to „value‟ come into play. Let us tackle these two points 
separately. The issue of some £1 commodities being greater „bargains‟ than others is best 
explained by the concept of the „market mavern37‟ or „price vigilante‟: individuals who scour the 
market for the „best deal‟. Helen is a self-confessed price vigilante. She admits to taking great 
pleasure in seeking out the best price and not falling for a „false bargain‟:- 
„When I was regularly shopping in pound stores it was for certain things. I mean, I loved looking round 
them anyway, but I didn‟t necessarily buy just any old thing in there. I would say that I either bought 
certain things that really were cheaper in them than in other shops, or I bought funny little novelty things 
                                                          
37
 Mavern is an old Yiddish word meaning „collector of knowledge‟. 
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now and again…. Like, I‟d buy cleaning products and bathroom stuff, and then I‟d buy little ornaments 
and things like that, but I never bought kitchen stuff, saucepans and that, because they normally break and 
then you have to buy another and then you‟ve spent as much if not more than you would have done if 
you‟d bought a more expensive saucepan somewhere else. And I never bought socks or tea-towels 
because although they look cheap, you can actually get them much cheaper from supermarkets or other 
large stores.‟ 
In this way Helen probably managed to buy the commodities that made the pound stores the least 
profit. Her behaviour, and that of other maverns, may mean the making of profit becomes harder, 
but in the bigger picture it very much aids the survival of the concept of the bargain as by 
accentuating the importance of price comparison it promotes the thrill and pride of being a wise 
bargain-hunter. It makes bargain-hunting something one can „be successful‟ at and therefore 
encourages consumers to involve themselves with bargain hunting almost as a past-time. The 
culture of price comparison may enable people to avoid bad deals, but it also encourages the 
gaining of pleasure from so-called „playing the market‟. 
As mentioned above, the second reason £1 commodities are not equal is that cultural 
connotations as to „value‟ come into play. Many logics apply to ensure that the consumer can 
still be beguiled by the feeling that she captured a greater bargain by choosing that particular £1 
commodity rather than the next. As Baudrillard recognised in The System of Objects (2005), the 
factors that differentiate commodities lie outside of a structural-technical analysis as this is 
insufficient for everyday objects whose safety and basic ability to work is easily satisfied. What 
emerges as important and defining are their cultural connotations:-  „Each of our practical objects 
is related to one or more structural elements, but at the same time they are all in perpetual flight 
from technical structure towards their secondary meanings, from the technological system 
towards a cultural system‟ (2005:6).  
What Baudrillard goes on to identify as key features of the display of objects describes well the 
inconsistency of the system within which the bargain operates. On the one hand, it often relies 
upon cultural connotations linked to the „exotic‟ and time; on the other its objects are serial 
objects not designed to last - part of a system in which abundance increases under the constraints 
of calculated scarcity (2005: 162). (This theme of abundance being defined by scarcity will be 
the major discussion in chapter four.) One must „snap up‟ a bargain: it is an entity that despite 
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being attached to ubiquitous objects, can become „unavailable‟ at any moment, and so must be 
searched out by the consumer faced with the possibility of finding it has become obsolete. 
Yet contemporaneous to being highly disposable, many bargains are particularly successful 
because they embody „time‟‟. It is worth briefly exploring in more detail the ways in which the 
object can take on the appearance of time and how this operates to elevate its status in 
comparison with other objects. As Baudrillard points out, it is the antique which most obviously 
embodies time: 
 
 
 
Yet, for Baudrillard, there is something false about an antique, as it „puts itself forward as 
authentic within a system whose basic principle is by no means authenticity, but, rather, the 
calculation of relationships and the abstractness of signs‟ (2005:78). For him, the antique object 
(and indeed the exotic object) is a myth of origins (2005:80). What Baudrillard is questioning 
here is the idea of origins; the assumption that there is a fundamental „authenticity‟, apparently 
unproblematic as a concept, of the type Walter Benjamin relied upon when theorising upon the 
destruction of the „aura‟. 
In reading the £1 commodity, it is crucial to pick apart this assumption without simply failing to 
acknowledge the potency of the ideas of „authenticity‟, „time‟, and „original‟, as many £1 
commodity are copies of antiques, or even copies of fake antiques. However, whilst absolutely 
proving the unhelpfulness of the notion of authentic, they also work to heighten it somehow by 
being superb at creating and portraying what I will call insta-history – instantaneous senses of 
cultural knowledge, yearning, or belonging which can be conjured instantly from the presence of 
the object. They are tools that create time that never happened - at least not to the individual 
consumer. Or, in the same way that Baudrillard described antiques, „they are a way of escaping 
everyday life, and no escape is more radical than escape in time‟ (2005:85). 
Time is key here, and particularly useful in (re)understanding how the pull of the „authentic‟ can 
work. It runs parallel to an emphasis on Benjamin‟s description of the aura as „a strange weave 
„The antique object no longer has any practical application, its role being merely to signify. It is 
astructural, it refuses structure, it is the extreme case of disavowal of the primary functions. Yet it 
is not afunctional, nor purely „decorative‟, for it has a very specific function within the system, 
namely the signifying of time.‟ (2005: 77-78) 
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of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close the 
object may be‟ (1997:250), rather than an emphasis on his more perspicuous and virulent 
argument concerning the „original‟. If we accept that the „authentic‟ (or rather the appearance of 
what we think of as at least symbolizing „authenticity‟) is connected to the semblance of distance 
through time we escape the problematic nature of Benjamin‟s assertion that copying an „original‟ 
„smashed‟ the aura. (The important feature for objects such as the £1 Buddhas is the way they 
embody a feeling of distance for the consumer; a feeling of being from somewhere else, 
somewhere with a substance „deeper‟ than that of the place occupied by the consumer. 
In the Buddhas, this is harnessed by their falsely aged appearance, artificially created patches and 
rubbings-away as if they have experienced the eons of time, the depths of religious significance. 
Such ageing attempts to provide the commodity with its own memories (faded jeans or scrubbed 
leather sofas are similar examples) and is now a potent weapon in the commodity‟s fight to get 
noticed. As Peter Stallybrass points out, gone are the days when „…from the perspective of 
commercial exchange, every wrinkle or „memory‟ was a devaluation of the commodity‟ 
(1998:196). The search for the authentic (or at least fake authentic) is now critical, in line with 
Susan Stewart‟s assertion that experience is mediated and abstracted and the lived relationship of 
the body to the world is replaced by „a nostalgic myth of contact and presence‟ (1993:133). It is 
almost as if the aura has become hyper-real and only its presence as a signifier matters to the 
consumer demanding a piece of fake distance - a quick-fix for the commodity‟s lack of „real‟ 
experience. 
So the semblance of distance can be seen as part of the consumer‟s desire to tap into time and 
perhaps to feel that memories they do not have or cannot have are accessible to them. It is also 
increasingly the case that memories must increasingly be shown through objects rather than 
through the physical appearance of our bodies - the more being wrinkled as a person is seen as 
unattractive and to be guarded against by various creams and potions, the more we want our 
things to tell stories through their wrinkles. Whereas for people, as the Juvederm cream advert 
says, „just because every wrinkle tells a story, doesn‟t mean you want everyone to read them‟, 
for certain types of things the opposite logic is true. And yet, just as the un-ageing of faces is 
supposed to instant, so the ageing of objects must be instant; both processes are united by their 
mutual quest for immediate gratification. Perhaps this hypocrisy can be seen as part of the 
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„conflict‟ Lefebvre mentions when talking of the everyday as the realm in which the authentic 
and inauthentic (neither of which he sees as existing as neat entities) attempt to justify 
themselves. 
By way of example: in one pound store, a woman is asking the owner about a plastic model 
bonsai tree which has caught her eye. She refers to it as a „plant‟, despite its being man-made and 
non-living, as she curiously fingers its plastic-fringed branches. She explains to me that keeping 
houseplants is not her strong point, but she likes to have „something green‟ around and goes on 
to say how she knows a bonsai takes years to grow normally and requires a lot of patience which 
she, she says, does not have. What she articulates is a desire to have things that embody age and 
time, immediately and without being required to put any ingredient of her own into her 
interaction with the commodity, whether that be physical (water, soil, nutrients), or non-physical 
(care, patience). She may grow attached to the bonsai as an object, but she will not have invested 
material or time into it: despite being symbolically hinged upon taking time, it has come to her 
„fully formed‟.  
Similarly, on a different occasion, a woman is gingerly fingering a small wooden box painted in 
„shabby-chic‟ style with faux-weathered white paint. „They‟re nice‟, I comment. „Yeah, they 
look like they‟re made from driftwood or something don‟t they. They make me think of 
summer‟. She pauses, picking up the box and turning it over in her hands. „Plus with this style 
you can‟t tell whether something was cheap or not can you‟, she laughs. Here, the object has 
satisfied the criteria of instant age, whilst also over-coming any remnants of reticence or stigma 
over price. Here, it is worth mentioning kitsch, as the kitsch object seems to have a unique ability 
to dispel issues of signification and connotation, almost acting as a crutch to lessen any 
embarrassment felt due to shopping for the cheap. It allows people to dismiss something as 
kitsch as and when it does not live up to any other category, but to do so in a knowing, post-
modern way. 
Much of what characterizes things as kitsch has to do with the creation of the „ancient-looking‟ 
from cheap, plentiful and immediately available materials. As Lefebvre says: 
 
 
„These memory-objects, these palpable, immediate traces of the past, seem to say in daily life that 
the past is never past. Not explicitly but implicitly, it signifies the reversibility of time. In this 
fractured, fragmented time, we can return to the past, since it is there. More so than others, the 
kitsch object possesses these strange properties: a blending of memory, recollection, the 
imaginary, the real‟ (2008 [1981]: 133). 
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For Celeste Olalquiaga this relationship between the „ancient‟ and the readily-available „modern‟ 
is conceptualised by reading kitsch as the fragments of Benjamin‟s aura; that debris which 
survived the aura‟s shattering caused by the proliferation of the „copy‟ under mechanical 
reproduction (2000:19). Thus Olalquiga links the immediacy of kitsch to Benjaminian thinking 
on the ease of reproduction and its concomitant (apparent) lack of aura. Whilst Olalquiga does 
not suggest in any way that these pieces of debris from the aura are in any way lesser than the 
„original‟ (and by original we must include manifestations of „high art‟), her theorizing does rely 
upon understanding kitsch purely as imitation - as the objects that can be quickly produced to 
copy and/or replace those original auratic objects (2000). 
In contrast Sam Binkley argues for „the uniqueness of kitsch as a distinct style, one which 
celebrates repetition and conventionality as a value in itself‟ [my italics] (2000: 133). His is a 
nuanced argument which, while it celebrates the toppling of old assumptions in regard to cultural 
hierarchies based on the supremacy of „high culture‟, and agrees with those theorists within 
cultural studies who posited consumers as intrinsically creative and critical in their choices 
(Grossberg, 1992, Fiske, 1989, Hall, 1996), wishes to assert kitsch as a distinct category which 
deflects creativity and innovation whilst celebrating routine, sentiment and banality. For Binkley, 
„mass culture theorists had it right when they identified the repetitive conventionality of kitsch, 
but got it wrong when they failed to recognize the social meanings that a repetitive, derivative 
style might hold‟ (2000: 134). They had correctly dismantled the hierarchy of taste which put 
kitsch at the bottom, but had created a regime in which „creativity‟ now marked out a culture‟s 
worth. Kitsch, Binkley argues, spurns creativity per se, revelling in a repetition of the familiar 
and a resounding affirmation of the everyday.  
For Binkley, this affirmation of the everyday is akin to Pierre Bourdieu‟s „taste of necessity‟, in 
that it expresses the conventionality of everyday forms and their embeddedness in everyday life 
(Bourdieu, 1984:371). However, for Bourdieu it is precisely kitsch‟s embeddedness in the 
everyday, this uniformity with past aesthetics, which categorizes its consumers as those whose 
economic lives are governed by scarcity: kitsch is aesthetics for those who cannot (financially) 
afford to make mistakes or experiment with their decorative choices. Meanwhile for Binkley, 
consumer choices in regards to kitsch are knowingly spurning creativity, rather than simply 
relying upon safe choices. I would go further to add that kitsch does not only affirm the 
everyday, but celebrates it. Furthermore, this celebration is done with a knowing nod to the past 
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and to its reinterpretation in the present. Kitsch is self-referential. Therefore, whilst it does 
indeed spurn creativity as Binkley argues, it is, on a subtle psycho-social level creative in itself 
as it exists to encourage enjoyment in recreating the past in the present. With kitsch, whilst of 
course the market decides which pieces of „high art‟ to copy, it cannot „brand‟ them in the same 
way it would other objects as they must be presented as „copies‟ of the „original‟.  
This interpretation of the choices consumers make is useful in un-picking their relationship with 
£1 commodities. A consumer‟s reasoning for choosing a certain sofa is based on its shape and 
colour and what the consumer feels that says about her; but these aspects are exactly those 
carefully pondered by designers and marketing teams whose remit is to create a product which 
„says‟ certain things. For example, a rounded, pastel-coloured, low-slung sofa, says „retro fifties 
style‟. As Bourdieu says, „we no longer even have the option of not choosing, of buying an 
object on the sole grounds of its utility, for no object these days is offered for sale on such a 
„zero-level‟ basis … It follows that the choice in question is a specious one: to experience it as 
freedom is simply to be less sensible of the fact that it is imposed upon us as such, and that 
through it society as a whole is likewise imposed upon us‟ (1984:151). Thus the sofa is typical of 
the ways in which „…objects work as categories of objects which, in the most tyrannical fashion, 
define categories of people…‟ (1984: 209). Despite this it remains the case that objects are often 
described as allowing a person to creatively define themselves with pure agency. Lefebvre‟s 
analysis points to the balance between emphasis placed on consumer choice versus coercion and 
structure. He says, „…although they are manipulated, they still have a small margin of freedom: 
they will choose. „Choosing‟ is represented in daily life as a value that manipulation does not 
destroy, but exalts‟ [my italics] (2008: [1981]: 72). 
In contrast, £1 trinkets have not gone through this marketing process (they cannot, due precisely 
to the necessity for them to provide a continuity with the past as Binkley argues); consumers are 
not being appealed to in the same way as they are with specifically marketed goods. A garden 
gnome cannot have his shape changed to give him a „retro‟ look; a plastic Buddha cannot be 
made in a different position to „update‟ him; these changes would render the objects 
unrecognisable as what they are. This is the nature of their „embeddedness‟ in the everyday. £1 
trinkets do not define their consumers in the same way as marketed commodities. This is 
reflected in the fact that there are no market research categories used by marketers for £1 store 
84 
 
consumers, which cannot simply be explained by the argument that information on £1 consumers 
is not worth enough to marketers for them to conduct research as the £1 sector is the fastest 
growing area in retail. 
Kitsch is at once destructive and creative in this sense – it destroys (or rather disallows) both old 
hierarchies of culture and marketers‟ ability to make the object define the person. Yet it creates 
and strengthens connections to the everyday. It places high culture imagery within the most 
mundane of contexts – „images socially marked as unique and exceptional… are subordinated to 
the practical everyday problems of the household‟ (Binkley, 2000: 143). Yet, relations to kitsch 
have moved on since Bourdieu wrote Distinction and it can no longer be argued that a taste for 
„trinkets and knick-knacks‟ is altogether about a working class attempt to gain „maximum effects 
at minimum cost‟(1984: 379).  
As Richard Peterson (1992) argues, the terms „elite‟ and „mass‟ have been replaced by multiple 
usages and readings of objects which can no longer be simplistically placed along a class 
hierarchy as they have become „omnivore‟ and „univore‟ due to consumers mixing objects from 
all parts of the taste hierarchy. This „mixing‟ was clear in my audio walks through £1 stores, 
during which consumers of various class backgrounds expressed various reasons for buying £1 
ornaments. For example, Judith enjoyed mixing the good quality furniture she had saved up for 
with kitsch ornaments in order to remain „down to earth‟ and so that her lounge didn‟t „look 
stuffy‟. In an almost reverse logic, Sarah hoped that by buying „one or two quality vases‟, her 
old, faded sofa would look „chic‟ rather than „clapped out‟. For Tracey, having „a few bits of 
kitsch around the place‟ gave it a slightly bohemian look, which reassured her she had not 
completely given up on the lifestyle of her youth. 
Where does this leave us in our analysis of the tactic of immediacy and its use of the bargain? 
The bargain plays upon notions of time and distance, but simultaneously plays upon an 
acknowledgement of the lack of time involved in the creation of certain commodities and the 
ways in which they are entirely replaceable and disposable. It plays upon the ways in which 
kitsch operates as knowingly embedded within the everyday. In many ways the concept of the 
bargain is therefore also implicit in breaking down old hierarchies of taste – bargain objects are 
often those which allow consumers to rely upon old categories of „taste‟ in order to destroy 
and/or recreate them within the present context.   
85 
 
The bargain is also all-encompassing. Yet, whilst the pound store shouts its single price policy 
from every available wall and shelf, demanding us to see all its commodities as equal bargains, it 
cannot undo other social categories whose potency and embeddedness in our attitudes give us 
other criteria and other hierarchies upon which to judge £1 commodities. £1 commodities may be 
equal in price, but they are far from equal psycho-socially. Certain types of materials are deemed 
to be of better „quality‟ than others -  a polyresin vase coated and glazed has a far more „quality‟ 
feel to it than a plastic one, despite the fact it may not have been cheaper to produce. Although 
both objects are £1, the glazed vase will be considered more of a „bargain‟ than the plastic one. 
There are also genre classifications which come into play. An object that must carry out a 
physical task, for example, a tea-towel or a plate, is expected to wear-out due to its usage - one 
expects to have to replace it so it ought to be cheap. An ornament however, will not get worn out, 
so will not need replacing, and is therefore deemed to be a greater bargain than a plate. 
The opening of the new pound store in Catford provides a good example of how these social 
connotations operate by singling out certain £1 commodities as being „worth more‟ than others. 
About three weeks after the opening of the store both the local Indian restaurant and the local 
Chinese restaurant had bought bulk-loads of ming-style £1 vases to put on their tables. What is it 
about the Ming vase that suggested to both restaurant owners that this was a suitable „object‟ to 
put on the table? The Ming vase, even though an inexpensive plasticized version of a „real‟ Ming 
vase, held enough connotations of luxury, style and „good taste‟ to have become a symbol of 
„civilisation‟ and „sophistication‟. Those connotations were so strong that it was perfectly 
acceptable to have a version of the vase that was very clearly an inexpensive „fake‟. 
This philosophical awareness of regimes of value is reflected in the historical conflict between 
two great entrepreneurs of low-end retail in France: Bernard Trujillo and Eduard Leclerc. 
Trujillo, originally from Columbia, promoted self-service in America and Japan before heavily 
influencing French commerce by stressing the importance of piling high and lowering prices. In 
his view this piling high must however be carried out alongside the creation of  „islands of 
losses‟ (loss leaders) amid „oceans of profit‟, and stores which were „a permanent circus‟ rather 
than having long-term window displays which he saw as „coffins‟ of merchandise. (Quoted in 
Bowlby, 2000: 166) Trujillo is credited with creating Modern Marketing Methods – MMM. In 
contrast, Leclerc has opened his first store in his home town of Brest; he had bought directly 
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from manufacturers and placed goods on shelves in unpacked boxes with little regard for 
„display‟ of any kind. His model proved successful and Leclerc became a household name in 
France. 
Both Trujillo and Leclerc were united in their contempt for small shopkeepers who refused to 
adapt, but their reasons differed vastly. For Trujillo the key issue was 'display' and updating 
selling techniques. He believed the shop ought to be a piece of showmanship in which loss 
leaders encouraged the consumer to buy more profitable commodities. Leclerc believed in 
delivering the lowest price for the consumer throughout, and was prepared to make less profit on 
each unit than anyone else. (In fact his strategy is much aligned to Jack Ma's 'shrimps not whales' 
strategy). Leclerc spurned the use of marketing as being against the interests of consumers, a 
conviction which earned him the mocking title 'L'epicier' (The Grocer) from Trujillo.  
With hindsight, whilst Trujillo's emphasis on display and creation of MMM has clearly been a 
tour de force in the development of consumptive practices in general, Leclerc's philosophy has 
certainly triumphed when it comes to low-end stores who have little if any concern for loss-
leaders' or 'display'. Indeed with the rise of agglomerative manufacturing and the current huge 
exponential increase in low-end stores it could be argued that the battle between these two great 
entrepreneurs is yet to be settled. Furthermore, as Bowlby points out, it may be that the argument 
about price versus display (or access versus aesthetics to put it another way) has almost 
eradicated itself in many contexts. Firstly, this is due to the way in which the aesthetic and the 
accessible are presented as options equally available in the same place, i.e. by supermarkets with 
both 'luxury' and 'basic' brands (2000:166). Secondly, the shop that disregards methods of 
display, and is therefore perceived as disregarding commercial considerations, 'acquires a kind of 
counter-prestige from the very fact of being seen not to participate in them‟ (2000:72).  
This was certainly true for many £1 store consumers I came into contact with who expressed the 
pleasure they gained in „a shop that calls a spade a spade‟,„the honesty of the pound store‟, or 
„the way it‟s so functional and unsophisticated‟. For example, Helen explained how she enjoyed 
the temporary ability not to have think – to „put her head on hold‟- that she felt the pound store 
gave her:  
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„Once you‟re in, you‟re in, and you can‟t get out until you‟ve gone up and down all the aisles, so you 
can‟t wander and take your own direction. It‟s kind of a relief because you have no decision-making to 
do, you have to do as the shop‟s layout tells you… and also, everyone‟s in the same boat as you... none of 
you can choose where to go, you just go up and down the aisles and stop when you see something that 
interests you. Funny really, because normally I would hate things that told me what to do- you know, like 
I hate to see people behaving like sheep - but for some reason I enjoy it in the pound stores, it‟s like a 
kind of relinquishing of responsibility. I enjoy the dumbness of the pound store… I guess it‟s like 
allowing yourself to be a sheep sometimes, but without the guilt trip (laughs)… yeah, knowing that 
you‟re not really a sheep because when you leave the shop you‟re thinking and making decisions again.‟ 
This disregard for display is most poignantly illustrated by the typical pound store window, 
which is quite frequently almost totally obscured by piles of products; in the pound store the 
window is about as far removed as it is possible to be from the idea of the shop window as 
glamourous cinema screen (see Freidberg, 1993). However, these overly „stocky‟ (a retail 
expression meaning full of stock) windows do not simply prove a disregard for display (although 
they are certainly indicative of that), but are also powerful signifiers of the presence of 
inexpensive products – the stocky window can immediately be read by the consumer as a 
guarantor of „bargains‟ within. Thus the lure of the pound shop is in direct contradiction to the 
pursuit of luxury in other shops - its lure is not that of the rare, or hard-to-own, but purely and 
simply that of the bargain. It follows therefore, that this lure has an aesthetic of its own which is 
specifically concerned with fullness and sprawl, because the bargain relies upon the abundance 
of its units, (even though as previously mentioned the idea of scarcity is necessary to cause the 
consumer to be in a hurry to „snap it up‟). Benjamin‟s description befits well: „…the 
commodities are suspended and shoved together in such boundless confusion, that [they appear] 
like images out of the most incoherent dreams‟ (2002:56). 
At first glance this lure of the chaotic, sprawling, (non)display and its attempt (and relative 
success) to ignore the ways in which social connotations add „distinction‟ to some objects, can be 
seen as practical proof that the Saussurean
38
 models of Barthes (1967) Sahlins (1976), and even 
Baudrillard to some extent, are irrelevant in the face of the single price store. However, whilst 
symbolic distinction is certainly to a large extent camouflaged and logically (apparently) 
                                                          
38
 Saussure‟s Semiology argued that all systems of meaning are organized on the same principles as language. (So, 
for him, linguistics was a sub-field of semiology). His ideas about how objects are divided up based on their 
differences with other objects had a large impact on the rise of structuralism,  
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eradicated due to the single price in the £1 store, it is not the case that all £1 commodities are 
seen as equal – as mentioned above, some have more social prestige than others. In fact the £1 
store is almost the reverse of Sahlins‟ depiction of the department store. Whereas, for Sahlins‟, 
marketing creates symbolic distinction between products that are often almost identical, the £1 
store (almost) dispels financial distinction between products that vary randomly from each other 
(as their only remit is to comply to the £1 profit margins). A £1 commodity is unique despite the 
mono-price. 
 
v) Frippery and its Discontents: The Fetishing of the Appropriate and the 
Appropriation of the Fetish.  
 
Helen describes herself as a „devout‟ pound store shopper and by way of example, begins to 
relate to me how her enjoyment of pound stores took on added meaning… 
'I got married last year and my mum made my dress and all that. She'd been working on it for months and 
had ordered some flowers that would go well with it from the local florist. But they're so expensive, real 
flowers, and we were determined not to spend more on the flowers than the dress! So I said, well, just 
order a few real ones and we'll make up the bouquet with plastic ones from the pound shop. My mum 
thought I was mad. I spent about two months collecting really nice plastic flowers- you know, subtle ones 
not the horrible big bright ones. Each time I went out shopping I'd scour the pound shops to see what they 
had in. And on the day it looked really fantastic. Everyone commented on how unusual and beautiful it 
was. I didn't want to throw it over my shoulder!… although I did, of course… I wanted to keep it! I was 
so proud of it, and I was even more proud because I had made it out of nothing - I mean it had cost hardly 
anything. Also, I felt like it really represented me, because I love pound shops and also I suppose if I'm 
honest because I had gone through quite a few years of being quite poor and that's not much fun on your 
own, and now I was putting those years behind me. I was getting married and I wouldn't have to cope 
with being poor on my own any more- but it had become a part of me, and although I hadn't enjoyed 
being poor I had a kind of pride in how I'd survived it.' 
For Helen, both pound stores themselves and some of the items they typically stock, particularly 
of course the plastic flowers, hold special import due to the role they have played in her life – 
they have gained more meaning due to becoming imbued with emotion. The plastic flowers are 
no longer simply objects for her, but things that have meaning as part of her own life-story; they 
were key players in what she considers to be the most important day of her life so far.  
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This type of change in relationship between subject and object is often held up as the solution to 
the impersonality of commercial transaction and therefore the extent to which market relations 
have come to govern all relations. It could therefore, also be seen as a counter-tactic to the 
culture of the bargain. However, in unpacking it further, it becomes clear that not only is it 
increasingly difficult to draw the correct line between having a deep connection to an object and 
fetishizing it, but that also this „appropriate‟ relationship is itself becoming marketed and 
fetishized, whilst on the other hand fetish behavior is becoming re-appropriated in a self-aware 
„post-modern‟ way. Let us attempt to pick this apart. 
This kind of „appropriate entanglement‟ is what Mrs Lucas describes when talking about her £1 
garden gnome, „Gerald.‟ Gerald is just under a foot high, with a painted-on red pointed hat, green 
trousers and yellow shirt. He comes complete with his own fishing line and cross-legged pose. 
Mrs Lucas saw Gerald one sunny afternoon in late June a couple of years ago and decided he 
would make a nice addition to her patio garden. 'It's quite a dull garden for lots of the day as it's 
north-facing and I thought he'd cheer it up ... now, sometimes, you know, when I‟m pottering 
around, I just start nattering to him about something that's happened or something that annoyed 
me. It's like, you know, he can just listen „cos that's all he can do and even though I know he's 
just a gnome it doesn't really make any difference „cos you still feel you've told someone - I 
mean, it could be anyone or anything really, it's just about getting it out of your system… yeah, 
he knows a lot about me that gnome.'  
 
Similarly, Jackie relates to me how a few years back she had bought a £1 gravestone to put at the 
spot in her garden where she and her children had buried the family cat. When they had moved 
house two years ago, they decided to take the gravestone with them, partly as „it felt strange to 
leave it there for the new people moving in‟, and partly to remind them of their departed pet. The 
gravestone was then later used to mark the spot of a goldfish her youngest child had won and 
which had not survived long in its tank. Although the children had become mature enough to 
respond very level-headedly to the death of the gold-fish, they had liked the idea that any family 
pet (regardless of how loved or how substantial a part of their lives it had been) should be buried 
with the gravestone marking the spot. Thus the £1 stone had become linked to a history of the 
family‟s pets, and indeed its future pets. 
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This being part of the object is also what Helen describes when she explains how she felt the 
plastic flowers had „really represented me‟ and how they were symbolic of her poverty at the 
time and that poverty (and therefore the cheap pound store flowers) had become „part of her‟. 
Certainly she has attached an idea and sentiment to the flowers – they have become a „thing‟ for 
her, but she has not fetishized them; rather she has with them exactly the kind of entanglement 
with the everyday that Lefebvre describes. Similarly, Gell‟s (1998) notion of the „distributed 
mind‟39, in which people act through objects by distributing parts of their personhood in them, is 
useful here, as is Strathern‟s (1999) similar notion of the „partiple person‟, divisible into things 
along certain exchange trajectories.  
The above two notions could certainly be applied to the way in which Helen saw „parts‟ of her 
old life and her old self as embodied in pound commodities. Helen‟s relationship with these 
commodities would also stand to disprove Edgar Morin
40‟s (2001) distinction between the 
„biographical object‟ and the „protocol object‟ or standardized commodity. For Morin, the 
biographical object has unity with its user and their identity and the owner develops their 
personality through it, whereas the protocol object is not used as self-definition and causes its 
owner to be de-centred and fragmented by their acquisition of things. As Helen‟s case shows, it 
is absolutely possible for standardized commodities to become biographical objects, partly due to 
the manner in which they can become „things‟ for that individual due to being imbued with 
personal ideas, and partly due to the way individuals can find alternative uses for mass-produced 
commodities.  
Therefore, along with the recognition that things can become part of a life-story is a concurrent 
recognition which sees things as moving in and out of thinghood. This acknowledgement 
                                                          
39 In his celebrated work Art and Agency (1998), Gell replaces a purely aesthetic theory of art, with one that 
emphasizes the effects art has achieved as a „distributed agency‟. Central to this is the theory of abduction, which 
states that things do not necessarily happen as a result of causal inference, but rather due to inferred intentionality. 
His is therefore a theory of the people behind objects, and those peoples‟ intentionality. Thus the creative products 
of a person become his `distributed mind‟, which has agency as it influences the minds of others.  
40
 In many ways Morin had much in common with Lefebvre. He too began a military career, leaving it in order to 
join the French Communist party. He too fought for the Resistance during the Second World War. He too 
experienced a difficult relationships with the French communists and was eventually expelled from the party in 195. 
Morin also founded and directed the magazine Arguments (1954–1962). Appropriately perhaps, he replaced 
Lefebvre at the University of Nanterre, where he became involved in the student revolts of 68. 
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challenges Bill Brown‟s (2001) argument which, despite citing the „object/thing dialectic‟ 
(2001:5), remains faithful to Derrida‟s notion that the thing is not an object and cannot become 
one, because it is a sign, whereas an object is not (2001:126). 
For Brown an object becomes a thing on the occasions it begins to have an idea attached to it as 
well as simply being tangible - 'things' are perhaps „what is excessive in objects... what exceeds 
their mere materialization as objects or their mere utilization as objects…‟ (Brown, 2001: 4-5). A 
thing is an object plus an idea, and those objects which assert themselves as things, constitute a 
„changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an 
object than a particular subject-object relation' (2001: 4-5). However, Brown‟s „things‟ whilst 
indicative of the subject having imbued the thing with sentiment, are perhaps not as indicative of 
a fundamentally changed relationship between subject and object (or „thing‟) as he would like to 
think. As he goes on to say, the magic by which objects become „things‟ is ultimately 
inextricably woven with their becoming values, fetishes, idols, and totems' (Brown, 2001: 4-5). 
Brown therefore suggests that it is the thingness of an object, its status as sign or idea, which 
creates its fetishistic nature. For Brown the thing is the fetish. 
Igor Kopytoff‟s famous biographical approach shows that things move in and out of the 
commodity state and that these movements can be fast/slow, reversible/terminal, 
normative/deviant - the same is true of the thing state.
41
 Furthermore, Appadurai‟s explanation of 
„regimes of value‟ can be applied to „value‟ in the sense of whether or not something is an object 
or a thing. Appadurai argues that „value coherence may be highly variable from situation to 
situation‟ (1986:15). In other words there may be a „minimum fit‟ between cultural and social 
dimensions of commodity exchange. In the same way we could argue that in certain settings 
along its trajectory, there is a minimum fit between object status and thing status in the life of 
any given object/thing. There are situations in which everyone would agree on the status of an 
object/thing, and situations when the agreement would be minimal leading to much confusion 
over its status. This is why moving from thing-hood back to object-hood, contrary to what 
Brown suggests, is possible on both an individual and a societal level. Indeed many marketed 
„things‟ failed the test of time and returned to objecthood; only „classic‟ items still have thing-
                                                          
41
 Incidentally, Appadurai differentiates between Kopytoff‟s cultural biography, and the social history of things, 
arguing that cultural biography is useful for specific things, but a social history of things is needed to look at classes 
or types of thing (1986 :34). 
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hood decades later. These „classics‟ are somehow so representative of the time they were 
fashionable that their thing-hood remains intact – for example, the original apple computer, 
space hoppers, acid-house smiley faces.  
vi) Thing or Fetish? 
We return however to the original conundrum – that question of how a subject-object 
relationship can exist in the sense Lefebvre desired, without the object becoming fetishized. 
There are two syndromes to be on guard against; the fetishizing of a more knowing/thinking 
relationship with the object, and the (re)appropriating of the fetish. By the former, I am referring 
to the types of consumer campaigns which, in attempting to bring proximity between consumer 
and producer by making apparent the „ethical conditions‟ under which a product was 
manufactured, end by creating a brand from that relationship itself - the fair trade movement  
unfortunately has the secondary result of fetishizing itself.  
The latter - (re)appropriating the fetish – involves a type of „knowing‟ relationship with the 
fetishized object in which buying it or wearing it in acknowledgement of its fake/fetishized 
nature is deemed a form of anti-fetishism. It is a kind of self-referential relationship with the 
fetish, in which the consumer plays with his or her own identity as a consumer, but seems to be 
saying „I am removed from all this though because I know the thing I have bought is fetishized.‟ 
It is rather like Žižek‟s example of the Hopi‟s masks (1991: 247). The unmasking ceremony of 
the Hopi tribe causes those being initiated to realise for the first time that what they thought was 
sacred and magic is actually their fathers and uncles behind masks. However, after the initial 
shock has worn off the mask itself somehow becomes the holder of magical meaning, or, as 
Žižek puts it: 
 
 
 
 
To apply this to the commodity thing - removing the mask is the equivalent of removing the 
fetishization from an object. It is the moment of knowing and potentially of de-fetishizing. 
However, if the mask itself, or the fetish itself (the branding, image, etc. of an object), is then 
deemed to contain the magic, this de-fetishization simply becomes a re-appropriation of the 
'...we know the mask is only a mask - the mask is only a signifier which expresses an internal, 
invisible spirit, a mystical preserve. However, we must not forget that this mystical spirit, 
invisible Beyond, is not what is hidden behind the mask  - behind the mask is the everyday image 
in which there is nothing holy or magic. All the magic, all the invisible mystical spirit, is in the 
mask as such...' (original emphasis) (1991:247) 
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fetish; a celebration of having understood the way it works, but a respect for it none-the-less. It 
allows the subject to feel in control of their relationship with the commodity, un-addicted as it 
were, and as Žižek points out, if the individual can feel they are not addicted to the commodity 
thing they can believe they are not part of a totalitarian regime, yet knowing that they really are. 
Žižek refers to this syndrome as one in which the (il)logic is constantly one of „I know it to be 
true, but nevertheless it‟s not true‟- a pathological state of constant denial through agreement 
(1991: 244). With certain types of knowing or „un-addicted‟ enjoyment of the £1 commodity, 
this amounts to a form of postmodernism which in acknowledging the fetish, feels it is trampling 
it down, when in actuality it is celebrating it, albeit in a nonchalant manner.  
 
vii) Conclusion 
Where does this leave us with regard to the tactics of immediacy? To recap, these tactics involve 
the attaching of the bargain to other pernicious concepts, including those to do with „distance‟, 
exoticism and cultural potency/capital. The bargain displays itself as readily abundant through 
„stocky‟ displays and apparent availability, yet retains the tease that it may disappear abruptly 
and must therefore be snatched up. On a global level, the bargain convinces us in the West that 
we have somehow earned the right to it, and even that we can help the non-West by seeking it at 
every opportunity. Even campaigns to expose the unethical origins of the bargain become twisted 
by capitalism and succeed in creating „brands‟ of themselves: this is in itself a secondary tactic of 
the bargain as although such products do not present themselves as bargains, they do suggest that 
through them ethics, a clear conscience and peace of mind can be bought relatively cheaply. The 
result remains that at a deep level a subsidiary concept of the bargain is convincing us that 
consuming slightly differently provides an answer to exploitation, in order that world order may 
remain unaltered. The bargain is unequivocally on the side of both micro and macro capitalisms. 
 
Perhaps the bargain‟s deepest impact however, is the way in which it instills a sense of the 
importance of immediacy in our relation with consumption. The bargain must be grabbed while 
it is available. This is possible even for those with few funds, as of course it is low in cost. 
Fundamentally this firmly guards against a sense of bonding between subject and object as even 
if the bargain (especially one with a price tag as low as the £1 commodity) becomes part of the 
subject, the subject knows that there must be limits to the hurt they will feel if separated from the 
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object as it only cost £1. It makes the kind of appropriate entanglements that Arvatov and 
Lefebvre extol harder, whilst simultaneously encouraging the kind of emphasis on possession as 
the (apparent) issue they wished to guard against.  
 
This difference between entanglement and possession is crucial as it creates a way out of 
traditional lines of argument often regarded as „anti‟-possession versus „equal‟ possession, and 
thus muddies the neat historical lines often drawn between Aristotle, Aquinas and Marx on the 
one hand, and Hirschman, Smith and market economists on the other. Maurice Bloch and 
Jonathan Parry outline these two strands in their introduction to Money and the Morality of 
Exchange (1989). The first begins with Aristotle‟s thoughts on self-sufficiency and how profit-
oriented exchange was unnatural and destructive of the bonds between people and households, 
and manifests itself as a general condemnation of money. Aristotle‟s ideas were taken up, in the 
thirteenth century, by Thomas Aquinas and the church authorities who saw many evils in 
material acquisition, and it is due to this that Marx‟s „labour theory of value‟ is often viewed as 
the place Aristotle has got to. The second tradition begins with Augustine‟s differentiation 
between the love of glory and the purely private pursuit of riches – the passions and the 
„interests‟ – and continues through to Montesquieu‟s argument that avarice unwittingly 
conspired towards the public good, the precursor of Smith and a view of money as a force for 
good. 
 
For Lefebvre, these arguments miss the point, since they are focussing on possession only and 
provide an erroneous account of Marx as in some sense „moralising‟ about money in the same 
way Aristotle did. As mentioned in chapter one, Lefebvre recognizes neither the moralizing 
discourse of non-possession nor the „petty-bourgeois socialism‟ which suggests equal possession 
for all and so places the concept of „possession‟ on high rather than linking it to relationships 
with others (2008 [1947]: 156).  
 
As the bargain, in particular the £1 commodity, denies entanglement most of the time, it leads us 
to become caught up in (irrelevant) cultures concerned with possession and with fomenting the 
idea of possession as moral. The bargain‟s tactic is to ignore true engagement with the object in 
order to promote morality either through a post-modern acknowledgement of the fetish (the „fun‟ 
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of „going wild‟ in a pound store), or through the legitimizing myth of the „good consumer‟. 
Within this latter, the bargain becomes salvation for the financially poor consumer; the pound 
store a temple in which even they can fulfill their duty to capitalism. It promises eternal 
abundance provided we continue to shop and so create jobs, demand, growth and wealth. The 
bargain subtly instils a pride in the ability-to-purchase for those usually unable to do so, causing 
them to remain participants in a capitalistic ideal rather than exploring alternative cultures. The 
pound store is a means of commodity worship for the economic underclass. 
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Chapter Three 
The Tactic of Disposability:  ‘Poaching in Cracks’ in Shanghai’s Spaces of 
Waste.  
‘Here we have a man whose job it is to gather the day’s refuse in the capital. Everything that the big city 
has thrown away … he catalogues and collects. He collates the annals of intemperance, the capharnaum 
of waste. He sorts things out and selects judiciously: he collects like a miser guarding a treasure, refuse 
which will assume the shape of useful or gratifying objects between the jaws of the goddess of Industry’ 
(Walter Benjamin, 2002:87). 
‘…our whole economy has become a waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured 
and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the process  [of production and consumption] is not 
to come to a sudden catastrophic end’ (Hannah Arendt, 1998:134). 
 
A small footbridge, perhaps four metres wide and no longer than ten, crosses the Suzhou river 
creek just before the point at which it flows into the great Huangpu river that cuts through the 
centre of Shanghai. On one side of it lie the famous Bund with its restored colonial grandeur, and 
further into town the French quarter, where international bright young things seek out European 
wines and bemoan the lack of „café life‟. „How can you people-watch when everyone moves so 
fast?‟ one of them asks. On the other side lie four blocks of crumbling low-rise dwellings, some 
of them half-demolished and forced to display their innards with a somehow disconcerting 
nonchalance. This is Zhabei, home to small-time traders and waste peddlers. Ahead, in the 
distance, is the iconic telecom tower, the finance building with its „bottle opener‟ top-piece 
(created during its construction to maintain its now defunct status as the world‟s tallest building), 
and the exhibition centre with its two futuristic globes sandwiching neo-Georgian splendour. 
Directly ahead is the reverse side of the immense Nestlé sign, a landmark clearly visible to the 
tourists on their river cruises. From this angle though, it is far from the same sparkling 
affirmation of corporate success, but rather, a dense bedraggled mass of rusting wires, 
desperately and pathetically securing its letters, lest they fall to a less than graceful end. It looks 
outwards to the profit of the Pudong. It ignores the waste of the peddlers. It fails to connect the 
two. (Figure 4) 
It is just gone five thirty in the evening. The weak rays of Shanghai‟s November sun are 
beginning to fade. Turning left across the small footbridge, away from the Bund, a narrow street 
heads into the peddlers‟ quarter of Zhabei. The dank smell of the river is never far away. The air 
is heavy with dust from houses falling down and apartment blocks going up. As the dust falls it 
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collects in swathes along the sides of streets and in the troughs of their uneven surfaces. Ahead, a 
line of construction workers, about a quarter of a mile long, wends its way along Dong Changzhi 
road towards the docks, to start the night shift. Now and again a street vendor cries his wares. 
The animated chatter of sellers and workers is momentarily silenced by a loud cracking sound, as 
one of the food vendor‟s coal-fired canisters explodes. He swears, and tries to rescue the 
blackened remains, as the chatter returns.  
Turning left off the main drag, the road becomes a dust path, on either side of which are 
numerous crumbling, half-derelict houses. Some stand, half-demolished, cut down the middle, 
their insides rudely exposed, faded bits of paintwork revealing where a shelf or a picture once 
hung. There are no cars here, only the odd bicycle, and the carts of the peddlers bringing back a 
day‟s haul to be sorted and stored: aluminium from iron, plastic from paper, wood from 
cardboard, dust from dust. A small man, perhaps in his mid fifties, steers his teetering cart across 
the pot-holes. Its load although seemingly precarious, is actually ingeniously packed and 
perfectly balanced, so as not to risk losing even one precious piece of waste. He says today has 
been a good day, rich pickings, and laughs when I smile and say „hao gonzuo ma?‟ (Good job 
eh?) It is not what people would call a „good job‟, but, he says, it is considered useful and 
respectable. 
He heads off across the stretch of open ground that separates the derelict quarter from the main 
road, and disappears between two crumbling buildings. A group of boys crouch in the mud and 
play cards. A young woman tires of attempting to ride her bicycle over such uneven terrain, 
lazily flicking one leg over the seat to continue on foot. Six school-children chase each other up 
an alleyway filled with rubble and disappear. I marvel at how spotless their uniforms look, when 
life here is built on and around waste. (Figure 5) 
 
************ 
 
This chapter in many ways can be seen as the flip-side of the chapter on the tactic of immediacy. 
Effectively it is looking at the results of the way the bargain operates, focusing on the necessity 
of the waste created by the disposability of the bargain. To this end, it begins by exploring the 
spaces of waste in Shanghai and how the city attempts to hide them whilst simultaneously 
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showcasing others. These places are then analysed as „failures‟ crucial to related successes and 
as part of a system of binary oppositions which operates to deny the use of waste in gaining 
profit. Finally disposability is examined as key to enabling this profit, as having an uneasy 
relationship with the concept of thrift (and thriftiness), and as a tactic inextricably aligned to the 
£1 commodity chain‟s propensity, and increasing requirement, for a shorter gap between 
consumption and disposal. 
 
i) Finding Cracks to Poach In 
For Michel de Certeau the tactician has no choice but to make use of opportunities or „cracks‟, 
and „poach‟ in them, because, unlike the strategist, he does not have a „proper locus‟. 
Furthermore, owing to this lack of locus, the tactic „takes advantage of opportunities and depends 
on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, 
and plan raids. What it wins it cannot keep‟ (1984: 36-37). These two principles - the first of 
operating in the un-noticed chinks of life, the second of constantly having to purge oneself of 
„winnings‟ - emerged consistently in Shanghai‟s spaces of waste. 
The spaces were „cracks‟ (and also opportunities in de Certeau‟s sense) largely due to their 
positioning outside of the main thrust of society, either geographically or socially and 
economically. They could be compared to what Susan Strasser (1999) calls „liminal spaces‟ in 
relation to the house – marginal places such as lofts and basements – in that they sat on the edges 
of Shanghai, or in the case of Zhabei, despite being central, were areas largely deserted and 
abandoned. They also had their own economies which operated outside of the main economic 
system. The peddlers in Zhabei, and indeed across Shanghai, were not part of any formal 
taxation or employment mechanisms; what they earned was theirs to spend or send home.  
They were also spaces in which, true to de Certeau‟s definition, the tactician had to purge 
himself of winnings due to lack of territory, and this factor emerged as key to understanding the 
operations of the peddlers. One peddler, „Mr C‟, told me how he would collect whatever was 
going now that he had secured a small space in a derelict building in which to store things. This 
meant instead of having to cycle out to the markets in the suburbs every evening to sell his waste 
in order to clear his cart for the next day, he could decide which market to go to and when, based 
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on what he knew was selling well that week. Despite this advantage, the storage space was still 
not large or secure enough for him to be able to stockpile and he had to purge himself of his 
waste and convert it into cash every couple of days. When I asked him whether I could see the 
place he stored his waste, he seemed disinclined, smiling awkwardly and pointing vaguely back 
towards a derelict building. 
Another peddler, a farmer from Hebei province, had added side walls to his cycle-cart fashioned 
from thick bits of cardboard and secured by bending them under weighty objects at their base 
and tying them around with nylon tape. Thanks to the enclosure these walls provided, he was 
able to pile his findings higher than if he simply had to balance them, and could collect more. 
However, when I commented on the effectiveness of his contraption he smiled and shook his 
head, explaining that it was only useful today: „Tomorrow‟ he said, „the rain will come down and 
wash it all away - so I will start again.‟ Sure enough, the next day provided a constant heavy 
drizzle which turned cardboard to papier maché and certainly would have seen the walls of his 
cart crumple into sogginess. It was not only his collections which could not be stockpiled, but 
even the „tool‟ of his trade - his cart - which was effectively a constantly evolving bricolage 
object, requiring daily repair as various parts wore out or it became necessary to sell them. 
(Figure 6) 
This practice of bricolage relates directly to de Certeau‟s use of the term when describing how 
tactics, unlike strategies, take what is available and make use of it in alternative ways (1984: 30-
37). Similarly, Levi Strauss‟ classic distinction between the bricoleur and the engineer does 
something similar, suggesting that the bricoleur must make do with what is at hand:  „a set of 
tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains 
bears no relation to the current project …‟ (1966:17). The engineer, by contrast, has tools and 
materials specifically conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. Crucially for Levi-
Strauss, what this means is that the bricoleur‟s projects cannot be counted by counting his 
„instrumental sets‟ (1966:17). However, he also suggests that, due to his narrow set of tools, 
effectively a „collection of oddments left over from human endeavours‟ (1966:19), the bricoleur 
is inclined to remain within the constraints imposed by his civilization; whereas the engineer 
„questions the universe‟ and „is always trying to … go beyond the constraints imposed by a 
particular state of civilization …‟ (1966:19). This is simultaneously to de-accentuate both the 
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affect a lack of material goods can have on action, and the bricoleur‟s demonstration of how he 
precisely is attempting to „go beyond‟ by engaging in bricolage in the first place. Whether he 
manages this within the constraints experienced, and with such limited resources, is an issue 
separate to that of their intention and one which will be picked up on in the conclusion. 
To return to the issue of stockpiling: there were other reasons for not stockpiling which had more 
to do with social relations than ownership of space. For example family or clan groups from 
other provinces, especially those who worked on foot, often operated as groups and shared out 
their findings equally. Fights could sometimes break out if a member would not redistribute his 
findings amongst the others when asked to – stockpiling for oneself was unacceptable in these 
situations. I witnessed this on Nanjing road, the main shopping street of Shanghai, when a young 
peddler was harangued into handing over three soft drinks bottles he had just found in a bin, by 
the older members of his group. He had seemed driven, angry at his situation, less resigned than 
the others, and when he moved off to forage in another bin they had stared after him, one woman 
gently shaking her head. (Figures 7 and 8) 
Similarly, in Hangzhou I had wandered through the outskirts with a group of five women, three 
of whom had lost their husbands in the last year, and two of whose husbands were too ill to 
work. They had explained to me how they shared everything they found. It was the only way 
they felt they could all stay afloat. They had formed a system of communal support, which not 
only meant no one person had a worse day than any other, but that also they were a stronger 
force when bargaining for higher prices per bottle at the waste markets. These tactics of the 
peddlers and the „cracks‟ they found to operate in, were however coming under increasing threat 
from the ambitions of politicians and planners determined to display that which represented the 
„new‟ China, and hide anything reminiscent of the „chaotic‟ old days, in the run up to the 2010 
Shanghai Expo. Cracks were being papered over at tremendous speed and Zhabei found itself 
caught in the midst of a determined desire to clean up and Westernize. 
The Expo has guaranteed millions of dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI) and provoked an 
ambitious plan on the part of the Shanghai authorities, keen to prove themselves following the 
success of the Beijing Olympics. As a result the whole of central Shanghai is undergoing 
massive regeneration and artists‟ impressions of this redevelopment show Western-style mock-
Tudor family homes, surrounded by trees and green areas. (Figure 9) Standing watching the boys 
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playing cards in front of the gaping, half-demolished facades of the houses behind, it is hard to 
imagine this quarter, or indeed any of Shanghai‟s sprawling inner-city areas, becoming visions of 
mock-Tudor plenty.  
So, in the run up to this regeneration much of Zhabei is simply being allowed to crumble. 
Furthermore, the peddlers are largely „illegal‟ internal migrants from rural Chinese provinces, so 
do not technically exist as far as the authorities are concerned. Under the Household Registration 
System, Chinese citizens are registered according to their home province and given rural or 
urban „hukou‟. The roots of hukou stem back to Ancient China, to 2100BC, when the Huji 
system was in place. However, in its present form, it was introduced by the communist party in 
1958, as an attempt to control the movements of workers. This became especially important 
during the 1980s, following the opening up of the Special Economic Zones by Deng Xiao Ping.  
The opening up policies created the necessity for a fine balance in maintaining the required 
population mobility in order that enough, but not too much, cheap rural labour could migrate to 
the cities. As Michael Dutton explains, this was achieved by introducing the notion of 
„legitimate‟ and „illegitimate‟ travel, in order that the authorities could recreate the semblance of 
order without jeopardizing the necessary flow of labour (2005: 274). A two-pronged policy 
during the early eighties saw the Household Registration system loosened to allow the resident 
identity card system, and a contemporaneous re-investment in shelter and Investigation Centres 
to crack down on transients. By the 1990‟s, these centres had come under scrutiny from Western 
human rights groups who successfully lobbied for their abolition, which occurred in 1996 
(Dutton, 2005: 274-289). However, a form of the Household Registration System (albeit one far 
more concerned with the economic needs for certain groups of workers) exists today and renders 
many rural migrants „illegal‟, creating a tier of society with no rights to formal employment, 
housing, or social security. Recently there have been widespread reforms to loosen the 
restrictions on internal migration in order to open up the spending power of rural populations, but 
their affect remains largely to be seen.)  
At first glance, the Expo appears to be concerned with a cleaner, greener Shanghai, placing 
emphasis on speed and efficiency - fast infrastructural links, rapid information and the potential 
this brings for more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the desired shift from manufacturing to 
service and information industries. However, it also has cultural ambitions. The Expo slogan 
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„better city, better life‟, is becoming increasingly prevalent across Shanghai‟s billboards, and 
comes complete with cartoon mascot „Haibao‟ (derived from si hai zhi bao – „treasure of the 
sea‟: hai = „sea‟, as in Shang-hai.) Haibao‟s message to the Shanghainese is one of promoting the 
quality of urban existence and improving and enhancing „wenming‟. Wenming has been a 
problematic word in Chinese culture as it translates as „western/civilized‟, from old Japanese. 
After 1949 its meaning shifted to denote general „manners‟ rather than „western‟ behaviour, 
although its usage in the Expo campaign seems to have re-gained some of the old connotations. 
Haibao enhances wenming by teaching the Shanghainese to avoid doing things the „international 
community‟ (by which is meant Europe and the US) may find uncouth, such as spitting, slurping 
food, or not queueing. He can frequently be found on screens in the back of taxis conducting a 
quiz with questions such as „Which European country does spaghetti traditionally come from?‟ 
(Figure 10) 
Haibao is part of a literal and cultural „clean-up‟ which will see certain spaces in Shanghai 
temporarily banished or permanently erased, to be smoothed and covered over with newly 
created spaces. The peddlers, with their barrows, are seen as the image of old China - antiquated, 
trundling, festering, and subsumed in intricate networks of allegiances based on clan and favours 
rather than merit. Just as the Beijing peddlers were banished to the suburbs during the Olympics, 
so their Shanghai counterparts will undergo the same restrictions during the Expo, although 
because the authorities recognise that their presence is actually crucial to the cleanliness and 
efficacy of the city, some will be given uniforms, temporary state contracts and equipment for 
the duration of the Expo. In the longer term, following the razing of their derelict quarters, their 
expulsion from central Shanghai will of course be permanent. Some may return home, others 
will simply be pushed further out and make the long cycle-ride in, in order to collect waste. 
What is of particular interest here is the way that the peddlers‟ roles are acknowledged as useful, 
but their appearance and the spaces they occupy are unacceptable to the authorities in their 
attempts to prove Shanghai‟s „world city‟ status. This often means that spaces with specific 
practical uses give way to spaces that connote strong impressions of success but as yet have little 
practical use. In other words, these symbols of success - such as green spaces, family homes, 
fountains - are deemed to have greater „use value‟ than places which handle material things. 
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„Production‟ in the run up to the Expo is the production of spaces which provide the necessary 
images for the West; it is production in the sense furthest removed from actual labour. 
This sense of a ‟visual‟ with little reality behind it is picked up on by Huang Yaseng, who argues 
that the „Shanghai Miracle‟ is largely „assumed‟ and based on the visual rather than actual living 
conditions and quality of life (2008:176). He blames this mirage of a miracle on the „Shanghai 
model‟, formulated between 1985 and 1990, and in particular the development programme of 
1987, which established key mechanisms intended to leapfrog Shanghai to global city status. 
These were, firstly, the internationalization of the economy, based on advanced technology and 
global brands, and secondly, the elimination of all features considered to be „backward‟ (2008: 
213-214).  
Although it may not have been directly intended as such, the 1987 programme was a precursor to 
the anti-rural bias and small-scale entrepreneurship of the 1990‟s. Attempts to internationalize 
saw all urban planning decisions centralized, and the government, as a monopoly buyer, 
requisition vast tracts of the Pudong area (then farm land) from rural households, compensating 
them at below-market prices. The land-use rights were then sold to commercial property 
developers at market prices, and the futuristic skyscrapers of the Pudong, representing global 
finance, emerged, creating Shanghai‟s iconic skyline and securing its place as a global player. 
Attempts to eliminate the „backward‟, saw the closure of small and informal market activities: 
again the concern was with how such places „looked‟, as opposed to how healthy they were for 
the economic or social life of the city. 
 
 
According to Huang, what lay behind the (in his view, false) „Shanghai miracle‟, were features a-
typical of what was happening in the rest of China: a heavy-handed state intervention, a blatant 
anti-rural bias, and a liberalization which privileged FDI whilst discriminating against 
indigenous capitalists. This meant that whilst GDP per capita in Shanghai made it look rich in 
comparison with other large cities and rural provinces, the wealth was siphoned off in the form 
of government taxes, and tended to be in the hands of large foreign companies or state-owned 
„… to the urban technocrats eager to project their city as an ultra-modern metropolis, these messy 
marketplaces represented not income-earning opportunities for rural merchants but rather 
unorganized, unlicensed, and unsightly activities to be stamped out‟ (Huang, 2008:214). 
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enterprises (2008: 177-178). It is telling that the now highly successful alibaba.com
42
, whose 
business model is based on agglomeration rather than vertical integration, left Shanghai in the 
late 1990s, preferring to base itself in neighbouring Zhejiang province. This said, there may be 
some truth in an argument which suggests that certain features of Shanghai‟s development, such 
as the privileging of FDI in the face of indigenous capitalists, is simply a legacy of colonial 
relations which split Shanghai into its „concessions‟, and created its present business ties. 
Despite the politics of hiding and display, Shanghai is a city of antithetical spaces, which, it likes 
to suggest, bear no relevance to each other, but which in reality, although problematic for each 
other at times, are locked into a mutually parasitical relationship. What the foreign investment 
will effectively do is remove the signs of both decay and surplus waste from the inner city areas, 
allowing them to function as „showcases‟ for profitable enterprise in Shanghai, and attract more 
direct foreign investment (DFI) into China-based companies. The acceptable excess, in the form 
of profit, will be able to be viewed without being obscured by the unacceptable excess – waste - 
as the waste-excess will have been geographically removed. Peddlers will have been evicted to 
the „invisible‟ suburbs; those who remain in central Shanghai will be state employees, with 
uniforms, hourly wages and tax receipts. Waste will officially be state property as soon as it 
comes into existence (i.e. is trashed), rather than being a free resource. Effectively, it will have 
been privatised in a manner not dissimilar to that which Dominique Laporte (1993) depicts as 
happening in seventeenth century Paris, viz. the extensive re-arranging of the urban environment 
and efforts by the authorities to remove waste from the city in order to purify it and return it as 
gold (1993: 28-31).  
In many ways Shanghai‟s ability to continue to develop its infrastructure, despite its spaces of 
waste, presents a contrast to Mike Davis‟s case study of the Hyperion sewerage system in Los 
Angeles, in City of Quartz (1992). As Davis reveals, when the Hyperion system broke down in 
May 1987, causing millions of gallons of waste to flood into Santa Monica Bay, it was due to 
„growth wars between homeowners and developers‟ being „fought within the limits of a 
collapsing infrastructure‟ (1992: 198). Population growth brought the entire system to the brink 
                                                          
42
 alibaba.com is the brain child of celebrity businessman Jack Ma. The ali group comprises of alibaba.com ( a 
business-to-business website linking wholesale buyers to Chinese manufacturers), alipay (an online payment service 
necessary in China where credit and debit cards are still not widespread), taobao.com (a Chinese version of e-bay, 
where, in keeping with cultural norms, buyers and sellers haggle the price down), and alitrust (a scheme under which 
trusted third parties verify the reliability and credentials of buyers and sellers on alibaba.com.) 
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of collapse; even the flood capacity basin could not be used as the increase in ground area 
covered over with tarmac had heightened the risk of flood, with the result that the facility was 
needed for its original purpose. Therefore, the mayor had no choice but to relinquish his usual 
pro-growth stance and join slow-growth activists by accepting an environmental review of all 
major developments. This resulted in a monthly cap being put on all new construction due to the 
lack of sewer capacity. The cap applied not only to LA, but also to the other thirty municipalities 
contracting its sewer treatment facilities. Anyone pumping more sewerage than their quota 
allowed into the LA system, was faced with a total growth freeze (1992: 200). Far from returning 
waste in the form of gold as Shanghai does, LA was forced to live amongst the very waste that 
itself was hindering, if not curtailing completely, the flow of gold. 
In Shanghai, the removal of material waste corresponds to the desired shift from manufacturing 
to service and information industries - the manufacturing sector being moved further out of city 
centres. However, with the manufacturing sector being the guarantor of China‟s success for the 
middle-term, and the necessity therefore of raw materials, the unacceptable waste-excess will 
remain indispensible. So too, in fact increasingly so, will the consumption that creates it. Profit 
will continue to be built on waste; the „success‟ of the new China on the so-called „failures‟ of 
the spaces that represent an older China. The cord that ties the two will simply have been planted 
over with the green turf and evergreen shrubs of an Anglo-American suburban dream. 
 
ii) The Function of ‘Failures’ 
If Zhabei is a place struggling to continue its operations in the face of imminent visibility, and 
„visitability‟ to use Bella Dicks‟ (2003) term, then the Shanghai municipal dump is one strictly 
out of bounds to the visitor. The taxi driver says he will not go any closer and he cannot wait 
long. It would be difficult for him to explain to anyone official why he was showing a Western 
visitor something as tourist-unfriendly as Shanghai‟s municipal dump. He has told me strictly 
„no photo‟, and he still thinks I am a journalist. I stare out through the dusty car window. At first 
there is nothing to see but a vast expanse of half-rotting matter; a decay-scape that refuses to 
decay. I am reminded of the strangeness of scenes in which human-made matter takes on the 
appearance of „natural‟ phenomena, as in Jennifer Baichwal‟s film Manufactured Landscapes43 
                                                          
43
 Baichwal‟s film documents the work of the photographer Ed Burtynsky whose photographs feature landscapes of 
areas transformed by human activity. 
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(2007). The sea-gulls are un-ignorable even from here; up close they must be deafening. Then, as 
my eyes begin to focus, a small line appears in the mid-distance; a line of carefully balanced 
pieces of corrugated iron, attached to wooden posts with matted bits of rope, the gaps filled by 
bits of crate or plastic. Assemblages of waste: homes to migrant waste collectors. I roll down the 
window a tiny bit, just enough to know how bad the stench would be if one were in amongst it. It 
would be suffocating. In the far distance, a digger moves into action, sending the seagulls 
temporarily into the air, before they eagerly re-settle to pick apart the new offerings.  
The Shanghai dump is officially managed by the French company Onyx and, due to China‟s 
draft „circular economy‟ law (often wrongly translated as „recycling economy‟ or „sustainable 
economy‟), it is legally obliged to separate recyclable waste from landfill. Therefore, 
„employees‟ from „recycling factories‟ (often with uniforms and some sort of official „front‟) are 
tolerated by the official contractors, as they are easily visible and aid Onyx in reaching their 
quota of recycled waste. However, relations with the informal, unstructured and un-measurable 
independent waste collectors are fraught. These groups live on the dump itself, are frequently 
hostile to each other due to their differing clans and, having no uniform, are difficult to see. 
Onyx openly admits injuries have arisen from large machinery suddenly moving into action 
unaware of the presence of waste collectors.  
Back in central Shanghai, a peddler had explained how when he first came to Shanghai he had 
lived on the dump for a few weeks, but it was too dangerous for him on his own. The machinery 
did not see him and the other peddler groups viewed him with suspicion. He explains though, 
that working there had taught him how to sort waste very quickly, and how to know how 
valuable it is. He says he can tell by feeling a plastic bottle between his fingers for a few 
seconds, whether or not it is „virgin plastic‟ – the most valuable type – or whether it is already 
second or third grade.  
************ 
 
Theory has, on the whole, written out the function of places such as these, defining them solely 
as rabellais-esque chaos, hellish examples of end-games. Indeed, anthropological writers often 
have a tendency to dwell on the fascinating vileness of dump sites – Gunter Grass‟s Show Your 
Tongue being a typical example. As Hutnyk suggests, Grass‟s writing seems to be almost 
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cathartic, as if he is putting himself through an ordeal in order to release something within 
himself (1996:104). It bothers Hutnyk that Grass posits himself as narrator in the position of 
being the first-ever western visitor, describing the city (in this case Calcutta) as a „crumbling, 
scabby, swarming city, this city which eats its own excrement (Grass, 1977: 181). My concern is 
not only with the representation of such places as fascinating hells, but also with the lack of 
analysis as to the role they play as hellish failures – both economically and symbolically. 
Whilst their material conditions are of course hellish, to accept them as „failures‟, without 
understanding how their presence feeds other successes, is to misunderstand the necessity of 
escape-valves in capitalistic chains. Such „failures‟ are crucial, because they allow the fall-out to 
fall out. Their existence is critical to the success of the city and indeed the wider manufacturing 
industry. Peddler‟s waste allows factories to gain access to cheap raw materials which they 
would otherwise have to buy from China‟s waste importers at much greater cost. As Lefebvre 
argues, „dysfunctions … are remarkable in that they stimulate functions and functionaries alike‟ 
(2008[1961]: 65) For him it is the combination of failure and what has been won prior to failure 
that is important; this is the onward movement of an event „through the murky thickness of 
everyday life‟, and it is the quality of the failure that that is more significant than having failed. 
„Could not successes sometimes be the worst failures?‟ he asks (2008[1961]: 66) Or, as John 
Urry argues in Global Complexity, „what is in the network is useful and necessary for its 
existence‟ (2003:9) and in this he includes the existence of so-called „failures‟.  
The idea of there being function in aberration has arguably been touched upon by the idea of 
unintended consequences. However, this stops short of explaining how side-effects could be 
systematic to the network. What Urry sets out towards, through his theory of complexity, is a 
way of perceiving networks in which success and failure are intrinsically linked. Complexity, for 
Urry, is a system that is neither perpetually anarchic, nor well-ordered and moving towards 
equilibrium, but one in which the global is simply not a single centre of power (2003: x). It 
emphasizes diverse time-space paths, unpredictable patterns, and disproportionalities between 
causes and effects (2003: 7-8). Viewed in this way „… complexity can illuminate how social life 
is always a significant mixture of achievement and failure‟ (2003: 13).  
What is key to this understanding of failure however - an aspect that Urry does not mention - is 
the way in which this relationship between success and failure requires collateral damage to be 
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written in to the fabric of commodity chains. Collateral damage has been conceptualized as 
„externalities‟, or overflows, and whilst sociologists have tended to see these as the norm, 
economists have been concerned with „framing‟ and have therefore seen externalities as simply a 
rare and expensive outcome. The emphasis for economists is not one of moral grounds, but of 
efficiency and resource allocation. This has strange similarities with Lefebvre‟s thought on 
uneven development: the key difference is not (as is often supposed) that one is a moral project, 
the other economic, but rather that the resource allocation for economists is structured by 
quantitative growth, whereas for Lefebvre the determining factor ought to be the need for 
resources in order to create qualitative growth. 
Whilst for Callon, analyzing in purely financial economic terms, the only issue behind 
externalities is that, whether positive or negative, they render the market (at least partially) 
inefficient, because they are responsible for a gap between private marginal income and marginal 
social costs (1998: 247). Externalities mean the market as a whole is not able to operate at its 
maximum as somewhere costs must be picked up, disabling certain players. Furthermore, in 
order to be framed, overflows must be made measurable, thus, according to Callon, by allowing 
each agent to calculate interests and express them, transactions can take place, resulting in a 
„robust and legitimate‟ re-allocation of resources (1998: 256). Of course what this assumes is 
that those agents express their interests honestly and/or that those in positions of decision-
making, make decisions fairly – one can hardly leap to the conclusion that the resulting resource 
allocation will be robust and legitimate!  
Collateral damage, and its historical variants, is specifically capitalist in the context of 
commodity chains and can be traced back to Mandeville‟s Fable of the Bees and Adam Smith‟s 
core argument that the success of the few would improve life for the many; or to phrase it more 
pertinently for our argument here, whilst the success of the few created collateral damage for 
some, the whole would be lifted. So, whilst it is necessary to recognise how failures work to 
enable capitalistic chains, it is equally necessary to understand that this collateral damage is a 
phenomenon specific and essential to capitalism. 
What an understanding of the necessity of „failures‟ does, is to question a whole range of 
simplistic binary oppositions which become bound up in the same dialogue. In the case of the £1 
chain (and indeed the wider discourse regarding Europe and China), along with „success‟ and 
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„failure‟, comes cleanliness/dirt, visible (visitable)/hidden, organisation/chaos, and lastly, 
use/waste.  
These binary oppositions are held in place across a surprising range of academic thinkers from 
differing perspectives. The idea of the remainder has been imbued with a sinister, negative edge, 
returning in all its horrific Freudian reality. For Georges Bataille (1991), this constant remainder 
or „accursed share‟, could only be successfully re-invested on a small scale and therefore on a 
global scale must be „squandered‟(1991: 10). This global view required Bataille‟s notion of a 
„general economy‟ within which waste excess can only be turned to profit-excess in specific 
small scenarios, because systems can only grow up to a point and cannot completely absorb all 
the excess in that growth. So, for Bataille, excess energy, or „wealth‟, must eventually be lost 
without profit, or as he puts it, „spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically‟ (1991: 21).  
According to Bataille therefore, it is this inability of mankind to „increase equipment‟ and the 
impossibility of continuing growth that makes way for squander. This impossibility is related to 
lack of space: as pressure on space increases, extension (expansion) results, but this new space is 
immediately filled. „The limit of growth being reached, life, without being in a closed container, 
at least enters into ebullition: without exploding, its extreme exuberance pours out in a 
movement always bordering on explosion‟ (1991: 30). Because space-making cannot continue ad 
infinitum, it is the short-termism of space-making which results in catastrophe: „Humanity 
exploits given material resources, but by restricting them as it does to a resolution of the 
immediate (my italics) difficulties it encounters … it assigns to the forces it employs an end 
which they cannot have‟ (1991: 21). Thus Bataille sees waste as unavoidable, the question is 
how to spend this excess in positive ways, and how to even up the pressures of waste so that 
there are not areas of the world striving for growth, whilst others are struggling with the products 
of growth. 
 
 
„A typical problem of the general economy emerges from this situation. On the one hand, there 
appears the need for an exudation; on the other hand, the need for growth. The present state of the 
world is defined by the unevenness of the (quantitative and qualitative) pressure exerted by 
human life.‟ (1991: 39)  
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Whilst Bataille
44
 insists waste, finally, once at the point of ebullition, can only be squandered, 
the classical economic view is that we do not reach ebullition, as waste is turned into profit. 
Both, in very different ways, are strangely emotional accounts, one wallowing in the glorious 
filth of waste, the other in a dogmatic, zealous mission to be the hero that cleans it up and makes 
it useful. Both conceive of waste and non-waste as fundamentally different entities which, for the 
classic economists, must be linked together if efficiency is to be gained. Neither account chooses 
to see waste and non-waste as simply different sides of the same coin. 
So the separation of waste from non-waste is written deeply into the fabric of political and 
academic theory (and across a range of perspectives) which has operated largely out of a concern 
with sifting through the „waste‟ in order to find the „truth‟ or the most useful bits. John Scanlon‟s 
(2005) thoughts on western philosophy and his support of a philosophy of fragments and detritus 
such as that practiced by Walter Benjamin is useful in further explaining this argument. He 
argues that modern philosophy from around the seventeenth century onwards, is a history of the 
disposal and tidying away of waste, a „sweeping away the debris that lies on the territory of 
reason‟ (2005: 61). He cites this as stemming from the break between Plato‟s order and that of 
the pre-Socratics, in particular Heraclitus‟s45 ideas of flux and the world as a beautiful heap of 
rubbish. This break is further sealed by Kant, for whom, according to Scanlon, it is from a kind 
of disposal that meaning, or value, emerged as the part retained (2005: 8). Following Kant‟s 
Critique of Pure Reason, the human is further separated from nature; therefore knowledge is 
separated from garbage and decay is no longer part of existence as Heraclitus would have us 
believe (2005: 75).   
                                                          
44 Despite coming into only indirect contact with Lefebvre, both Bataille and Benjamin were influenced by his work. 
In the case of Bataille, what quite possibly kept them apart was the former‟s critique of the Surrealists (although 
later on Lefebvre may have agreed with him). Furthermore, whilst Lefebvre always leaned more towards Tzara, 
Bataille, despite going through a critical period, became a firm comrade of Breton. Benjamin was a member of 
Bataille‟s informal „College de Sociologie‟ and at points was much closer to Lefebvre‟s Marxist allegiences; indeed 
the Frankfurt School‟s Marxism was much closer to that of Lefebvre‟s. Benjamin enthusiastically read Lefebvre‟s 
La Conscience Mystifiee, probably enjoying its mix of mysticism and materialism. However, this same mysticism 
meant that at points Bataille was very much more „Marxist‟ than Benjamin.  
45
 Heraclitus wrote one single book - On Nature - which largely consisted of aphorisms, including the most famous 
„everything flows‟, „you cannot step into the same river twice‟ and „the fairest cosmos is a rubbish heap piled up 
haphazardly.‟ These were typical of his view of existence as constant flux, in constant creation and constant decay, 
and earned him a reputation as the philosopher of „becoming‟ rather than „being‟. Heraclitus renounced the binary 
law of Milesian philosophy which posited objects as either in full existence or not existing at all, and proposed a 
state of existing that could be both „on‟ and „off‟. 
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In contrast, what Scanlon advocates is a return to seeing waste as part of knowledge, or at least 
as providing an insight into existing knowledge, in order to follow a Benjaminian method where 
letters and fragments are examined in order to reveal the waste of knowledge- the parts thrown 
away (2005: 79). For him, knowledge is actually recycled debris, rather than the „cleaned‟ part of 
a whole, the other half of which has been disposed of (2005: 69). The suggestion here is that 
waste has a part in the present - pure history is hell, but so is no history. Perhaps Benjamin 
recognised this with his concept of the historical in the present as necessary to wake us; the „out-
moded‟ commodities of the arcades contained the ability to wake Europe from her „dream sleep‟ 
(2002). Certainly the notion of the discarded fragment as useful for the bringing into 
consciousness of necessary ideas is particularly potent here: the philosopher/rag-picker as 
described in Irving Wohlfarth‟s essay on Benjamin - „The Historian as Chiffonier‟. The image of 
the rag-picker became, of course, an extended metaphor for poetic method and reflected what 
Benjamin saw himself and Siegfried Kracauer as engaged in - the Arcades Project sought to pick 
up the refuse of history. His description of the character, however, could equally describe a 
scavenger on the Shanghai municipal dump. 
I would also argue that Benjamin‟s idea of the rag-picker as history-in-the-present was linked to 
his concept of the „Angelus Novus‟46 – the character blown backward into the future with the 
wake of history‟s debris stretching away from him. And in many ways the treatment of the waste 
peddler in current Chinese culture suggests a similar understanding of a character somehow 
from, or working with the remnants from, a past age. The figure is understood as somehow out-
moded, out of place in the technocratic present; part of an older, dirtier, poorer, less developed 
China.  
John Frow makes a point allied to Scanlon‟s, arguing that waste is the „degree zero of value, or it 
is the opposite of value, or it is whatever stands in excess of value systems grounded in use‟, yet 
it is something from which money can still be made (2003: 21). This potential value can, 
however, only be gained by the movement of that waste (2003: 29). Here Frow is drawing upon 
Michael Thompson‟s concept of value as an effect of the circulation of objects between regimes 
                                                          
46
 Interestingly, in his book on Lefebvre, Rob Shields questions whether Lefebvre might be a Angelus Novus figure, 
„condemned to be a powerless bystander at key historical moments, at which he is caught off-guard and to which he 
has no adequate response and too slow a reaction time to intervene in‟ (1999: 4). Personally, my feeling is that he 
recognised the power available to one who always remained not quite the leader or figurehead and that his 
preference was to create momentum before passing the baton. 
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of value; a circulation which can be driven either by wastefulness (valuable matter being turned 
into waste), or by the reverse process (Thomson, 1979). Clearly, it is the movement, the ability to 
mutate, that gives a value to waste, but what factors determine and motivate this transformation?  
For Stephen Gudeman the answer is innovation. In his Anthropology of Economy, waste is given 
a kind of innate creativity, the ability to be turned into profit, to gain value, not through 
squander, or privatisation (necessarily), but through the ability of humans to innovate. Gudeman 
sees this is as an argument against classic economic accounts which, in his view, do not explain 
imperfect competition, monopolies or accumulation. For him, it is not simply the balancing of 
endowments and satisfactions, in other words efficiency, which creates growth, but the turning of 
accumulated stuff, or „waste‟, into profit, through innovation (2001: 95). There are some useful 
points to be gleaned from Gudeman‟s thinking when considering the £1 commodity chain and its 
reliance upon waste and disposability. 
Firstly, seeing growth as emerging from the transformation of waste-excess, joins waste and 
profit as two sides of the same entity, or as two results and potentials of linked processes. This 
thinking provides a distinct alternative to the „periphery‟ versus „core‟ models mentioned in the 
introduction. This enables us to better understand disposability by taking waste out of the purely 
economic and begin to pick apart how it operates within social contexts. For example, within the 
£1 commodity chain, the £1 object confers upon its owner the ability to easily dispose of what is 
no longer wanted or needed without guilt, due to its „low value‟. The £1 object carries a desire to 
squander on the part of the consumer, to feel that one can afford to squander, a feeling perhaps 
not dissimilar to the „prestations‟ Mauss speaks of. To be able to squander, enables a feeling of 
wealth. The awareness of the £1 commodity as almost-already-waste, creates a feeling of 
„wealth‟ (or at least spending-ability within that context) for the consumer, precisely because to 
be able to waste signifies wealth. So, for the individual consumer, the £1 commodity operates to 
increase a feeling of wealth. But, on a theoretical level, it seeps into the way we perceive a link 
between waste and profit. We can waste as we have spending power, we have spending power 
because we waste. 
Secondly, Gudeman sees the innovator as part of a „thick historical stream‟ through which he 
„draws together traces and leavings from others … and from himself … [and] makes up an 
historical trajectory or personal „style‟… Through the use of traces of himself, the innovator 
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creates a way of doing, indexed in an object or service, that becomes a model for others‟ (2001: 
147). This is to perceive the peddler not only as an innovator, but also as having more awareness 
of his or her position in the chain than purely economic accounts would give. (And certainly we 
can see how this is the case for the peddler in China, where peddling has a long legacy, 
connotations of honesty and hard work, and even some famous success stories – peddlers such as 
Wang Jinglian who have become CEO‟s of large steel companies. However, Gudeman bases his 
argument on a Schumpetarian notion of innovation and, despite twisting it to his own purposes, 
does not seem wholly to repudiate Schumpeter‟s classical liberal model in which only capitalism, 
and in particular institutions of credit, can form the backdrop for innovation (Schumpeter, 
1954).
47
  
 
For Gudeman, (as for Schumpeter), capitalism creates innovation, even if it is acknowledged that 
this innovation sometimes comes about as a result of hardship: this hardship is seen 
quintessentially as an opportunity rather than an injustice. Gudeman does not tackle unevenness 
in wealth or development; indeed for him an uneven terrain breeds the creativity necessary for 
innovation. Capitalism is therefore inextricably linked to creativity, siphoning it off as an 
exclusive territory of the market, and uneven development is excused as a necessary prerequisite. 
Although certainly a more anthropological form of economics, Gudeman‟s remains 
fundamentally concerned with the (economic) efficacy of the market; his thinking revolves 
entirely around understanding how people make sense of and cope with what the market throws 
at them, rather than how it impacts unfairly upon them. 
 
Lefebvre too is concerned with inventiveness, but states clearly that it is a product of the 
everyday, not of the market. For him inventiveness is born of the everyday and confirmed within 
it, largely due the way in which it involves a wager and a risk of setback (2008 [1961]:240) – 
again, we see here Lefebvre‟s vision of tactics themselves linked to making (possibly the wrong) 
choices. However, his use of the word „échec‟ for setback, simply (and perhaps unsubtly) 
translated as „loss‟ in the English version, is telling. „Echec‟ is set-back or defeat and is 
                                                          
47
 Schumpeter‟s belief, as outlined in his most famous work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1954), is that 
the success of capitalism will lead to a form of corporatism and a fostering of values hostile to capitalism, especially 
among intellectuals. His primary concern was to point out the flawed project of socialism, but fearing that socialists 
would not read it and therefore not realize the futility of their aims if it appeared to favour capitalism, Schumpeter 
wrote it in a way that appears sympathetic to socialism. 
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connected to its secondary meaning which is the game of chess (les échecs) or to be in check-
mate (être en échec). This is important as for Lefebvre choices do not lead to „loss‟ pure and 
simple, but rather to failures from which successes arise or dialectical relationships between 
areas of success and failure emerge. So „invention‟, whilst risky, at worst sets one back a while.  
 
iii) Consumptive Thrift: The Link Between Waste and Profit 
So far, this chapter has attempted to argue for a theoretical paradigm in which waste is not seen 
as the binary opposite of non-waste, both in terms of thought processes and material situations. I 
have argued this in the case of the £1 commodity chain as on the ground scenarios make it clear 
that not only is waste turned to profit (products are made from waste materials), but that to a 
large extent, witnessed literally and in national policies, this is a cyclical process. Waste creates 
raw materials used to create profit; but profit must be spent on consuming things in order to 
create more waste. Thus, non-waste is already ear-marked as waste before it is trashed; its raison 
d‟etre is, increasingly, that it will be consumed and expire, so as to be consumed again: 
consumption suddenly emerges now as the key element in understanding the tactic of 
disposability. Yet the patterns of this consumption are not straightforward; they have differing 
cultural ways of operating, meanings and implications. The following section attempts to explain 
the complicated ways in which consumption operates differently at different points along the £1 
commodity chain, making the chain as a whole schizoid in its attitude. Whilst some parts of the 
chain accumulate money, others accumulate things; some parts save to spend, others spend to 
save. The notion that, strangely, unites the two and serves to unpack consumption along the £1 
chain, is thrift. 
 
Saving to spend… 
As the plane takes off the girl next to me gently rustles the bag nestled between her feet, eager to 
explore its contents. She looks about twenty, but it is difficult to tell. She wears some 
fashionably distressed jeans and a sports top. This is the flight from Shanghai to Kunming, the 
provincial capital of rural Yunnan province in South-West China. I am the only non-Chinese 
face on board. Once we have reached our cruising height the girl leans down and pulls the bag 
onto her lap, opening it and taking out a blue Adidas zip-up top, a pale pink t-shirt with the 
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words „cool life‟ scrawled on it in glittery silver, and a Hello Kitty pencil case. She holds each of 
the things in front of her, examining them from different angles, turning them over in her hands, 
and feeling their insides and edges. Her face is at times tense, as if fearing potential regret at her 
own error of judgement or taste in buying them, and at times serene. Finally, seeming pleased 
with her purchases, she turns to me and smiles, asking where I am from: „Meiguo?‟ I reply that I 
am not American, but Yinguo – English. „Ah, Yinguo! David Beckham, Big Ben, Red Bus‟, she 
reels off gleefully, referring to the UK‟s Olympic hand-over ceremony celebrations. 
She informs me that nearly everyone on the flight is returning from shopping trips to Shanghai. I 
look around. It certainly looks as though most people have at least one glossy carrier bag. „It‟s 
expensive to fly though isn‟t it?‟ I ask. „Yes. Quite expensive, but they don‟t have much holiday, 
so the train takes too long‟. Here, as elsewhere across the globe, time has come to mean money. 
„What do they buy?‟ I ask. She says it‟s mainly clothes and presents, things they cannot find as 
easily in Yunnan, such as Western designer labels. She explains that this is probably a rare trip to 
Shanghai for most of them and they would have saved money especially for it. 
As we disembark from the plane at Kunming, I watch the long line of Chinese make their way 
across the tarmac, clutching their shiny bags, and shielding their faces against the driving drizzle. 
At the terminal building, they seem to suddenly and quietly disperse, getting into dusty, patched-
up cars, strangely at odds with the glossy commercialism of their purchases.  
These are the rural inhabitants that the Chinese government is so keen to encourage to spend, 
hoping it can unlock their spending power in order to create new demand for China‟s products 
and so maintain economic growth. Its attempts to do this involve a wide group of policy changes, 
the aim of which is to remove urban discrimination against rural migrants in the areas of 
employment, welfare, and social security, giving the one-third plus of China‟s population who 
are rural migrants equal rights to urban residents. While this will not involve the disbandment of 
the Household Registration System, which has traditionally been and continues to be blamed for 
the inequality between rural and urban Chinese, it will see it substantially relaxed in various 
situations. The intention is to create a burgeoning wealth amongst a migratory group of rural 
Chinese; effectively a reserve army of consumers, who can soak up the over-production 
necessary if China is to continue developing at such a pace, especially since EU and US demand 
has fallen following the global recession.  
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Due to this vigorous campaign on the part of the authorities, it is in rural provinces such as 
Yunnan that the iron rice bowl
48
 most incongruously meets the plastic credit card. 
Unsurprisingly, the reserve army of consumers are not as easily mobilized as might have been 
hoped. Firstly, there is no guarantee that unlocking rural populations‟ spending power will mean 
they buy Chinese goods (as is anecdotally evidenced by the numbers of Western labels on 
display amongst the consumers on the plane). Secondly, the cultural attitudes of generations of 
Chinese in regard to the necessity to save cannot be undone overnight or without evidence of 
serious welfare reform. Despite the demise of the iron rice bowl, it is far from the case that a 
credit culture has been able to pervade. In fact, what reigns is a rather awkward transition, a kind 
of power-sharing arrangement between Maoist and capitalist dreams, in which the lack of iron 
rice bowl causes careful saving, rather than reliance upon credit. Consumption becomes the 
careful spending of careful saving.  
This preoccupation with saving on the part of individuals is mirrored by state policy towards 
foreign reserves and in each case has become known as „Asian thrift‟. The term is one often used 
in a derogatory way by Western economic commentators; indeed following the global financial 
crisis many even suggested it was to blame. The (il)logic went something as follows: China‟s 
inclination to save, on both a governmental and individual level, has led to a global savings glut. 
This in turn, led to the US national current account deficit, which meant the US had to find new 
and „innovative‟ ways to lend domestically. This came in the form of sub-prime mortgages, 
which led to the credit crunch. If China had not saved as much, the US would not be in so much 
debt, and would not have been 'forced' to make mistakes. „Made in China‟ is not only to be found 
stamped on the side of washing machines, but also firmly embossed on the rear-end of the global 
financial crisis. It is therefore China‟s responsibility to spend, in order to save us all. 
 
… and spending to save  
Passing through the doorway of the pound store a woman who looks to be in her late twenties 
slowly intakes her breath and exclaims to her friend, „Oh I could go mad in here!‟ The friend 
replies that she only has „a tenner‟ (a ten pound note), to which she responds, „Yes, but that‟s all 
                                                          
48
 „Iron rice bowl‟ (tiefanwan) is a colloquial term for the Maoist notion of the social guarantee (baoxialai), which 
saw workers placed within a unit which provided them with all that was necessary for daily survival, including food. 
The phrase was meant in the sense that we would use the expression „cast iron guarantee‟.   
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I need to go mad in here isn‟t it!‟ Later, I speak to Tracey, who tells me she sometimes goes to a 
particular pound store with her children on a „mini-spree‟. „I tell them we have fifteen pounds 
between us all, so we can each pick five whole things and put them in the basket. It‟s such fun 
because you feel you can throw caution to the wind a little and that you are choosing little treats 
for yourself in a quite extravagant way, only it‟s not extravagant „cos we‟re only spending fifteen 
quid. And the kids love it, I think they feel it‟s so exciting to be able to choose five different 
things – five!‟ I ask why she thinks that feeling of being able to spend without having to think 
about the money too much is so pleasurable. „I dunno, I s‟pose it‟s just „cos you feel in control. 
It‟s about power I s‟pose, and you know, everyone likes spending, and people talk about what 
they buy and where they got it. And also, lots of the things I save money on, or they‟re two for 
one [meaning two items for the price of one] so I‟m saving money when I shop in there.‟ 
There are two interesting things about what Tracey says here. Firstly, she is fulfilling a now-
classic marketing line of capitalism, which is that by spending, or even by spending more than 
you intended, you will save money. She believes herself to have made a saving if she makes 
purchasing choices she wouldn‟t normally make, based on the offers available, but even if she 
has made a genuine saving, she uses it to buy something else. In other words, Tracey is never 
really „saving‟ money, she is simply finding ways to make it go further. She is spending to save 
in the more recent capitalistic sense; that is, she is a „good capitalist‟ because she spends, not 
because she accrues what she saves in the form of capital. 
Secondly, Tracey uses the pound store to give herself and her children a sense of being able to 
„choose‟ things they desire as individuals – things that „take their fancy‟ and that they therefore 
feel they are somehow attracted to or represented by. Accounts such as Tracey‟s can easily be 
interpreted as fitting neatly within the parameters laid out most recently by Daniel Miller‟s 
oeuvre which emphasizes the ways in which individuals feel they are expressing their self-
identity through their consumptive choices. (As mentioned before, Miller posits his argument as 
one which fights for the individual to be perceived as having agency, in contrast to the „out-
dated‟ argument in which the consumer is seen to be at the behest of powerful market sirens.) 
However, in taking this stance he dismisses the way in which the market can only offer pre-
determined choice to the consumer, so his or her „self-identity‟ is only being expressed in ways 
pre-ordained by capitalism. Unfortunately this makes Miller‟s thinking easily hijack-able by neo-
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liberal thinkers keen to team the words „market‟ and „choice‟ with others such as „expression‟ 
and „freedom‟. If we followed this kind of argument to its logical end, we would paint Tracey as  
„liberated‟, „free from constraint‟, a person who‟s choice to create a „treat‟ out of spending 
money in a pound store is a pure one, to no extent governed by necessity or struggle or simply 
the lack of other types of „treat‟ that do not revolve around market relations.  
 
iv) Conclusion 
We have seen how the tactic of disposability relies upon a culture of hiding and display which 
belies the ways in which areas deemed to be „failures‟ are intrinsic to the operations of the £1 
commodity chain. This runs parallel to a general separation of waste and non-waste on the 
practical and theoretical level, which constitutes a tearing apart of reality and the images 
provided of „reality‟ and thus denies the Hereclitian nature of the chain. Furthermore, we have 
seen how the speed with which something is disposed of after being consumed is crucial to the 
survival of the chain and how this curtailed existence of the object denies the ability to „make do 
and mend‟, creating an enemy out of certain types of thrift. In fact the tactic of disposability 
uncovers how disposal denies bricolage in the same way that the tactic of immediacy revealed 
how possession denies entanglement: these two pairs are linked diametrically. 
In many ways this quasi moralistic attitude towards thrift represents a subtle yet fundamental 
turn in capitalism‟s relationship with itself. Whilst our most recent economic history – that of 
allowing market logic to prevail (whether that be with the firm hand of the State or through 
laissez-faire policies) – stems from Augustine‟s idea that avarice could be commandeered to 
guard against other more detrimental passions; avarice and saving in some contexts has now 
returned to the original Aristotelian notion of the miser and come to be seen as unhelpful and 
selfish. Far from keeping other passions in check and therefore enabling the pursuit of wealth 
and an improvement in conditions for all, thrift is now seen as the sin of the miser on both global 
and individual levels. This is shown through complaints about China‟s foreign reserves and on 
the domestic level, through offers of „two for the price of one‟ – economizing by spending, not 
saving. As Zizek says,  „… the capitalist is no longer the lone Miser who clings to his hidden 
treasure, taking a secret peek at it when he is alone, behind securely locked doors, but the subject 
who accepts the basic paradox that the only way to preserve and multiply one‟s treasure is to 
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spend it‟ (2002: 43). „Being thrifty‟ is now about spending, not saving, and consumption is put 
forward as its opposite – thrift: hence the disjuncture between the use of the word thrift to mean 
making inexpensive purchases and economizing (as in „thrift store‟), and the newer use of the 
word to mean precisely not purchasing, not spending (as in „Asian thrift‟).  
Consumption is emphasized in order to provide on-going economic growth, and due to its low 
price the £1 commodity must speed the gap between the satisfaction of needs (at the point of 
exchange) and desire (at the point of disposal). In the context of the £1 chain the importance of 
being wasteful in the presence of thrift cannot be over-emphasized: firstly to secure the 
continued increase in the number of exchange interactions and thus maintain economic growth, 
and secondly to create the waste materials necessary for manufacturing. A fast turn-around, that 
is, a high level of disposability, is crucial. Therefore a £1 commodity is not built to last, and this 
non-lasting is not only a physical property of the nature of the „built-in obsolescence‟, as 
described by Packard in The Waste Makers, (1960) but a more psychologically-rooted property, 
conferred upon the commodity by its price-tag, which allows it to be trashed even when it 
continues to function. Function is reduced to fad in the case of the £1 commodity. 
This reduction is related to what Bernard Stiegler calls „the proletarianization of the consumer‟ 
(Crogan, 2010: 161). In an interview with Patrick Crogan, Stiegler interprets Marx‟s definition of 
the proletariat as not being about pauperization, but rather as resting upon the de-skilling of the 
worker – Marx describes the proletariat as a worker who had skills and savoir faire, but who has 
been dispossessed of them by the introduction of machines. Stiegler points out that this is also 
precisely what Adam Smith had said almost a century earlier in The Wealth of Nations (1991), 
but he had not made a political theory out of it. Similarly, Gilbert Simondon has called this de-
skilling disindividuation, based on the logic that when individuation comes through the singular 
knowledge a person possesses, if this is taken away from them they are disindividualized (1954). 
For Stiegler, the same process of proletarianization that the worker experienced, has also now 
rendered the consumer less capable of knowing how to live (savoir vivre
49
):  
                                                          
49The concept of „savoir vivre‟ was first developed by Stiegler in the three volumes of his Mécréance et Discrédit 
(2004, 2006). These volumes outlined the way in which the industrial organisation of production and then 
consumption has had destructive consequences for the modes of life of human beings, in particular with the way in 
which the loss of savoir-faire and savoir-vivre (that is, the loss of the knowledge of how to do and how to live), has 
resulted in what Stiegler calls „generalised proletarianisation‟.  
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Thus, according to Stiegler, the proletariat consumer is left with nothing but his purchasing 
power, just as the proletariat producer was left with nothing but his labour power - „so he will 
work to earn the little bit of money he uses to be able to buy what he produces, having lost 
everything; he has no knowledge in work anymore and no knowledge in life. So he is unhappy 
(2010: 162). In the context of the £1 commodity chain, Stiegler‟s argument here is useful in 
explaining the way in which the consumer knows not how to repair (or cannot as the object‟s 
design will not allow for repair) and therefore has no choice but to re-buy. This in itself is part of 
the decrease in savoir vivre. Furthermore, Stiegler‟s vision of the disempowered consumer is 
instrumental in placing the (already dispossessed) worker as a (now dispossessed) consumer, 
who can do nothing but attempt to gain pleasure in spending on the most ephemeral and 
inexpensive of commodities
50
.    
This spending on the ephemeral, due to the proletarianization of the consumer, further serves to 
ingrain the importance of disposability. The resulting (covert) emphasis on waste has seen the 
figure of the peddler emerge as the embodiment of the quandary between thrift and waste. He 
enables the transition from waste to product (and therefore profit), so is inextricably involved in 
capitalistic practices.  Yet, simultaneously, he defies the logic of the wider chain and that of 
capitalism in general by operating as a bricoleur who is the ultimate example of „thrift‟. He is in 
many ways the „reverse image‟ that Lefebvre saw as represented by Charlie Chaplin - a character 
who reflects the image of everyday, but who is simultaneously „exceptional, deviant, abnormal‟ 
(2008 [1947]: 12). Through him, and him alone, the tactic of disposability is challenged, but how 
long this challenge can withstand the increasing pressure on places to show themselves as images 
of success remains to be seen.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
50 What Stiegler posits as a replacement to this, is a world in which rather than there being consumers on one side 
and producers on the other, there are simply „contributors‟ who „participate in the creation of the world in which 
they live‟ – a world which could be described as „open source‟ (2010: 162).   
 
„…from the moment when marketing invents the service society…we see how the 
consumer is himself deprived of his savoir vivre. The producer was deprived of his 
skills or abilities (savoir faire), the consumer is deprived of his savoir vivre‟ 
(2010: 161).  
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Furthermore, the changing of these spaces of waste has an impact on individual and national 
psyche. As Hawkins and Muecke point out „changing relations to waste mean changing relations 
to self‟ (2003: xiii – xiv). In buying and disposing of and therefore creating her own waste, the 
Chinese subject is made a „consumer‟ in the eyes of the world, which in turn reflect back to her 
the image of China as a now „successful‟ nation in which thrift is no longer necessary. By 
portraying consumption as success and removing it from the idea of waste, the tactic of 
disposability ingeniously hides itself under the illusory concept of purchasing power. 
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Chapter Four 
The Tactic of Agglomeration: Solidarity, Reciprocity and Transportability in 
Yiwu. 
It is a Thursday afternoon in mid-November. The train is busy. Nearly every seat is taken up by a 
neatly dressed businessman, overnight bag in one hand, Blackberry in the other. There is a polite 
low rumble of business-like chatter. We speed through Shanghai‟s sprawling outskirts and on 
through the rural grasslands of Zhejiang province, the route offering fleeting glances of small 
agricultural villages and emerging light-industry towns. The scenery becomes more mountainous 
as we enter the Eastern part of the Jin Qu basin, before finally and abruptly giving way to a grey 
urban expanse. This is Yiwu, the „sea of commodities‟, a promised land for the international 
wholesale buyer, and a place which boasts the highest concentration on the planet of all existing 
products. 
I disembark at the small grey station building along with around just thirty others, all Chinese. If 
200,000 international business people arrive in this city every day, as the official publicity 
suggests, then very few of them were on my train. We make our way through the scruffy 
underpass and out into the station forecourt, to be greeted by the usual ticket-hunters and a small 
row of official taxis. No signs to the markets, no business or translation services advertised, no 
wholesale agents waiting to meet foreign buyers; only immense, straight roads and austere grey 
high-rises. Yiwu is far from the glossy international hub promotional sources would have us 
believe.  
Yiwu‟s existence stretches back to the Tang dynasty (AD 6244) and, keen to prove historical 
credentials, promotional websites point to its famous residents from the Tang, Song and Yuan 
dynasties, as well as more recent prodigies, including educationalist Chen Wangdao, literary 
theorist Feng Xuefeng and historian Wu Han. However, there are few signs of this history today. 
Yiwu has re-branded itself exclusively around its „fame‟ as the world‟s „small commodity city‟, 
an official status bestowed by the Chinese government in 1982. In fact, since the „reform and 
opening‟ policies of the 1980s, Yiwu has used the small commodity industry to go from being a 
traditional agricultural town to the key driver of a huge regional economy, not only in Zhejiang 
province, but in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) economic area as a whole. The YRD constitutes 
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less than one per cent of China‟s land area and only 5.8 per cent of its population, yet creates 
approximately 20 per cent of its GDP (2005 Chinese government figures) and contains more than 
800,000 private companies, most of which are small family-owned enterprises organised in 
networks. The area manufactures predominantly small, inexpensive commodities such as socks, 
toothbrushes, plastic cups, and in certain types of manufacturing has usurped the established 
industrial success of the Pearl River Delta. 
Yiwu‟s prime location in the YRD has made it an important transport hub, with express trains to 
and from Shanghai as well as eight inland flight routes. Since 1982 ground area has increased 
from 2.8 km square, to 18 km square and now consists of Huangyuan Market (established in 
1992), Binwang Market (established in 1995), and China Yiwu International Trade City (first 
established in 2002) which includes Futian Market. Each market contains around five smaller 
markets, specialising in specific product areas, and together they cover an area of approximately 
2 million square metres, containing around 58,000 company booths displaying around 400,000 
products. Local word has it that more than 1000 containers leave Yiwu every day, largely bound 
for Europe and the US and, according to China‟s People’s Daily newspaper, the city creates a 
daily cash flow of 287 million Yuan (around US$34.5 million). Furthermore, these figures have 
remained buoyant despite the global recession, as it is luxury goods rather than „necessities‟ 
which have experienced a drop in demand. Yiwu is the ultimate „one-stop-shop‟ for wholesale 
buyers; a manufacturing and distribution leviathan, presenting itself as an immense ark of all that 
the new, „open‟, efficient China has to offer; a place rooted in Deng‟s ethos of opportunity and 
innovation. Yet, apart from a few conspicuously parked Mercedes, it remains curiously down-at-
heel, stoically immersed in its own methods of operation, and almost entirely impenetrable to the 
outsider. 
This chapter will discuss the defining characteristics of Yiwu - its „history‟, agglomerative 
nature, and alternative modes of solidarity - and analyse how they are used tactically. It will 
begin by explaining the ways in which Yiwu has attempted to promote itself as „place‟ due to 
national concerns with both appearing to be „green‟ and maintaining a continuity between 
communism and market economics. This will be followed by a discussion of Yiwu as 
agglomerative space and more specifically as a model unique to, and emerging from, China‟s 
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history. The ways in which this agglomerative space leads to new modes of solidarity will then 
be explored by drawing upon the experiences of international wholesale buyers in Yiwu.  
 
i) Yiwu as ‘Historical’ Space: The Making of Place from Non-Place. 
Let us pick up where we left off on that Thursday in mid-November. A thin drizzle has begun, as 
mountain mists descend on the city of Yiwu, obscuring the tops of the grey high-rises in the 
distance. I am standing in the middle of Xiuhu park, an entirely human-made creation which 
accounts for most of the ‟eleven square metres of public garden per inhabitant‟ that the official 
websites triumphantly announce. Xiuhu Park is an anomaly, a strangely self-conscious attempt at 
naturalism within an environment exclusively designed and built for its main purpose of 
manufacturing. Having wandered through the underground shopping mall, with its numerous 
small stalls and Western-style pizza restaurant, I stop by the concrete-bottomed lake, with its 
artificial islands and reproduction Ming archways, bridges and gazebos.  
Ahead of me stands the only part of this built environment which dates further back than the late 
seventies - the leaning Da‟ansi pagoda. Incongruously juxtaposed between the faux gateways its 
ancient weathered bricks are set against a backdrop of smooth grey-pink eighties high-rises. It is 
the only remnant from Yiwu‟s dynastic days; days when, as a small village, Yiwu spawned poets 
and authors, educationalists and thinkers, rather than the legions of small-business entrepreneurs 
that it teems with today. Squinting, I can almost remove the tower block from view, framing the 
pagoda against the sky. Seen alone like this, it symbolizes an older China and the Yiwu of Tang 
days. Un-squinting brings back into frame once again the modern high-rise beyond, and the 
pagoda gains its more recent layer of symbolic value: a layer gifted it by the Yiwu of current 
times, the Yiwu keen to embellish its trading reputation with a cultural-historical tradition; the 
Yiwu determined to epitomize successful capitalism whilst insisting on its continuity with both 
Confucian and Maoist legacy; the Yiwu determined to be someplace, rather than non-place. (see 
figures 11, 12 and 13) 
This determination began in earnest following the defining events of 1984. The year was a 
pivotal one for Yiwu due to the famous „no 4 document‟, entitling private Town and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) to the same tax incentives as collectively-owned TVEs. More importantly, 
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the document also granted TVEs the same policy treatment as State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
therefore effectively equating private firms with SOEs. Its impact on potential private 
entrepreneurs was huge. According to Huang (2008: 97), within one month of its announcement 
rural residents in the county of Yiwu raised 10 million Yuan and established 500 businesses. It is 
not surprising therefore, that within the next two years the city of Yiwu's ground area increased 
at its fastest ever rate. Alongside this physical growth, Yiwu's new-found reputation as the latest 
economic power-house of the new China was creating official concerns with regard to the 
necessity to enhance its credentials as both an environmentally responsible entity and an 
historical one. 
The environmental concern was a complicated mix of the necessity to portray Yiwu as 
'responsible' and 'green' to international corporations who were considering using it as a 
production base, subject to general 'ethical' standards, and a popular re-appropriation of 
Confucian principles of 'harmony' and 'balance'. This re-popularisation of Confucian thought has 
been occurring in business circles over the last two decades, and has most recently found form in 
the idea of 'the better life' explored in the chapter on Shanghai. Meanwhile, the historical element 
was not simply a desire to acknowledge Yiwu's existence back in China's dynastic past; the fact 
that the Yiwu of the late eighties was barely the same place as the Yiwu of those dynastic times 
was clearly understood. No, there was also a concern, mirrored ideologically at State level across 
all policy areas, that this shining example of Deng Xiao Ping‟s 'to get rich is glorious' ethos, 
should be situated within, and reminded of, its communist allegiance. Hence, statues celebrating 
the commitment and industry of the Maoist worker were erected, such as the one shown in 
Figure 14. 
This careful recreation of „history‟ and „culture‟ thus had a strong political agenda; an inherent 
objective to create a sense of the relationship between market economics and communist 
socialism in and through the built environment. The aim was to present Yiwu as a place with 
communist history, which had chosen to indulge in a spot of market capitalism - a kind of 
communist bedrock upon which capitalism had been allowed to pitch its tent. This can be seen as 
part of what Kevin Hetherington (2008) identifies as a preoccupation with shaping the past: 
 „If in the past concerns existed within capitalist societies to shape the future and to attain 
some degree of control over the image of it, in our culture of simultaneous time it is 
shaping the past that has become our preoccupation‟ (2008: 281). 
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Thus the Maoist worker monument is perhaps part of an attempt to balance/counter/excuse (?!) 
the present and future, that is, the market economy. It is an example of what Hetherington calls 
„an image of the past that provides a sense of authentic origin and justification for present hopes‟ 
(2008: 283), proving the way that heritage in its providing of the story of the present, has become 
a characteristic of the entrepreneurial city. 
In reality, it was the introduction of market economics which gave birth to Yiwu as we know it. 
And yet, as will be explored later in this chapter, Yiwu displays many genuine legacies of a 
communist past in its planning and operations; legacies far more effective than tokenistic Maoist 
statues in branding it capitalism 'Chinese-style‟. But assuring Yiwu would be seen as arising 
from, and connected to communism, was only one part of the necessity for such insta-history; the 
other part had to do with securing Yiwu‟s placeship. 
In many ways Yiwu is a classic example of non-place in the way that Mark Auge (1995) 
conceptualised it. It could be argued that it sits in direct opposition to the 
anthropological/sociological notion of place concerned with specific cultures localised in time 
and space (1995:34). It does not have the requisite characteristics of identity, relations and 
history common to anthropological places; hence the desire on the part of the authorities to 
create these elements, or drag irrelevant versions of them from Yiwu‟s past. Arguably, its 
inhabitants have a lived environment in which history consists of replicas of ancient China, 
which can only serve to show people what Yiwu never was. History is an abstraction in Yiwu, 
and not simply in Auge‟s sense of being absent. When monuments are faux-history, that history 
becomes an abstraction of a different sort. The monuments reference a 'real' history that is clear 
in the minds of people, so they potentially bring forth a historical awareness, but they do not 
convey history within the location they stand. They convey only the idea of history, not history 
itself; they are the holograms of the monument world. Furthermore, this faux history is 
juxtaposed with the parading of Yiwu‟s attributes in what Yi Fu Tuan considers to be more 
„abstract‟ ways – the promotion of it as a place of great efficiency and an exciting hub of 
activity. As Tuan argues, these methods often tend to belong to cities which are either literally 
newly built, or „new‟ in their current form: 
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 Also concurrent with Auge‟s definition of non-place, Yiwu owes much to temporal elements: 
'what reigns there is actuality, the urgency of the present moment. Since non-places are there to 
be passed through, they are measured in units of time' (1995: 104). While the authorities are keen 
to promote Yiwu as space, they also cannot help promote it as time, referring to the 1000 
containers a day that leave its environs, or the tens of thousands of commodities produced each 
hour by its factories, or the sheer number of exchanges that take place inside its markets. Yiwu 
may well be promoted as a nice place to live, but it is also promoted as an astounding temporal 
phenomenon. One lives the speed of commodity exchange as part of one's place; the 
impressiveness of that speed is the place. 
Finally, in accordance with Auge‟s definition, Yiwu allows the visitor a certain anonymity which 
can be experienced as a liberation from identity. A business person in Yiwu is purely that; 
momentarily they can say „I am not 40. I am not a father. I am not English. I am not an amateur 
cyclist. I am not an owner of a thatched cottage. I simply = business‟. In Yiwu, a person is 
(primarily) exchange.  
However, the above features of history, temporality and anonymity are not sufficiently 
convincing as an attempt to map Yiwu as non-place. Although Yiwu‟s monuments can be seen 
as a false history, irrelevant to anything (physical) that ever existed there, it is not a-historical. 
Whilst its history may not come from a dubious connection with the dynastic village of „Yiwu‟ - 
this link was and is entirely severed – it can be seen to emerge  from the ways in which the Yiwu 
we know today (the Yiwu just prior to and following 1984), was built almost unwittingly 
referencing Confucian and Maoist traditions. (As the section on agglomeration will show, 
building layout in Yiwu owes much to both these historical movements.) The history that makes 
Yiwu place is not to be found in its monuments but in the fabric of its everyday spaces; in the 
„A city does not become historic merely because it has occupied the same site for a long time. 
Past events make no impact on the present unless they are memorialized in history books, 
monuments, pageants … An old city has a rich store of facts on which successive generations of 
citizens can draw to sustain and re-create their image of place … New cities, such as the frontier 
settlements of North America, lacked a venerable past; to attract business and gain pride their 
civic leaders were obliged to speak with a loud voice. Strident boosterism was the technique to 
create an impressive image, and to a lesser extent it still is. The boosters could rarely vaunt their 
city‟s past or culture; hence the emphasis tended to be on abstract and geometrical excellences 
such as „the most central‟, „the biggest‟, „the fastest‟, and „the tallest‟ (2005:175).  
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unintended aspects of both Confucianism and Maoism that entered into its creation and being. 
This runs in accordance with Auge‟s argument, that place has history as a day-to-day creation; it 
is 'historical' for its inhabitants since their own pasts are captured there and they have built up 
memories there (1995:55).  
The desire to create this day-to-day history can even be witnessed in the behaviour of many of 
the wholesale buyers who visit Yiwu. Despite never staying long enough to find a sense of place 
in the same way an inhabitant would, the buyers still wanted a sense of familiarity and 
community. They therefore chose to stay in the large Western chain hotels rather than the ex 
state-run hotels, despite the fact these hotels did not necessarily have better facilities and were far 
further form the markets. Many told me they enjoyed the kind of ad-hoc community that briefly 
built up in and around these hotels, especially around busy trading times of the year.  
Furthermore, it is plausible, if not likely, that Yiwu will increasingly gain place-ship as its 
monuments start to become seen as typical of a time in China‟s history when it was attempting to 
marry market economics and communist socialism. As Auge points out, markets too can gain 
history: 'whether they are shrinking or expanding, the space in which they grow or regress is a 
historical space' (Auge, 1995: 59). It may be that in the future Yiwu‟s markets are hailed as the 
instigators of new forms of capitalist relations, in a manner not dissimilar to the way Venice‟s 
markets are regarded as the birthplace of older capitalisms. Visiting Yiwu will then become part 
of what Auge calls the 'experience of non-place as a turning back on the self' (1995: 92); an 
awareness of oneself in a position that itself is spectacle due to myth-making which has created 
an image of a place stronger than the actual place.  
This awareness of the place Yiwu is likely to occupy in future histories is certainly true for some 
of the traders I come into contact with when following „L‟ round the markets. Coming to Yiwu 
for four days nearly every month, L has become a familiar face to the traders he regularly buys 
from. He describes how they often take to selling their products, by selling the fact they come 
from Yiwu: 
„Not so much now, because now they just know what I want and they know my reactions well enough to 
know whether I‟m going to buy or not, so they don‟t try to convince me as much as they used to, you 
know… they don‟t give me the hard sell. But before, before they knew me, if they thought they were 
losing me, you know, if they thought I was about to walk away, they would start to tell me how this was 
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Yiwu and I wouldn‟t do any better anywhere than this. They would say how efficient and fast it was, and 
how cheap, and how this was world-famous Yiwu… you know… YIWU!‟ 
Similarly, a young French couple who have made Yiwu their home, tell me how they struggled 
to feel anything towards it at first, but found the idea they would be part of world history 
comforting. Genevieve tells me: 
„When we came here, me and Marc, I was quite depressed for a while, and I guess a little shocked, 
because I knew it would not be beautiful you know, but I thought I would be able to make it my home 
even then… and I was not… I could not feel like that about it. And the business was hard you know, it 
took a long time to have any success. But, I mean, we came here before Yiwu was really known about 
and when I started to hear about it, you know, I felt different. I realized it was becoming famous, you 
know, globally, and all of a sudden, I felt proud. I was amazed! This place I could not make my home… 
and suddenly I was proud of it. It was completely illogical, my reaction…‟ 
Finally, there is an added twist to positing Yiwu as place. Auge‟s concern with non-place is 
essentially a political one: it is that their 'contracts' may become the most common way of 
interacting with location and their (fake) features of place may gain total legitimacy. This is not 
to mourn the loss of 'history' or 'culture' or 'organic relations' in a way that quickly leads to 
questionable notions of the fake/real, the original/copy, the social/non-social, but to acknowledge 
that non-place is primarily economic and therefore cannot be separated from the proliference of 
corporate control and profit-logic, and of the systematic destruction of the means to escape, 
refuse, and re-appropriate the two latter (Auge, 1995: 103). This is to re-codify non-place not as 
a bland location, but as a political location, whose apparently non-political brandings and bland 
spaces serve to hide its potency as a corporate player. Therefore, if Yiwu has place-ship, it is 
hiding its primary economic function less effectively, allowing for a greater potential to 
challenge corporate logic. In fact, as the next section will explain, Yiwu has a market logic 
unique to itself. 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
ii) Yiwu as a Transportable Model: Agglomerative Space and the Re-
Appropriation of Confucian and Maoist Legacy 
 
If Yiwu has place-ship, as I argue, due to the ways in which past historical, cultural and political 
legacies can be witnessed in its built environment, how do these legacies manifest themselves? 
How is it that space itself is representative of social movements? The follow section will attempt 
to explain this by drawing upon the notion of the „danwei‟ and explaining how the impact this 
notion has had on space in Yiwu has allowed the latter to become a globally transportable entity. 
Danwei was the principal method of implementing party policy in Maoist China. Although the 
word is most commonly translated as „work unit‟, the danwei was actually far more than that, 
binding workers to it for life, providing housing, food, clinics, childcare, schools, and therefore 
identity and social respectability or „face‟ (miazi) too. Furthermore, because it provided all that 
was necessary for daily survival, it is often connected to the notion of the „baoxialai‟ or social 
guarantee, colloquially referred to as the „iron rice bowl‟ (tiefanwan).  
Yiwu‟s manufacturing raison d‟être can most evidently be seen in its lay-out, which centres 
around the immense wholesale markets, housed in giant warehouses and zoned according to 
commodity. All main roads head towards a commodity market, supporting an interpretation of 
Yiwu as a Hausmannized city, promoting the „natural flow‟ of goods and people through urban 
space. Yet housing and production areas in Yiwu follow a different logic, one which appears 
unable to escape an older spatial repertoire, and which is bound up with past cultural movements 
and historical change in China.  
Like many „new towns‟ in China, Yiwu was built based on the concept of xiaoqu or „small 
districts‟- planned neighbourhoods in which housing is integrated with communal facilities such 
as nurseries, clinics, restaurants, shops, and sports facilities. In accordance with David Bray 
(2005), I would argue that these xiaoqu bear a strong resemblance to the socialist danwei in their 
layout and provision of services. Although a result of the necessity for the socialist collective at 
the beginning of the Mao era, the layout of danwei can also be traced back to the traditional 
courtyard house designed to complement the ethical codes of Confucianism. Thus, it re-
employed a familiar spatial repertoire to the service of socialism (Bray, 2005: 35). Lu Feng also 
makes this argument, saying the danwei has a close kinship with traditional lineage group 
arrangements, but that this kinship within the work unit is politically, rather than family, based 
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(1998: 54-58). The danwei of course was not only a way of producing products, but acted as a 
dual production system also maintaining a steady supply of political intensity and therefore 
activists who could be mobilised for party campaigns (Dutton, 2005: 164). (The products of 
danwei were thus perhaps „socialist‟ objects in much the same way as Arvatov‟s (1997) were, 
containing ideologies within them.)  
In Yiwu, the same repertoire is again employed, this time in the service of manufacturing, but 
this re-employment, of course, brings with it both Confucianism and Maoism, continuing them 
into the new xiaoqu spaces. In fact the commercial developers of these areas even focus on 
creating spaces for „linli guanxi‟ (neighbourhood guanxi51), such as the danwei used to provide, 
proving just how deeply the ideological remnants of the danwei are ingrained in current practice 
- the „mimetic effect‟ Bray mentions (2005:156). The danwei, born of Confucianism, and 
appropriated for political ends, finds itself now, in the post-reform period, re-appropriated for 
economic ends as part of the general dominance of economic logic, as Michael Dutton asserts: 
 
 
 
Furthermore, unlike in other Chinese cities where, as Bray attests, the replacement of danwei by 
xiaoqu has meant the removal of labour as the determinant of social space, in Yiwu xiaoqu 
remain linked to workplaces. For example, Yangguang xiaoqu is close to Binwang market, and is 
therefore home to mainly small craft and jewellery manufacturers. Thus, if your father is a craft-
ware manufacturer, you are most likely to live in the residential area next to Binwang market and 
attend school with the children of other craft-ware manufacturers. Space, in this sense, is strictly 
divided according to manufacturing style, and the whereabouts of everyday life is dictated by 
what type of article a person makes. This is because of the way in which Yiwu did not become a 
manufacturing city like most, neither was it built from the profits of manufacturing, but rather it 
                                                          
51
 Guanxi is often  translated as „relationship‟ or „connection‟, but is best explained as a combination of „ganqing‟ 
(depth of feeling within an interpersonal relationship), and „renqing‟ (moral obligation and „face‟ or social prestige). 
It describes personal relationships in which one is able and obliged to perform and receive favours - a long-term, 
obligated and heartfelt connection in which individuals have the right to demand fair return, benefits sharing and 
reciprocity (See Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958, Hwang, 1987; Lin, 1999; Luo, 1997). It is generally accepted that the 
principles of guanxi come from Confucian thought. Guanxi‟s emphasis on interpersonal connections caused it to 
attract the interest of network analysts from the late 1970‟s onwards. 
„The once all encompassing work unit that took care of all aspects of a worker‟s life is being 
transformed into an economic enterprise, while peasants, once tethered to the land by a castelike 
system of household registration, are being transformed into „free‟ workers and drawn into the 
city in ever-increasing numbers‟ (2005: 268). 
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was created as a place in which to manufacture, meaning departmentalisation was ordered by 
labour from the onset. In Yiwu, labour relations continue to determine residential organisation 
and therefore identity. In fact Yiwu provides a good example of the more complicated 
subjectivities existing in current-day China; its spatial relations force a nuanced analysis of the 
often unquestioned assumption that the shift from „danwei ren‟ (danwei person) to „shehui ren‟ 
(social person) corresponds un-problematically to the rise of the market and the privileging of 
individual interest. (See Cao Jinqing and Chen Zhongya who put forward a relatively straight-
forward connection between market economics and non-collective identities, 1997.) In reality 
subjectivities are created by a constant re-appropriation of deeply ingrained features from the 
„old China‟ and the subsequent re-arrangement of them as part of the „new China‟. 
This re-arrangement must not only be seen within the context of long historical movements such 
as Confucianism and Maoism, but also in the light of the original inspiration for Yiwu and the 
ways in which it has gone on to inspire copycat versions of itself elsewhere. The Yiwu model 
was inspired by „Zhejiang Village‟ (Zhejiangcun), a migrant clothing manufacturing area in the 
Fengtai district of Beijing, named after the province its migrants came from. According to Li 
Zhang (2001: 67-68), Zhejiangcun was created in stages. The first, from 1980 to 1984, saw 1000 
migrants arrive and live in local households without creating a community of their own. During 
the second stage, from 1985 1990, it expanded rapidly due to the greater demand for clothing, 
new social networks and relaxed migration policies, attracting around 30,000 migrants. During 
this stage, and due largely to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the Asian Games in 
1990, the government mobilised several „clean-up‟ drives to force out migrants. However, 
around two months after each drive, migrants would resume their former activities. The third 
stage, from 1990-1998, saw the complete razing of Zhejiangcun in 1995 causing a mass exodus 
of around 40,000 migrants, and its subsequent re-building as an enormous modern plaza - the 
realisation of the authorities plans and a „suitable‟ representation of the new China.  
However, regardless of the differences in its appearance during these stages, Zhejiangcun 
continued to be characterised by four key features attributed to its basing itself on the migrants‟ 
former practices in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. These were: (1) that it consisted of numerous 
small-scale private enterprises; (2) that it specialized in wholesale petty commodity markets; (3) 
that it was built on tens of thousands of mobile traders who facilitate the flow of materials; (4) 
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that it was made possible by various forms of non-governmental financial arrangements. These 
characteristics had become known as the „Wenzhou model‟, a phrase which was officially 
announced as a new economic paradigm for China in 1986 (Zhang, 2001: 52-53). (This was of 
course the same time that Yiwu began to flourish and those four characteristics are clearly 
evident there.)  
The fact that Wenzhou had created the model was not simply coincidence, but also as a result of 
its historical ties with the Yongjia school of thought - a movement from Yongjia county in the 
Wenzhou region whose roots lie in the Southern Song Dynasty. The school contested 
mainstream Confucianism‟s belief that only farmers were the backbone and true value of the 
nation, arguing in contrast that scholars, farmers, artisans and traders were all equally important. 
So, unlike in other provinces where under Confucianism land was valorized and peoples‟ 
attachment to it revered, in Wenzhou commercialism had been celebrated historically. In the 
light of this historical legacy of part of Zhejiang province it becomes less surprising that it was 
Zhejiang migrants who created a model which was successful enough not only to return to its 
province of birth and make its way into official experiments with commercialism, but also which 
has proved robust enough to be recreated internationally and promoted as defining a specifically 
Chinese way of operating. 
By the time the model was used in the creation of Yiwu, it had become a state-endorsed project 
rather than an unofficial migrant enclave such as Zhejiangcun. It also had the advantage of an 
excellent strategic position along the burgeoning Yangtze river delta, with geographical 
proximity to Shanghai‟s ports and infrastructure, and the accumulated expertise of Zhejiang 
residents. Not surprisingly therefore, there were attempts to recreate the model elsewhere in 
China, and in 1995 an entrepreneur from Yiwu tried to set up a copycat market in Zhenzhou. 
According to KelleeTsai (2002), around 300 vendors paid 1000 Yuan up front in cash to lease 
their 12 by 15 metre retail lots for five years. But when she visited in 1996 and 1997 Tsai found 
the market „looked sluggish‟ and contained more vendors than customers (2002:175). By 2001 
most of the migrant vendors who had been persuaded by the entrepreneur to come to Zhengzhou 
from Yiwu had returned home due to poor profits (if any), and only those migrants from less 
developed provinces and consequently with lower expectations, remained. It was clear that the 
model required strong infrastructural and economic links in order to be successful; therefore the 
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potential for its continued recreation within China was, at least temporarily, limited. However, 
potential to recreate it outside of Chinese borders grew, and eventually became irresistible. 
Yiwu‟s success had gained it the status of a transportable entity within its own right; a model that 
could be transplanted wholesale within the boundaries of other countries.  
The first of these was opened in Warsaw, Poland, 1992, having been established by the local 
government of Guangdong, China. Initially it contained 200 Canton firms, but through 
continuous investment has become an area of 200,000 metres, upon which are built four two-
storey halls containing 600 firms. Following this, in 2003 a joint venture between an Austrian 
and a Chinese businessman saw the opening of the AsiaCenter in Budapest, which covered an 
area of 125,000 square metres. However, the Chinese partner was unable to fulfill his promises 
to the booth tenants within the centre; the Austrian partner took 100 percent control and changed 
the functioning of the centre to make it more a retail outlet than a wholesale market. Then, in 
2004, a Chinese government agency – Chinamex - created the „Dragon Mart‟ centre in Dubai, 
which contained 4000 booths. Agreements for a further centre to be situated at Schiphol airport 
area in Amsterdam were signed in 2007. 
Most recently, Chinese company Fanerdun Ltd proposed a copycat market in Kalmar, Sweden. 
The industrial town has seen extremely high levels of unemployment over the last decade as 
manufacturing jobs are lost due to large companies moving production to cheaper labour 
markets. However, being well linked by infrastructure to the rest of Europe, and seen as low risk 
socio-politically due to its situation in an historically „neutral‟ country, Fanderdun thought it an 
ideal site. The Kalmar complex was due to be opened in September 2008, but opening was 
stalled due to on-going issues with Chinese construction workers not being paid and safety 
regulations not being followed. (Fanerdun say the former was due to a slowness on the part of 
Swedish bureaucracy, combined with a misunderstanding over the agreed minimum wage.) 
Despite this, the project continues, and is, as yet, the most wholesale transposition of the Yiwu 
model. Unlike the Warsaw market, which was initiated by the Chinese government, and the 
Budapest and Dubai markets which are joint investments, Kalmar is wholly owned by Fanerdun 
Ltd, a family-owned private Chinese company, founded in 2001 by Mr Luo Jinxing. Fanderdun 
bought the land outright from the Swedish authorities, and the market is being constructed by 
Chinese workers using materials largely shipped directly from China. Furthermore, unlike the 
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other Yiwu models, booths in the markets of Kalmar are not rented and then staffed by import 
agents, but sold directly to manufacturers, thus constituting Direct Foreign Investment (DFI).  
The Kalmar „commodity city‟, like Yiwu, is designed around commodity markets, defined 
according to product, with housing, amenities, hotels and recreational and park areas in addition. 
Interestingly, the „deal‟ for anyone purchasing a booth includes permanent rights to stay in 
Sweden for themselves and two family members (although Swedish authorities have denied 
this), an apartment in Sweden and another in Hangzhou, China - the home of Fanerdun company 
headquarters. Luo Jinxing is keen to point out that the project is more a future Chinese 
community than a commodity market. He is, effectively, offering Chinese manufacturers the 
chance to 'buy' citizenship, whilst also exporting 'place' as well as a commodity market.  
This is just one of many ways in which the export of the Yiwu model differs from traditional 
forms of internationalisation, as conceptualised by Coase (1937). Yiwu's mode of 
internationalisation is based on the 'cluster', defined by Michael Porter as „… a geographically 
proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, 
linked by commonalities and complementarities‟ (2000: 16). Unlike most processes of 
internationalization, which result from the gradual export of a company or parts of a company, 
the transportation of the Yiwu model sees the entire cluster move at once and as an entity, a 
phenomenon Jansson et al (2007) refer to as „entry clusters‟. Furthermore, it is an entry cluster 
which, due to the strong social connotations of the types of products it manufactures, is strongly 
associated with China in Western perceptions. In fact, the Yiwu model exports not only itself, as 
an operational model, but also a culturally potent association.  
 
This association manifests itself in popular cultural imagination in images of China as the 
world‟s factory; a full-to-overflowing production fiend, of epic proportions, as witnessed in 
Baichwal‟s previously mentioned Manufactured Landscapes and referenced in Giovanni 
Arrighi‟s assertion of China‟s „industrious revolution‟(2007). It is through such depictions and 
imaginings that inexpensive, ubiquitous commodities have carved a place for themselves as 
„Made In China‟ objects. In fact I would like to suggest that, contrary to the beliefs of many 
economic commentators (e.g. Huang, 2008), China does not lack a global brand as such -„Made 
In China‟ is a brand. Whilst  it of course cannot be assessed economically alongside „company 
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brands‟, its cultural and psycho-social status bears uncanny resemblance to other „brand 
identities‟, providing clear opportunities for consumers to gain awareness of its connotations and 
even feel a fondness or „brand affinity‟. „Made In China‟ has done what „Made in Spain‟ in the 
eighties never managed to do; it is not an embarrassed apology for low-end products, but rather a 
triumphant announcement of use value at a bargain price. Furthermore it eludes the problematic 
questions concerning at what point a „global brand‟ from a specific country can no longer boast 
its national credentials due to joint ownership by multi-national stakeholders.  
Yiwu is also unusual in that whilst its internationalisation complies with most thinking on 
clusters, as its efficiency can be attributed to supply chains, labour markets, infrastructure, and 
sociological factors such as shared local knowledge or increasing social capital, its methods of 
solidarity challenge the established image of clusters. Furthermore, these methods may come 
under challenge once attempts are made to continue them within the new host country. It remains 
to be seen for example, whether the Kalmar Yiwu model will be as successful as it is in China, 
when attempting to operate within the legal and ethical frameworks of a more developed 
country- one which will insist upon certain standards in relation to IPR, working hours, 
minimum wage, materials used, etc. There is a high likelihood that these factors will add cost to 
the end product, and that along with enforced environmental responsibility creating „ecoflation‟ 
(O‟Keefe et al: 2008), commodity prices will also be inflated by higher ethical standards 
(ethicoflation?!). Either this, or, as the Yiwu model is exported, it will find ways of avoiding 
governance, perhaps creating islands of alternative governance within foreign systems which go 
way beyond the special conditions of Export Processing Zones
52
. 
 
Finally, whilst processes of internationalisation increasingly involve disaggregation as parts of 
commodities are produced in various countries (Gereffi:1994), with Yiwu‟s low-end, simple 
commodities this is not the case. The Yiwu model sees commodity chains which are neither long 
(containing many players), dense (containing many different manufacturers for the one product), 
nor deep (containing many levels, i.e. other firms making only one component of the product). 
On the contrary, commodities are produced in one place by one manufacturer, and aggregate in 
                                                          
52
 Export Processing Zones (EPZs) are areas within a country, whose purpose is purely to attract export-oriented 
industries, sometimes offering them favourable investment and trade conditions compared to the rest of the country. 
Unlike „free trade zones‟ which involve shipment and warehousing, EPZs are set up for actual manufacturing. In 
China EPZs are called Special Economic Zones (See Philips, D. R. and Yeh, A. G. O.). 
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that place. The export of the model therefore represents what could be called a patchy spread of 
the agglomerative manufacturing city. This means that, by creating unusual clusters of low-value 
commodities in a few chosen nations, Yiwu runs counter to the trend identified by Appelbaum 
and Christerson (1992) - that high-value commodities show a greater degree of clustering in 
fewer nations. Yiwu is defined by its agglomerative space and relations. This in turn, as the next 
section will show, leads to new forms of solidarity. 
 
iii) Yiwu as Reciprocal Space: Sharing the Risk Means Sharing the Wealth 
The road from the hotel to Binwang market is straight. Dead straight. It leads me directly from 
the foyer of the formerly state-run hotel I am staying in, to the market‟s impressive atrium. (See 
figure 15.) A direct route from centralised communism to agglomerative capitalism; from the 
past to the present. Cars drive fast in Yiwu, speeding past me as I walk. And here, people speak 
loudly and in staccato tones. A waiter had informed me the previous evening that there was an 
accent specific to Yiwu which was very harsh – „Even the words of lovers sound angry‟, he had 
said. Drawing nearer to the market I pass groups of women sitting by the roadside, knitting. They 
perch on small stools, their fingers moving deftly and with the practiced habit that can only come 
from years of repetition. What they knit will be sold inside the market, but the manufacturer they 
work for attempts to keep overheads down by doing without premises. So, perhaps as part of a 
desire to feel closer to their own process, or to gain a sense of geographical place in their 
working lives, they come and sit everyday close to the market entrance.  One of them looks up 
and nods at me as I pass. She recognises me from previous days now. I smile and continue on 
into the Binwang market building. 
Ahead, behind, and to either side of me, as far as the eye can see, are long, perfectly straight 
corridors, flanked by immaculately arranged stalls, each exactly two metres square, their 
contents un-forgivingly lit by the industrial strip-lights above. Each stall represents a factory, and 
contains one example of every commodity, in all its variations, which that factory makes. One 
blue six inch vase, one yellow six inch vase, one blue ten inch vase, one yellow ten inch vase, 
and so on and so on. This is Binwang market, Yiwu, a vast, three-tiered wholesale warehouse, 
around 1 kilometre square and strictly ordered in sections according to the type of commodity on 
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display; a Noah‟s Ark of China‟s small commodities. Should the rains come, and the plains 
flood, Binwang will provide a prototype for each of the god of industry‟s creations. 
Yiwu‟s commodity markets are effectively huge agglomerations of small businesses, each with a 
very high degree of product specificity. Tsai argues these agglomerations of commodity types 
are not simply due to the way the markets are organised for the buyer, but that they also reflect 
networks connecting the former workers of particular factories (2002:176-177). According to 
her, workers made redundant from the same factory, often become private entrepreneurs selling 
products that reflect the focus of their former employer. Furthermore, their ability to overcome 
common grievances is frequently enhanced due to collective action which comes about as a 
result of their shared danwei in the past. In other words, mutuality, based on past experience and 
present circumstances, creates solidarity. These historical allegiances are another way in which 
the legacy of the danwei remains alive in Yiwu.  
It seems likely that it is also this combination of shared expertise in specific product 
manufacturing, and the awareness that many private enterprise manufacturers are using skills and 
ideas from their past employers, which has created a unique culture of solidarity, especially when 
it comes to issues of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Officially, Yiwu is keen to appear as an 
arbitrator and follower of international legal and ethical standards on trade practices. As party 
secretary of Yiwu, Lou Guohua says, 'We know that the prosperity of the market heavily relies 
on credibility. Quality control and credibility establishment is key for Yiwu to be integrated with 
the world' (2008: www.english.peopledaily.com). Being China's most famous and most prolific 
city for small commodities, Yiwu is a testing-ground and leading example in the building of new 
legal frameworks for IPR and has strategic importance at the national level and in the 
establishment of co-operative international relations. 
In 2008, Yiwu released a White Paper entitled 'IPR Protection in Yiwu', which elaborated upon 
Yiwu's IPR protection in terms of patenting, trade-marking, copyrighting and judicial protection. 
It stressed how Yiwu has developed a multi-layered network of protection and adopted 
monitoring and interconnecting mechanisms from various departments, enabling booth-owners‟ 
complaints of infringement to be handled immediately through information sharing and mutual 
supervision. Yiwu is the only county-level city in China to have an IPR protection service centre, 
and was the first to create an international co-ordination in IPR involving over 200 members 
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from eight countries, including the USA, France, Germany, Japan and the UK. Yiwu‟s Trade and 
Industry Department describe this operational style as „small network‟ supervision of „big 
market‟ functions; a practice which has come to be known as the „Yiwu mode‟ of IPR protection. 
However, this newly-evolved legal framework is largely concerned with protecting higher end 
„brand‟ products, as part of a concern with up-grading and protecting the types of commodities 
China as a whole makes, and with guarding against the loss of credibility that counterfeit trading 
brings upon Chinese manufacturing. For the smaller manufacturers who remain ensconced in the 
low-end sector, new IPR legalities have little relevance, as „brand‟ and „fakes‟ are non-issues in 
the realm of mundane and ubiquitous objects. Furthermore, due to the short-termism and 
volatility of commodity chains for inexpensive commodities, and the simplicity of the products 
manufactured, companies often switch production very quickly, producing whatever is selling 
well at that time. Therefore, Yiwu‟s operations rely upon the kind of spontaneity that requires 
risk; yet because this risk is a mutually shared experience, it works to build solidarity. 
This is evident when I meet „J‟, a UK buyer come to Yiwu to purchase commodities for what he 
describes as „well-known high-street bargain chains‟- he will not reveal which ones. He tells me 
it quite often happens that a manufacturer wants to switch production, so sells his old moulds in 
order to purchase different ones, and since he can no longer be part of the commodity chain for 
that specific product anyway, does not mind if the buyer of those moulds makes more or less the 
same item he was making. „Once a manufacturer believes demand for a certain commodity to be 
on the wane, he doesn‟t mind someone else taking their chances with the same commodity‟, says 
J. „Nobody wants to be tied to one product for ever anyway, the risk of someone making what 
you used to make is out-weighed by the ability to switch to the latest hot product.‟   
The reasoning rang true. A few weeks earlier I had met a logistics manager named Blair, who 
had told me how his company had wanted plastic light pulls in a certain blue-green colour. He 
had gone to established companies in the Pearl River area, and they had done sample runs for 
him, changing the size and shape to his specifications and using a slightly different tone of one of 
their set colours. They were no good; the colour was not close enough. Then, he had a call from a 
young factory owner from Yiwu, who had heard from a friend of a friend that a Western 
businessman was looking for light pulls in an unusual colour. „I can make them‟, he said, „Give 
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me a week to show you‟. Blair had replied that it was not possible to make the colour based on 
already established formulae and that he did not want to deal with more people who would try to 
convince him it was a close enough match, when it clearly was not. He put the phone down and 
thought no more about the conversation. A week later the phone rang again. It was the young 
factory owner saying he had a sample for Blair to see. Blair said he was leaving in two days and 
did not have time. „I am downstairs‟, said the voice. Blair moved to the office window and sure 
enough, in the street was a young Chinese man holding some boxes and waving up at him. The 
boxes contained a sample run of 50 light pulls, in exactly the shape, size, and colour Blair had 
wanted. He was amazed. He gave the factory owner a contract on the spot. 
So, for the great majority of small business owners in Yiwu, making very basic products at low 
prices, the „risk‟ of a product being copied, is a small price to pay for the ability to be able to 
create spontaneously what is demanded, and, while it sometimes causes problems for specific 
individuals, it keeps the place as a whole thriving. In Yiwu risk allows for a spontaneity which 
creates a safety of sorts; a safety that at first glance seems to defeat itself, as its logic runs almost 
entirely contrary to the logic of large global corporations. „Risk‟, in current discourse, and 
applied to financial or business transactions, is risk as defined by the rationale of big business- 
Jack Ma‟s „whales‟,53 as opposed to the rationale of huge agglomerations of „shrimps‟ present in 
Yiwu. In fact, despite its „big market‟ status, Yiwu is operationally far more aligned to the „small 
networks‟ part of its own model; risk is effectively reformulated in Yiwu and forces us to 
reconsider the traditional assumptions of „rational‟ normalising risk discourses.   
I want to emphasise here that in arguing that Yiwu has found a way to use risk to its own 
advantage and even gain a form of solidarity from it, I in no way wish to suggest that, left to its 
own devices, risk „sorts itself out‟, as it were, creating vibrant business opportunities for all. The 
way in which risk operates in Yiwu cannot be generalised to account for or predict other 
situations and its creation of solidarity is only in response to raw-edge capitalism. Yiwu‟s risk is 
bound up in survival. What the Yiwu example can do rather effectively though, is to highlight 
                                                          
53
 Celebrity businessman Jack Ma (who stars in China‟s version of  the TV show The Apprentice) is the founder of 
the „ali‟ group of companies, which includes the business-to-business website, alibaba.com. It is his belief that the 
future will be based on small to medium-sized enterprises (shrimps), rather than large corporations (whales), and 
this has informed his highly successful business models. 
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the ways in which risk analysis continues (wrongly) to see itself as a reasoned category, a 
scientific domain, based on our normative assumptions. Yiwu exposes the ways in which risk 
discourses have allowed „our‟ capitalism, based on the way we „do‟ capitalism in the West, to 
colonise the practices of other places. Unless challenged these discourses can dictate what is 
considered to be a risk and therefore how business ought to be executed. 
Key to understanding why Western risk discourses are problematic when applied to non-Western 
contexts, and certainly to Yiwu, is the notion of conflicting risks. Risk is wrongly understood as 
a definite entity, rather than a perception from a specific viewpoint. Once risks are understood as 
dependent upon situation, a dilemma is created in which protecting against one category of risk 
exposes another: a right to something, conflicts with another‟s right not to something. For 
example, preventing the „stealing‟ of designs in Yiwu (the right to intellectual property), could 
heighten the risk of large Western companies only using a handful of producers and the rest not 
surviving as a result (the right to put oneself forward for work). For Yiwu, it is crucial that 
wealth (even small parcels of it) is spread, if the whole is to survive. In a commodity chain based 
on the existence of many small players making many small units for small profits, those profits 
must fall to the many. If designs are protected, profit starts to fall to the few, the few grow large, 
and the majority must fall off. Sooner or later this defeats even the western agendas in which 
copyright was deemed necessary, as the newly grown companies are large enough to start 
competing head-on with the western companies. 
It is because risk discourses have not recognised the nature of conflicting risks that they continue 
to consider themselves rational, scientific monitors of danger. This manifests in two key ways. 
Firstly, risk discourses tend to be culturally myopic - based on what would be risky in the West 
and under a Western agenda. In fact I would go further and suggest that there is a political 
benefit to this too: seeing culture as only „out there‟ allows us to believe and purport that in 
assessing and defining risk we do not have an agenda, that we are the magnanimous arbitrators 
of global justice acting only out of care for another people and place. Whilst China is beginning 
to tackle copyright issues itself in connection with its high-end or information products, much of 
the process is part of on-going debates with Western arbitrators whose mission is greater 
economic gain under the guise of bringing a more „civilised‟ capitalism into operation. 
Discourses surrounding this process therefore do not acknowledge that the weakness of 
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copyright law in China is only an issue if and when it denies Western companies the ability to 
operate as they are used to doing but with all the benefits of that other place. Bill Gates‟ 
(previously mentioned) experiences when he took Microsoft to Beijing are an example of a 
corporation feeling they have a „right‟ to copyright protection whilst contemporaneously 
exploiting cheap labour.  
Secondly, risk discourses are based on the concept of individual rational choice; the 
(economistic) idea that humans have a kind of in-built „hedonic calculus‟ which weighs up losses 
and gains as a neutral tool, operating for everyone based on the same agenda, rather than being 
influenced by situation and context, or culture, stigma, status, and mutual aspirations. This means 
industrial expansion is seen as only possible within the context of an individualist culture, and so 
this argument assumes there is a single generic way to expand and that newly industrialised 
countries are effectively clones of earlier industrialised ones. This is to deny the nuanced way in 
which Yiwu operates as an industrial city: due to its many small players, and possibly due also to 
the fact it was effectively purpose-built to house such an agglomeration, it experiences itself as a 
mutuality - sharing the risk, also means sharing the wealth.  In order to comprehend the logic of 
Yiwu classical risk analyses requires the addition of a notion of agglomerative equality.  
„Sharing the wealth‟ was a phrase I heard frequently from buyers in Yiwu. It was sometimes 
used to refer to the tendency of businesses to stay small and remain in areas of similar 
businesses, so as to be able to share knowledge and resources. If successful, a small business 
owner tends to start up another small business in a horizontally linked industry, rather than 
attempting to buy out companies similar to his own in a bid for vertical expansion. These 
horizontal companies, which are often staffed by members of the same family or close family 
friends, will then give work to each other by sending clients through each other‟s companies- 
thus „sharing the wealth‟.  
On other occasions the phrase was used more scathingly. Two young Russian wholesalers in 
Yiwu were adamant that you had to „do your sums, make a decision, and do the deal, there and 
then, on the spot. If you wait, you will find other people get involved and you do not know what 
is going on. They [Chinese manufacturers] try to share the wealth, so you have to say yes before 
they can bring someone else in on the deal. There are many layers, you know, many layers that 
you do not want.‟ Similarly, back in Shanghai, another wholesale buyer, John, had told me how 
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he had recently travelled down the coast to Ningbo to meet a factory owner he felt he may well 
potentially want to do business with. When he arrived, the factory looked as though it could 
easily cope with his requirements, and the price quoted was a good one. „But the guy I am 
dealing with has involved another guy in the deal and I can‟t work out why‟, he said. „I don‟t 
really want to deal with both of them even though they still seem to be able to offer a good price. 
I don‟t like it. Why is he there? Why do they always have to share the wealth?‟  
Similarly Blair had also encountered similar behavior explaining to me how about eight years 
ago he had an agent from Singapore who was introducing him to several companies in Asia.  
„We were paying a retainer to him, for his services, plus all his expenses‟, said Blair.  „He 
introduced me to the owner, Mr W. in Suzhou, and someone I thought worked for Mr W.  We 
did the deal and began purchasing small aluminum tubes.  We paid about one dollar for each.  
About two years into the relationship I received a call from Mr W in which he stated that he 
could sell me the product for only 55 US cents if I could get those other two guys out of the 
middle.  I told Mr W I had no idea that the other guys were involved and to immediately stop 
paying them and send me revised pricing.  He did and I fired the guy in Singapore.‟ 
„Ben‟, a UK buyer who has his own business sourcing cheap commodities for various low-end 
stores, had a slightly different take on the situation, saying „it‟s normally that there are more 
layers involved than you think, not that the manufacturers are literally sharing out the profit 
between them. When people say „wholesale‟ in China, it‟s often second or even third-hand 
wholesale. That‟s why you have to come to Yiwu and make sure you deal with a factory that‟s 
actually based in Yiwu- that way you‟re most likely to get the real wholesale price. If you go to 
someone in Shanghai, they‟ve probably already got their stuff from here and marked it up a bit- 
they‟re just selling it on.‟ „So,‟ I ask, „are you saying the „layers‟ are not acting together, that 
they are not ever in on the same deals?‟ Ben pauses for a moment. „Well yes, sometimes those 
different layers know each other and are part of the same agreement to supply a certain buyer, 
sometimes without that buyer knowing - I have heard of that happening. But, you know, it‟s a 
way of operating here, someone owes someone a favour, so finds a way they can be useful to a 
deal they‟re doing, brings them in on it you know. It doesn‟t necessarily mean they are charging 
any less good a price, and I‟ve learnt that you can‟t just go in there and clear out the dead wood, 
get rid of those extra guys. You have to say, is the deal right for me? If so, you have to do it, and 
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not worry about what‟s going on with them - that‟s their problem, as long as the price is right for 
you.‟ He laughs - „Yiwu‟s only a one-stop wonder if you make it work for you.‟  
What emerges is a portrait of a place that is intrinsically set up to operate as a shared space, on 
both the micro and macro level. Its very infrastructure is designed in such a way as to cause 
numerous small enterprises to gain through practising mutuality. Unlike the Guangdong (Canton) 
market, Yiwu allows buyers to order small quantities and to mix small amounts of various 
commodities as part of an order. It operates more like a domestic supermarket than a cash and 
carry. Containers to be shipped can be shared between any number of people. The success of one 
company, far from being seen as the downfall of another, is simply seen as potentially attracting 
more money to the area. One simply has to stay ahead of the game, make the next hot product for 
a hot price. This modus operandi creates forms of solidarity which are at one and the same time 
„new‟ and built upon older forms. It also forces us to consider agglomeration as a tactic of place. 
It is due to the embedded-ness of the concept of individual rational choice within risk discourse 
that the latter considers only the individual and the conglomerate - these are the only terms it 
knows and it posits them as binary opposites, not considering the agglomerate or the mutual. 
This is perhaps largely because classical risk analysis is not used to dealing with entities in which 
there is a high level of equality between players; if Yiwu had a wider range of company sizes, 
including some which could better withstand problems, risks would be less equal, so the strategy 
of sharing them would not be successful.  
All of this is not to suggest some essentialist vision of Yiwu as a place somehow displaying 
„communist‟ characteristics within a capitalism of its own. I do not mean to make the crass 
argument that individualistic behaviour does not exist there- of course, it does. However, it is the 
case that risks are calculated with the whole in mind, simply because the whole is more likely to 
turn up insurmountable risks to the individual. My intention here is to use Yiwu to expose the 
mistaken impression of risk analysts that it is direct individual choice which determines action. 
As Mauss emphasised, our sharp division between freedom and obligation, just like that between 
self-interest and altruism, is an illusion thrown up by the market, whose anonymity allows us to 
ignore the fact that we constantly rely upon others (1990).  
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iv) (Tactical) Reciprocity: Entangling Market and Community 
These new forms of solidarity based on agglomerative operations, not only bring into serious 
question Western theories of risk, but also force us to pull apart well established dualisms which 
have become taken for granted in the history of Western philosophy - market/community, 
commodity/gift, exchange/use, monetary/non-monetary, modern/traditional, capitalist/non-
capitalist, anonymous/associated, reciprocal/non-reciprocal. This last seems to have somehow 
gained a greater moral undertone than any other opposition, anthropologists and economists 
across the philosophical spectrum hi-jacking it as a „moral‟ term and twisting it to suit their 
purposes. Put simply, one strand saw reciprocity as fostered by „community‟, and so depicted 
money as demoralising, alienating, and corrupting, whilst the other saw reciprocity as fostered by 
„market‟, and culminated in the view of money as a great force for betterment and „civilisation‟. 
Briefly, the first strand begins with Aristotle, and manifests itself as a general condemnation of 
money and trade, along with a celebration of self-sufficiency and production for use. In Politics, 
Aristotle defines man‟s wants as naturally finite, and, therefore, trade as only natural in that it 
restores self-sufficiency as we exchange what we do not need for what we do: „Interchange of 
this kind is not contrary to nature and is not a form of money-making; it keeps to its original 
purpose- to re-establish nature‟s own equilibrium of self-sufficiency (1962: 42). Self-sufficiency, 
for Aristotle, required reciprocity, which was natural and therefore good; profit-oriented 
exchange was deemed unnatural and destructive of the bonds between people and households. 
The Aristotelian theme that has carried through epistemologically is that of trading „for the sake 
of‟, becoming trading „for its own sake‟; the transition one from to the other being a moral 
mistake according to Aristotle. Aristotle‟s ideas were taken up, in the thirteenth century, by 
Thomas Aquinas and the church authorities who saw many evils in material acquisition. One of 
their major problems was the idea that merchants did not „produce‟ anything, so they did not 
„work‟, yet still earned from the labourer. It is because of their preoccupation with material 
production, that Marx‟s „labour theory of value‟ is often viewed as the last in a long line from 
Aristotle.  
This first tradition can perhaps be said to continue to the idea of the „gift‟ economy being 
somehow intrinsically „moral‟, as opposed to the immorality of the „commodity‟ market. More 
recently, it can be found in Polanyi‟s (2001) assertion that when kinship is present, reciprocity is 
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apparent and dominant, but when the market economy prevails, things are better understood by 
formal economics - presumably a formal economics which assumes a non-reciprocity 
relationship. For Polanyi, as for Aristotle, this transition from what he called „embedded‟ to „dis-
embedded‟ economies (i.e. land and labour becoming separated from the social fabric of society 
through money and exchange), was a devastating moral transformation. Again the moral is 
equated to kinship relations, and the immoral to the market relations. Again there seems to be an 
unproblematic line separating the two. From the standpoint of this tradition money corrupts 
reciprocity. 
The second tradition is that which concludes that money aids reciprocity. It could be said to 
begin at the point when the church is using Aquinas‟ thought to scorn material acquisition, when 
a few strands of religious and political life broke away from that thinking and attempted to make 
acquisition morally acceptable by separating the „interests‟ from the „passions‟. Hirschman‟s 
(1977) well-known account of how money-making became honourable begins with Augustine‟s 
differentiation between the love of glory, which he saw as able to have redeeming social value, 
and the purely private pursuit of riches. For Augustine, it was the State which must be the 
mechanism for holding back the worst passions and harnessing them in the name of „interests‟. 
(Perhaps there are premonitions here of Deng‟s awakening call, that „to get rich is glorious‟; it is 
the glory that is at stake, rather than the individual riches.) However, Hirschman argues, both 
repression of the passions, and harnessing „interests‟ to overcome them, lacked persuasiveness, 
so a third solution, to discriminate amongst the passions and use the apparently more innocuous 
passions to counteract a more dangerous and destructive set, emerged as the answer (1977:20). 
As „danger‟ was seen as embodied in lust more than in any other passion, avarice was left free to 
emerge as the less frightful passion which could be deployed in the attempt to maintain the calm 
of the others. So, the scene was already set for Montesquieu to take this strand of thinking one 
step further, and argue that not only could avarice be used for „good‟, but that even when not 
being „harnessed‟ in the name of that project, it could unwittingly conspire towards the public 
good (2002). This „invisible hand‟ meant the role of the state in repressing passions was now far 
less necessary, if not totally unnecessary.  
More or less contemporaneous to Montesquieu, was Bernard Mandeville‟s Fable of the Bees, in 
which he argues for the necessity of vice in the running of capitalism: „every part was full of 
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vice, yet the whole mass a paradise‟ (1997: 14). (Not surprisingly, these two works are often 
deemed to form a precursor to laissez-faire thinking.) Montesquieu‟s argument went on to 
suggest that not only could self-interest lead to betterment for all, but that the trade which 
emerged from this self-interested desire, by necessity, „polished‟ and „softened‟ barbarian ways 
due to a mutual dependence (2002:80). By creating a strong web of interdependent relationships, 
it was thought, domestic trade would create more cohesive communities, and foreign trade would 
help avoid wars between countries.
54
 This „doux commerce‟ can be directly compared to Smith‟s 
„many advantages‟ arising from man‟s „natural desire‟ to barter (1991). So, in this second 
tradition, far from eating away at reciprocity, money cements and creates reciprocity.  
There are of course various positions that fall in between these two strands, namely Simmel‟s 
(2004) assertion that money allows the individual to extend their personality, a line of reasoning 
taken up by Miller (1998), and which arguably can be witnessed in Colin Campbell‟s (1987) re-
interpretation of Weber.
55
 However, broadly speaking, two traditions can be traced; one in which 
money is the purveyor of morals and a force for the improvement of conditions, another where it 
is the culprit for a loss of morality and a harshness of conditions. Money has therefore been 
aligned with market, and non-money with community, both sets of terms competing for the right 
to add „morality‟. Strangely, in both sets, it is the perceived presence of reciprocity which is the 
argument used for the nature of the set to be „moral‟- reciprocity as that of trading nations versus 
reciprocity as that of gift-giving communities. The classic anthropological studies of Malinowski 
and Mauss heightened the attribution of „reciprocity‟ to small communities. This, alongside the 
industrial malaise of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, proving once and for all that 
trade (at least its capitalist variety) did not bring prosperity to all and peaceful situations. So, 
with reciprocity attached to community rather than market, morality became the exclusive 
preserve of non-economic domains, and, due more to antagonisms between the world views of 
anthropologists and economists than to evidence gathered from their studies, the binary 
opposition was set. 
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 Incidentally, this idea of trade as an effective tool against „barbarism‟ or war was, until relatively recently, used by 
McDonalds, who argued that no country with a McDonalds had ever gone to war. After the break-out of war in the 
former Yugoslavia, they promptly dropped the argument, which was of course, banal and riddled with flaws from 
the outset.  
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 Campbell‟s work „The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism‟ re-works Weber‟s argument, by 
saying it is the romantic desire to have what the brand or product promises which is the spirit of capitalism. 
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Therefore, what we have arrived at, in terms of our interpretation of reciprocity, is an often 
schizophrenic position which asks us to embrace individualistic accumulation, but for the good 
of a mutuality; in affect creating of us Bauman‟s „walking contradiction‟ of the „good consumer‟ 
(2000) who must spend, but must not overspend or spend wrongly. (This same contradiction can 
be seen in recent statistics of China‟s development, which show how as poverty in China 
decreases, so inequality increases, and providing „evidence‟ for those who assume as inevitable a 
Smithian process in which, in order for us all to rise, some must rise far further than others.) 
Reciprocity has become embedded in consumption by this reasoning, and rendered invisible; to 
return a „favour‟ given to us by „the market‟, we must selfishly spend, for the good of everyone. 
But this is only the case if we allow that „market‟ is distinct from „community‟; by disallowing 
the opposition we can, perhaps, reclaim reciprocity. The city of Yiwu, from the very outset of its 
modern conception, defied all opposition of „market‟ and „community‟, being ideologically 
defined by its „small commodities city‟ title, and physically created to house workers above 
factories. In Yiwu, market relations are community relations. Reciprocity, is claimed by the 
collapsing of the two into each other. 
This collapsing is perhaps better understood within the wider cultural context and by referring to 
the concept of guanxi (for explanation, see earlier footnote 50). Guanxi posits reciprocity as 
existing throughout all realms of life and therefore automatically dispels the binary oppositions 
the Western tradition has spent years building up. The reciprocity involved in guanxi, is expected 
regardless of whether money is part of the interaction or not, and regardless of whether those 
involved know each other due more to a business or more to a family connection. It is not the 
realm that is important, but the quality of the interaction and this emphasis on interaction blurs 
the realms to the point where they are not useful or necessary concepts. In this cultural context, 
therefore, reciprocity cannot be exclusively attributed to either the market or the community. In 
fact guanxi exposes the attempt to merge market and community as a quintessentially Western 
project, as it is Western theory and culture which separated the two in the first place and which 
has, ever since, engaged in theoretical machinations which push and pull the concept of 
reciprocity, shaping it to provide supporting evidence for varying political strategies across 
history.  
149 
 
In fact the struggle of Western business people to understand and accept guanxi has often centred 
on the „inappropriate‟ nature of allowing strong ties and favour-giving to determine how and 
with whom business is done. Within the Western model this is seen as allowing practices 
reserved for the family or community realm to enter the market. Furthermore, because of the 
obligation to return the favour, even if it is at a much later date, Westerners often tend to describe 
guanxi as a „using‟ relationship and therefore as unethical. These misinterpretations have 
resulted in some quite famous struggles for Western multi-nationals trying to break into the 
Chinese market. When Lee Kai Fu controversially left his position as Corporate Vice President 
at Microsoft to work for Yahoo he wrote a report stating that Bill Gates had made various 
„guanxi mistakes‟. These included boastful public relations campaigns, failure to make long-term 
commitments, failure to properly nurture local talent, and most importantly, failure to lower the 
price of Microsoft software so as to make it affordable to Chinese consumers. Gates was seen as 
benefiting before contributing, and according to Lee, he should have expected the vast amount of 
pirated software, considering its contextually high price. To mix metaphors rather, the fakes were 
a kind of guanxi karma. 
Blurring distinctions, and arguing for an economy made up of what would traditionally be called 
„market‟ factors and „anthropological‟ factors is Stephen Gudeman‟s project. His analysis sees 
economy as consisting of two realms: community and market, community being associations, 
and market being anonymous short-term exchanges (2001: 1). In the community realm, which is 
localised, material goods are exchanged through relationships kept for their own sake, whereas in 
the market realm, which is global, short-term relationships exist purely to achieve a project or 
secure a good (2001: 10). Gudeman‟s attempt to join market and community in a new conception 
of economy is inspired by the view he shares with Mark Granovetter (1973), that while 
anthropologists employ an over-socialised view of human action (embedded communities), 
economists employ an under-socialised one (disembedded communities)
56
. So, following this 
logic, in non-market economies there is more instrumental action than anthropologists recognize, 
and in market economies there is more embedded action than economists concede (2001:19). 
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 Gudeman is of course borrowing the terms „embedded‟ and disembedded‟ here from Karl Polanyi‟s The Great 
Transformation. Polanyi‟s substantivism embraced a cultural approach to economics, which emphasized the way 
economies are embedded in society and culture. 
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So far so good. There are some useful acknowledgements of economic and anthropological type-
casting of situations, which seem to be working towards some sort of market-community merger, 
and an acknowledgement that these realms take on many of each other‟s features. However, 
something is amiss. Despite allegedly being pro a dispelling of the market-community duality, 
what Gudeman seems to have done is to have merged the two in the interests of „economy‟. In 
other words, despite proclaiming an interest in the anthropology of economy, his argument is 
economically determinist at its core - it only merges market and community in the interests of re-
inserting them into economy. To achieve this, he makes a number of false, or perhaps we should 
say, potentially murky, distinctions. Association belongs to community, while „anonymous short-
term exchanges‟ belong to market. While it is difficult to argue association does not belong to 
community, it is questionable whether market exchanges are necessarily either short-term or 
anonymous. There is also an assumption that „exchange‟ in this context will be between 
consumer and „producer‟, which discounts the many other types of exchanges within intricate 
modern markets which may be part of long-term trading relationships. 
The second problematic distinction is between relationships in the (local) community, which are 
„kept for their own sake‟, and those in the (global) market, which are only a means to an ends. 
This would suggest community as an unproblematic word and one which can never define 
something supra-nation or trans-global in its scope, and disallow the possibility of a completely 
self-sufficient local market. It also tends to posit global and local as separate movements, 
denying the many small pockets of locally idiosyncratic globalisation, and subtly supporting the 
idea of a global market as a slowly spreading ink-stain in the simplistic manner of Friedman and 
other „flat-worlders‟ (See Thomas Friedman‟s The World is Flat, 2005). However, more 
interestingly, it suggests the existence of relationships kept for no reason other than their past 
existence. It may be that historical allegiances cause relationships to continue longer than they 
otherwise would, but if one or other party enjoys nothing within the relationship, history will not 
suffice in maintaining it. In other words, relationships are never kept purely „for their own sake‟- 
there is always „a project to achieve‟, albeit obliquely. The suggestion that in a certain realm 
relationships are somehow purer, more meaningful, because they are not kept to fulfil a desire, 
brings into play the idea that „community‟ is somehow necessarily more wholesome than 
„market‟, and therefore begins to paint „community‟ in exactly the way those aforementioned 
over-socialising anthropologists did.  
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I mention these points, not so much to form a critique of Gudeman as such, as he does 
acknowledge that market and community realms can cross through enduring relationships (2001: 
11), but to illustrate how difficult it is for us to escape the list of binary oppositions that have 
formed the basis of Western economic and anthropological theory. My concern differs to 
Gudeman‟s: I am concerned with merging market (read economy) and community in order to 
blur features traditionally consigned to either anthropology or economy. It is not that 
anthropological and economic elements make up economy, it is that anthropology and economy 
share elements that have so far only been allowed to reside in one or the other realm. I am not 
suggesting that there are not, in theory, two usefully separate disciplines, but I am suggesting that 
almost any on-the-ground example termed „economy‟ or „community‟ contains aspects of both 
and deserves to be read as an interwoven mix of the two - neither one nor the other, but its own 
idiosyncratic mélange of both.  
The work of Michel Callon is useful here in further exploring an alternative viewpoint in which 
market relations are acknowledged as having merged to some extent with those of the 
community. Callon‟s mission is to continue Polanyi‟s work by arguing that economics, rather 
than being a descriptive tool, actually performs the economy (see Callon, 1998, 2007). As 
Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay says, for Callon, economic ideas achieve their efficacy and durability by 
entangling themselves [my emphasis] with „materialities‟ (2010). This use of the notion of 
entangling arguably adds an extra dimension to Arvatov‟s objects, which can be seen in this light 
as not only entangling those subjects who make and use them, but also being materialities which 
entangle themselves with the economic ideas.  
However, as Mukhopadhyay points out, despite Callon‟s positioning of subjects as agents 
entangled in a web of relations and connections, he is far from being a proponent of the idea of 
the network as a mechanism of collective effort. For Callon, networks inherently contain 
structural asymmetry, agonistic struggle, coercion and violence, and here he is engaging here 
with Polanyi‟s concern in regard to the violence entailed in the process of disembedding, or 
„making market‟ as Mukhopadhyay puts it (2010). This latter frequently involves dispossession, 
exploitation and the destruction of markets structured on other principles. This is largely the 
case, and indeed was the case in Zhejiangcun and many other areas of China in which 
„unofficial‟ markets were closed down to be replaced by cleaned-up official versions. However, 
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in Yiwu, built-for-purpose as it was, the making of market did not involve a disembedding in 
Polanyi or Callon‟s sense. Rather, it involved the making of a new phenomenon – one we could 
perhaps call the market life-world – in which market and community were instantly-already 
combined. (In fact the ways in which older systems of reciprocity play out in Yiwu and newer 
systems of contractualised protection are tacitly ignored, stands testament to the entangling of 
market and community.) 
In comparing classic cases of making-market (such as the colonial relations Mukhopadhyay uses 
as his example) and more recent (and unusual) cases such as Yiwu, it is difficult not to cast the 
market life-world as the latest highly successful invention of a capitalism determined to enter 
into every last vestige of everyday life. If we accept this as the case, where does this leave us 
with defining how reciprocity works within a merged economy and market? In opposition to 
both the traditional anthropological view that reciprocal ties are the basis of society, and the 
neoclassical economist view which sees these ties as evolving from individual interests, 
Gudeman believes reciprocal ties to be tactical acts. As such, they extend the community base to 
persons outside of its borders as a way of „groping with uncertainty at the limits of a community‟ 
(2001: 80), in order to gain power or maintain independence. Thus, for Gudeman, refusal to 
reciprocate can be interpreted as a lack of desire to create mutual relations, or an inability to do 
so, which means it cannot be viewed as a norm of social life (as the anthropological tradition 
would have it) nor a function of self-interest (as neoclassical economics would argue). For 
Gudeman anthropologists are still caught in a dialectic with western economists, as both offer 
essentialist views, the anthropological view being relational, and the economistic view being 
atomistic; one reinforcing relationships and altruism, the other the individual and egoism.  
In contrast to both these positions Gudeman sees reciprocity as „part of a system of practices in 
which participants express, conserve, lose, and gain position in the sphere of social value‟ (2001: 
89-90). So, reciprocity as a tactical act is about negotiating the value of one‟s position; a position 
with a value which is social, not economic. As he says, „reciprocity is not the core of society but 
its expression … neither a primitive isolate nor the atom of society but its badge‟ (2001: 92). But 
what determines the social value of a position gained through tactical reciprocity? Surely, the 
value is defined by the amount of choice the position confers upon its owner? If reciprocity is 
based on tactics, used to gain greater influence in some way, then the way it is played out is to do 
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with individual people carving out ways to gain more life choices, or at least be less constricted 
in life choices. It is about the creation of a feeling of greater freedom in the ways in which to 
survive, and can be mutual as well as individual. It is not „maximising‟ in the classic sense; that 
is, it is not manifested in attempts to make profit; rather it is concerned with maximising choice 
through increasing personal potency within the surrounding framework. This is not to say that 
such tactics on the part of individuals necessarily run against the capitalistic strategy of the 
market life-world. Indeed, the potency of the market life-world could explain why guanxi, a 
Confucian tradition, has been reformulated for the purposes of capitalistic enterprise. 
 
v) Agglomeration as a ‘Chinese Characteristic’ – Counter-Hegemonic Tactics?  
What is being tackled once again here is the battle between the grounded tactics of individuals 
and the strategic movements of larger systems and institutions. The £1 trinket chain is of course 
caught up in the wider politics of the places through which it passes and indeed, as we shall see 
in the following section, in the strategic policies and movements of supra-national and global 
entities. The tactics of the trinket, run contemporaneously to those of China, Europe and the 
world order at the early stages of the 21st century. At any one stage of its journey, the tactics at 
play may or may not be those of the wider relationships it finds itself part of, such as that 
between China and the EU. Let us pick part this particular relationship briefly. What are the key 
characteristics and agendas at play within the China-EU relationship? 
As David Kerr attests, in many ways China and Europe have no fundamental conflict of interests 
and do not represent a threat to each other, so short term difficulties have so far been more than 
outweighed by long-term gains „as their partnership produces a multiplier effect, advancing the 
positive and mitigating the negative‟ (2004: 3). The Asia Europe Meeting Process (ASEM) has 
proved testament to this and in 2003 both the EU and the PRC declared in separate documents 
their recognition of each other as strategic partners. Similarly David Shambaugh talks of an 
„emerging axis‟ appearing in the international system between China and Europe (2004: 243-
248). However, such accounts may represent a glossing-over of sorts (not to mention an 
emphasis on duree as opposed to moments of disagreement) as there are some broad strategic 
ways in which China and Europe differ widely. What follows is an attempt to summarize these. 
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Firstly, it must be recognized that China is a large single state, compared to the multi-state entity 
that is Europe. China has traditionally found Europe a complicated entity, and has struggled to 
interact with its multiple member states, each with their individual legal and cultural differences, 
despite all being bound by EU regulations. In addition, many of Europe‟s states are former 
Soviet Block countries who have a communist past and therefore represent a cultural difficulty 
for China. As Kerr says, this means China has to negotiate between EU institutions and the 
national interests of member states (2004: 5-6). This has become no less of a problem as China 
has moved from an international relations model in which politics took clear precedence to one 
in which economics does; although China‟s economic turn is largely responsible for the West‟s 
tempering of the „China threat‟ by the „China opportunity‟ since the 1990‟s. 
To compound this heterogeneous picture, not all European member states contribute equally to 
Europe‟s relations with China. Whilst the EU‟s presence as a member of the World Trade 
Organisation enabled China to join, supporting them against US reticence, only France and the 
UK have a place on the UN security council, so the „EU‟ is not necessarily represented vis-à-vis 
China. Furthermore, the „big three‟ (France, UK and Germany) have more sway and also tend to 
view their relations with China in the context of their international roles, i.e. in relation to the 
USA. Thus an invisible EU-China-US triangle colours much of the interaction between China 
and „Europe‟ (as represented by the „big three‟).  
That said, this triangle perhaps goes some way to creating a shared China-EU agenda, centred on 
a critique of US mono-lateralism. However, this anti mono-lateralism is sometimes drawn into 
question by Chinese development policies. Most notably, in the late 1990‟s the Central Party 
School of the Chinese Communist Party (then led by Hu Jintao and Zheng Bijian), began to use 
the term „peaceful rise‟ to describe bringing Great Power status to China in a non-hegemonistic 
sense, i.e. alongside rather than instead of the US. However, outside of China, the word rise 
caused problems as it was interpreted as inevitably suggesting the fall of another – the „power 
transition thesis‟ (See Wang Yiwei, „The Dimensions of China‟s Peaceful Rise‟, Asia Times, 
14
th
 May 2004). From spring 2004 Chinese leaders abruptly stopped using the term and during 
2005 began using „heping fazhan‟ instead – peaceful development. Core here is the idea that 
China‟s rise cannot be threatening if China and East Asia rise together through „mutually 
embedded regional development‟ (Kerr, 2004: 293). Although as Kerr is careful to point out, the 
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process of reducing competitive tensions intra-regionally, may have the effect of increasing 
competitive tensions inter-regionally - „thus the political economy – and hence the politics – of 
regionalism are no longer properly separable from their inter-regional equivalents‟ (2004: 293). 
Secondly, there are structural and cultural differences in the way that China and Europe are 
organized. Kerr underlines the differences between what he calls „European structuralism‟ and 
„Asian orgnanicism‟, saying that whilst „Europe is a legal-institutional order that reflects the 
dominant properties and historical traditions of European States‟, the Chinese world view is 
based on ethical-communitarian independence. (2004:296). Therefore, whilst Europe is keen to 
enforce more rigid laws via institutional mechanisms, China appears to attempt to avoid these 
due to a preference for ways of operating to be grounded in ethico-cultural norms. It is easy to 
apply this argument to the relations in Yiwu; the ways in which intellectual copyright laws, 
whilst officially applied, are avoided in favour of older interpersonal loyalties. However, as far 
as the EU are concerned, China‟s „failure‟ to reach the requisite standards as regards the 
governmental role in the economy, the accounting system, bankruptcy law, financial reform, etc. 
is the reason for its continued refusal to grant China full market economy status. (Although as 
Feng Zhonping points out, many believe the real reason for this is that anti-dumping laws would 
be harder to enforce should China gain full market economy status.) 
What do these broad differences in culture mean in the context of the £1 chain? I‟m inclined to 
agree with Kerr that over the next twenty years China will increasingly move into manufacturing 
large consumer „durables‟ such as cars, planes, etc. (2004: 292). At this point the ability to avoid 
the legal and institutional formalities that Europe insists upon will rapidly decrease and the 
tactics of China as a nation will perhaps begin to clash with those of the small commodity chain 
– where currently they do not. Gaining full market economy status will become even more 
crucial for China, so IPR frameworks and laws will be brought in which will make the 
spontaneity the £1 chain requires difficult if not impossible. The nature of the size of company 
required to make large goods, alongside a (enforced) cultural shift away from ethical organicism 
and towards legal structuralism, will undermine the agglomerative nature witnessed in small 
commodity chains and force larger profits into fewer hands. 
Furthermore, the insistence upon stricter trading structures and laws will deepen the EU-China 
relationship not just as strategic trading partners, but also as global responsibility partners. Only, 
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this is a process made up of competing ideas – „strategic trading‟ is not necessarily compatible 
with „global responsibility‟.  So far, as small commodity enterprises have been spread around 
and unofficial in nature, the £1 chain has managed to avoid over-arching policy enforcement on 
global responsibility. In future, it may not be able to do so, which may result in the ethico-flation 
mentioned in chapter four and therefore the end of era of China as the worlds factory for small 
commodities. However, it is important to underline here that „global responsibility‟ is simply 
part of the rhetoric surrounding strategic trading; having a CSR policy is part of good strategy 
practice. Therefore to talk of global responsibility in the context of trade relations is usually little 
more than neo-liberal diatribe. Strategy (globally) is to at least talk-up responsibility; tactics are 
to ignore it where possible- on the Western side as much as the Chinese side. The only available 
counter-tactics are therefore to take back the notion of responsibility from corporations. 
All this leaves us with a strange quandary. Whilst the £1 chain is capitalism par excellence, it 
displays certain characteristics (namely agglomeration – which enables small profits to be shared 
more widely) which could be utilized as counter-tactics against (Western) capitalism as we know 
it. If China moves away from the small commodity market, its manufacturing is far more likely 
to become organized in the way Western capitalism operates. Thus, the £1 chain becomes a 
pawn in the wider geo-politics of capitalism; capitalism has almost succeeded in appropriating its 
counter tactics. 
 
vi) Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed how Yiwu has developed as an unlikely mix of Confucian, 
Maoist, and capitalist ideals which together have shaped its spaces and operations. Alongside 
this a small but potent history of agglomerative trade, whose origins lie in Wenzhou and the 
Yongjia school of thought and whose principles were played out in Zhejiangcun, has 
unfolded. Yiwu‟s spatial relations in many ways represent its intrapersonal operations, in that 
their uniformity and division into small areas specific to task form the basis of a commercial 
logic based on the importance of the abundance of small units and the resulting survival of 
the whole. This tactic of agglomeration involves a relationship to risk in which spontaneity is 
reformulated as a safety of sorts and therefore runs counter to the logic of most global 
corporations, manifesting itself in forms of solidarity which belie classic Western risk 
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analysis. These forms borrow from „old‟ solidarities, such as guanxi networks (whose origins 
lie within Confucianism), as well as more recent ones, such as the communistic practices in 
place under Mao. 
The combination of these factors has given Yiwu a market logic unique to itself and one 
which is proving highly transportable, with implications for citizenship and international law 
and ethics as well as just trade. However, the anomalistic characteristics of this form will 
mean that it can frequently only operate as a bounded community within other contexts and it 
may well find itself increasingly challenged by the ethical and legal frameworks of the 
countries into which it exports itself. Furthermore, it remains to be seen how „new‟ legalised 
mechanisms, such as the introduction of formal policies on IPR, will impact upon the nature 
of these solidarities.  
Notwithstanding this, it is certainly not the case that Yiwu is experiencing a simplistic shift 
from communistic to individualistic practices as a result of market industrialisation. The 
Yiwu model is in itself a Chinese brand of sorts, and one intrinsically bound up with Made In 
China. Its own self-image as a fantasmagorical utopia of commodities, is as yet mirrored by 
the West‟s fascination with the sheer scale, speed and efficiency of China‟s rise. The 
exporting of Yiwu pits aggregation against established practices of vertical growth, non-
contractual solidarity against commercial legal frameworks, and the imminently defunct 
national „global brand‟ against a new and omnipotent non-brand national brand. Its 
transportation to new territories is potentially the creation of a space in which these and other 
key dilemmas of current capitalisms are tackled.    
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Chapter Five 
The Tactic of Abundance: Felixstowe’s Fullness of Time and Space and the 
Virtual Anti-Inventory. 
„The critique of the thing and of the process of thingification (of reification) in modern thought would fill 
volumes. It has been led in the name of becoming, of movement, of mobility in general. But has it been 
seen through to the end? Does it not remain to be taken up again, starting from what is most concrete: 
rhythm?‟ (Lefebvre, 1992: 1) 
„The commodity prevails over everything. (Social) space and (social) time, dominated by exchanges, 
become the time and space of markets; although not being things but including rhythms, they enter into 
products. (Lefebvre, 1992: 6) 
„… „freedom‟ is obtainable at 7-Eleven grocery stores, not in egalitarian social relationships‟ (Ben Agger, 
1989: 17). 
 
It is late November 2006 and a small crowd has gathered along the blustery dock-side viewing 
area at the port of Felixstowe in Suffolk, England. The port has always been privately owned, 
despite being requisitioned, along with all other British ports, during both World Wars, before 
being sold to foreign interests for the first time in the 1970s. Thus it escaped much of the 
problematic transition from a nationalised to a privatised entity following the Thatcher 
government‟s decision in the 1990s to create the Associated British Ports Company: a 
corporatised entity which would subsequently be sold by stock offer. In 1991 75% of the port 
was acquired by the Hutchison Whampoa Group, Hong Kong, the world's leading port investor, 
which has interests in 47 ports across the globe. This move cemented links between the then 
burgeoning Chinese manufacturing industry and facilitated shipping and trade links. Today those 
links have resulted in the much anticipated arrival of the largest container ship the world has yet 
seen. 
Those gathered are keen to witness the arrival of the largest container ship the world has ever 
seen. The vessel is almost a kilometer long and moves eerily into harbour to be greeted by the 
inevitable flurry of press interest and local curiosity. Its cargo is of toys, household products, 
gadgets, clothes, decorations and trinkets – as the headlines attest, it is „bringing Christmas from 
China‟. Down on the dock itself, huge cranes are poised ready to begin lifting the containers 
from the ship according to a sophisticated, highly computerised, logistics plan which charts to 
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the inch where each will be placed in readiness for distribution across the UK. The tiny figures of 
men on the dockside, dwarfed by the enormity of this floating island of merchandise, seem 
sublimely ridiculous – men out of time and place, running to keep up with things larger and less 
stoppable than they have ever experienced. The watching crowd appear awestruck. Some ask in 
low voices how it will stop and how it stays afloat. The scene is a twenty-first century version of 
such early industrial spectacles as the first great train rides or the churning cogs of giant 
factories; despite its computerisation it is cumbersome and heavy like those earlier miracles. The 
small coloured blocks on the futuristic screen translate into heavy, creaking lumps of metal, 
stained with sea-spray and demanding upkeep. The liquidity of the operation remains curtailed 
by the dictates of the iron cages. (See figure 16.) 
This chapter aims to tackle the question of how things, in this case £1 trinkets, relate to and 
impact upon certain times and spaces. In recognising how fullness of time and space is 
characteristic of the £1 chain, it seeks to understand how this abundance is used as a tactic of the 
chain. In doing so it takes both the port of Felixstowe and the website www.alibaba.com as 
contrasting examples of times and spaces which are either literally or metaphorically (virtually?) 
'full'. The emphasis on abundance here is part of an attempt to understand how it interacts with 
other times and other spaces to create rhythm. Rhythm is specifically understood in contrast to 
the ever-present assumptions regarding the 'speed' of capitalism and the 'whizzy' rhetoric 
(Hutnyk: 2004). The chapter goes on to portray how the £1 commodity chain in rhythmical terms 
(as characterised by abundance in space and time) represents the fruition of the preceding 
chapters' arguments on immediacy, disposability and agglomeration, as these tactics are what 
create and determine the rhythm. Finally, the £1 chain and its rhythm is placed within the context 
of large global trends and analysed in regard to the macro concerns of international relations. The 
small £1 trinket thus becomes a catalyst for supra-national rhetoric on the global balance of 
power and the future of capitalism.  
 
i) ‘Pleine comme un oeuf’: the fullness of time and space  
The question of scale in the £1 chain is best understood as abundance. It is the nature of 
operations which rely upon the small profits made from many small units to make themselves 
abundant; and this abundance appears not simply in the physical existence of plenty, but in the 
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sense of time also being full. Put differently, the demand for the instantaneous requires time to be 
filled up as well as space. Yet this filling up of both should be treated with care. It is not the case 
that „full‟ describes a richness of content, nor is it the case that „full‟ refers to speed in the pure 
sense. As will be revealed, fullness/abundance is neither a value statement nor a reference to the 
rhetoric of „fast capitalism‟ referred to by Ben Agger (1989) (amongst others) and critiqued by 
John Hutnyk (2004). 
Indeed Lefebvre‟s own notion of fullness, within the context of his works, was that of the paucity 
of culture under the regime of fullness, the hollowing out of everyday life, the constant insistence 
on quantitative rather than qualitative growth. Speed too, is treated with care; Lefebvre 
(importantly, often along with the input of his last wife Catherine Regulier providing a female 
voice), whilst recognising the conveniences of everyday inventions which have reduced the time 
necessary for, say, household chores, also acknowledges that this has not come in a way which 
empowered people/women to take hold of their own time. Rather it has manifested itself in a 
way which causes them to have to work to pay for such gadgets; in which leisure time became 
distinct from any other time; in which rhythms in everyday life leant ever more firmly towards 
the mechanized and linear and were thus off-kilter with cyclical rhythms that may have provided 
more empowerment.  
Lefebvre describes a more nuanced understanding of fullness: „Le temps est bondé (jam-packed) 
et la vie parait pleine à craquer. Or elle est vide. Pleine comme un oeuf, vide comme l‟abîme‟ 
(1961:94 in French version of CEL). Here he is describing modern life as at once crammed full 
(pleine comme un oeuf) and yet completely empty (vide comme l'abîme). The phrase „pleine 
come un oeuf, vide comme l'abîme‟ literally translates as „full like an egg, and empty like the 
abyss‟, but „pleine comme un oeuf‟ is a colloquial French expression in its own right usually 
used to describe something that is full to the point of bursting. Indeed what is lost in the English 
translation is the sense of pregnancy; the idea that to be „full like an egg‟ is to be, precisely, full 
to the point one might crack - there is an inherent sense of a bursting point, or at the very least of 
an uncomfortable fullness held together by a fragile membrane. Interestingly, the colloquialism 
is also used of someone who is inebriated, so holds connotations of debauched behaviour, of 
excess to the point of eruption. Lefebvre‟s usage of this expression therefore strongly suggests he 
did not simply see time (and space) as „full‟, but that this fullness was unsustainable, driven by 
over-abundance or greed, and that when the fullness „cracked‟ the consequences would be 
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messy. In this sense the expression remains far truer to his Marxist-Communist credentials and 
the idea of the potential for revolution than the English translation would have us believe. It 
reminds us that through Lefebvre‟s sometimes ponderous speculations, there remains a more 
revolutionary bent, and that whilst critiques of his inability to actually describe a plan for 
revolution are perhaps valid,
57
 his oeuvre has tended to be misjudged as a cynical commentary 
on commodity culture rather than an inspiration for action. 
It is not unlikely of course that the Lefebvre‟s egg analogy emerged as a result of his reading of 
Marx, in which the latter asserts: 
 
 
 
The „integument bursting asunder‟ is a theme Hutnyk explores in Capital and Frame 
(forthcoming 2011). He points out that „integument‟ is the chosen English translation of the 
German word „hulle‟, which is a kind of seed cover, in the form of a furry husk or membrane 
which must crack open. For Hutnyk, the integument is therefore analogous to Marx‟s coat (as 
explored by Peter Stallybrass, 1998), which had to be pawned frequently, meaning Marx could 
not enter the library for lack of appropriate dress, and which can be contrasted to Engels‟ far 
superior coat (See  Tristam Hunt‟s biographic work The Frock-Coated Communist, 2009). 
 
What Lefebvre is positing here, is the idea that life is full in a purely quantitative way; that it has 
a paucity of quality content, yet is saturated. Furthermore, this saturation has the potential to lead 
to a revolutionary bursting point. Thus, for Lefebvre, abundance is defined in terms of a lack of 
meaning, depth and personal choice, but it can also, potentially, be re-appropriated and turned to 
the cause of deep, cultural change. There are two aspects to be gleaned here. Firstly, that „speed‟ 
should be considered in the light of fullness and space, both literally and virtually. Secondly, that 
                                                          
57
 For example, the Situationists described Lefebvre‟s relations with the New Left as „Argumentist dung‟ (quoted in 
Michel Trebitsch‟s introduction to Volume 2 of CEL), complaining that he gave no plan for a revolution himself, yet 
accused the Situationists of being little more than a youth movement.  
 
„The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished 
alongside and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of 
labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. The 
integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are 
expropriated‟ (1990: 929). 
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fullness relates to paucity – hence Lefebvre‟s turn to concepts such as scarcity, false needs, and 
abundance as lack. The following section explores some of these themes. 
 
ii) The double-edged sword of Abundance: alibaba.com – the ultimate anti-inventory? 
So far abundance has been considered in the context of places where things are gathered - the 
strange non-places of stock-piled commodities – the markets of Yiwu, the dump sites and 
recycling factories of Shanghai, the immense container ships at Felixstowe, even the brightly lit 
£1 chain stores. But what of those places that resist the inventory? What are the tactics of the 
anti-inventory; virtual spaces created for the display and selling of objects, in which those 
objects (as yet) do not exist in material form? 
It is mid-morning. The mist that earlier had hung above the sparkling surface of the west lake has 
lifted, revealing the iconic forms of its long, low walkways, with their crenellated sides and half 
moon gates. The air is clear and moist. Sound does not travel quite like it does elsewhere, rather, 
it hangs, just briefly, in the dampness, before disintegrating into the urban quagmire.  Opposite 
the lake, a group of older Chinese men and women sit on benches playing traditional instruments 
and singing. Others, mainly men, are crouched on the pavement playing cards for nearly 
worthless Fen. A man in his mid twenties shows off his Kung Fu moves to friends, saying 
„Jackie Chan, Jackie Chan!‟ His friends stop a Western tourist and politely ask if they can take a 
picture of themselves with her, using the cameras on their mobile phones. Above them all, the 
ever-smiling face of Jack Ma beams down from an immense billboard, surveying the scene with 
that familiar owl-like glint and irresistible optimism. 
This is Hangzhou, about 100 miles out of Shanghai, and birthplace of Jack Ma (or Ma Yun to 
give him his Chinese name), China‟s popular and highly successful entrepreneur and role model. 
It was here that, at the age of 12, Ma cycled miles every morning to wait outside hotels and offer 
to give guided tours to tourists in an attempt to learn English. It worked. His English is near 
perfect. Perhaps rather prophetically, this was 1976, the year Mao died, bringing an end to the 
Cultural Revolution and soon after, a beginning to the reign of Deng XiaoPing, along with its 
reform and opening up policies.  
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Twenty-three years later, as much of the world was in a state of pre-millennium fever, 
concerning itself with era-marking extravagances or panicking about the „millennium bug‟, Ma 
quietly and confidently launched alibaba.com. The site is a business-to-business (b2b) 
marketplace which links wholesale buyers to manufacturers, serving 12 million members from 
200 countries, figures that are increasing constantly. It now has offices across China as well as in 
Europe and Silicon Valley, over 5000 employees, is China‟s largest e-commerce company and 
the world‟s largest and most successful online b2b marketplace for small to medium-sized 
companies. 
„Lee‟ (his chosen „English name‟- a derivative of his own), is a business graduate from 
Shanghai, here to attend the Hangzhou Trade Fair, where he hopes to make contacts and gain 
employment in trade logistics. I point to the Jack Ma billboard: „He seems very popular …‟ He is 
very popular, Lee informs me, a huge national role model. A recent survey found that one in ten 
school children wanted to be like him.  „What is it about him they like?‟ I ask. Lee pauses for a 
second or two, before explaining that Ma came from humble beginnings, the son of hard-
working parents in rural Sichuan province, so his rise is inspirational for the huge majority of 
young workers from rural provinces trying to carve out a better life. „He is a symbol of what can 
happen in the new China‟, says Lee, „and people want to believe that.‟ I nod, „He‟s been very 
clever to use the Internet‟.  Lee agrees. He thinks it was because Ma came from nothing that he 
dared to take more risks than others - he would go back to nothing if he had to because he knew 
how to cope with it. So he invested in the Internet even before it had taken off in China, which 
meant he got there first and cornered that market with hardly any competition. „Do you think he 
would have got where is today without the Internet?‟ I ask. „No‟, says Lee, „He would be 
successful, but not to the extent he is now‟. 
According to the China Internet Network Information Centre, in 2006 alone, China‟s Internet 
population increased by 24%, to 137 million people - one tenth of the population - compared to a 
minute coverage five years previous. Without doubt, the sudden and large increase in Internet 
coverage and usage in China has hugely contributed to Ma‟s success. Within the £1 commodity 
chain, the Internet has been, and is, a fast flow, both in terms of the speed with which it was put 
to use by Chinese manufacturers, and in terms of the extent to which it caused the chain as a 
whole to operate more quickly. Thousands of small manufacturers signed up to alibaba.com and 
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began receiving orders from Western companies. Because alibaba.com did not require buyers to 
purchase in bulk, these orders tended to be relatively spur-of-the-moment decisions requiring 
quick turn-around schedules. Just-in-time economics had reached new levels in the £1 chain. 
Alibaba.com is in many ways the ultimate just-in-time business; being Internet-based and 
agglomerative, but also not possessing in itself any material objects. Unlike the container ships 
themselves, the spaces at Felixstowe port, or even the „stocky‟ displays of the £1 stores – all 
places in which space must be filled – alibaba.com is a virtual inventory; an anti-inventory; a 
menu of things which will only be brought into existence if and when they are purchased. Yet, 
conceptually alibaba.com fills up space and time, making promises of future labour and 
motivating new desires, new needs, at the click of a mouse.  
Comments and forum threads on www.thewholesaleforums.co.uk reveal the way in which this 
virtual inventory creates fullness. A wholesale buyer, relatively new to the business, who had 
just started using alibaba.com, asked advice from others on the forum, saying, „How do I go 
about narrowing down my choices? Have you guys eliminated suppliers based on location, 
rating, or other criteria? Slightly lost as to where to start!‟ One reply stated, „I know where 
you‟re at. I experienced the same thing two years ago when we switched to alibaba from our 
traditional suppliers. It feels like the whole of China‟s on there right? The ratings tell you 
something, but not enough. I would attempt to make contact with about six companies, tell them 
you have contacted others and that good and honest communication is important to you, and see 
which one gets back to you quickest and with the best response‟. This comment shows not only 
how „fullness‟ can be experienced in the virtual world as an abundance of potential, but also 
how, in attempting to sift through that fullness, people often create a further level of fullness by 
demanding fast responses which do not necessarily come with any qualitative guarantee. 
Similarly, another user was considering using alibaba.com to buy products made in Yiwu. „I 
want to shift my purchasing more to online, but I‟m thinking I‟d still like it to be Yiwu-based, as 
I have bought from there for the past five years and believe it to have more integrity than other 
areas. But I can‟t tell whether the Yiwu-based firms on alibaba are displaying in the markets, or 
just happen to have a workshop there. I want one that has a regular stall. Any advice?‟ Amongst 
the replies was one that said, „You can ask the supplier for their stall number and check it out on 
one of the Yiwu websites, but I‟ve found that if someone is on Yiwu they are nearly always 
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connected to the markets because it‟s not worth them being based there otherwise. Even if their 
factory doesn‟t have a stall, they are making products for another factory that does‟. 
These comments show how alibaba.com reflects the abundance of small manufacturers and the 
sheer amount of material production, but is also a window onto the fullness of this production, 
and the difficulties in making choices in the face of an abundance which is rich and yet somehow 
bewildering and devoid of meaning. It promises an abundance of things whilst emptying out 
culture and eliminating the need to defer gratification. 
This touches on how abundance can be seen as the filling up of time and space as both „plein‟ 
and yet „vide‟. But what is the nature of the contradiction of fullness as far as Lefebvre is 
concerned? And what insights into the nature of the £1 commodity chain does this provide? To 
explain this as Lefebvre saw it is to recognize two key concepts – scarcity and colonisation. The 
former is at the least implicit, and at times almost literally described in Lefebvre‟s „theory of 
needs‟, which insists upon understanding „‟fullness‟ and „plenty‟ in the context of scarcity, 
deprivation and, most importantly, uneven development. The latter is a concern with the culture 
of „fullness‟ and the ways in which it has created a paucity of enjoyment of everyday life and a 
loss of control by people over their time and traditions. Key to this is Lefebvre‟s critique of so-
called „leisure time‟ (particularly prevalent in volume three of CEL) which he sees as bound up 
with consumption (and therefore the need to work) and can be seen as part of a long trajectory of 
theorists ending in the rhetoric of the shopping mall as non-place.  
Both Lefebvre and Debord (in fact this was one of the few concepts that united them) saw 
everyday life in the modern world as governed by scarcity, rather than the then more prevalent 
view that it was governed by the wealth of consumer society. Both fell interestingly outside 
classic (over-simplified) late fifties-early sixties rhetoric regarding the evils of consumption. By 
volume three of CEL Lefebvre was acknowledging that abundance was now an issue, but only in 
that it created a paucity/scarcity to the richness and culture of everyday life. His was always a 
line of thought in which it was scarcity, either literal or cultural (again the needs of the stomach 
were dialectically linked to those of the imagination), which was the governing factor.  
The idea of colonisation can be understood as loosely linked to scarcity, by the way in which 
Lefebvre (along with Debord) interpreted industrialisation and the ensuing (uneven) 
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accumulation of things and capital as the cause of everyday life becoming disconnected from its 
own historicity. For Lefebvre this was most evident in the way the linear rhythms of industry and 
accumulation interfered with cosmic, non-linear cycles. In 1961, Debord summed up this 
disjointedness with the phrase „everyday life is colonized‟, at a talk given to the Research Group 
on Everyday Life at the Centre des Etudes Sociologiques (CES). 
Perhaps in exploring the abundance/scarcity dichotomy it is best to begin with an explanation of 
Lefebvre‟s theory of needs. This is first stated in volume one of CEL (2008 [1947]: 96) and is 
the reason Lefebvre himself and other commentators see his interpretation of Marxist thought as 
emphasising the (arguably forgotten) sociological aspects, as opposed to the economic ones – 
processes of production and circulation.  What informs this position, is Lefebvre‟s over-arching 
concern with alienation, and the way in which he saw everyday life as the sole curative force for 
alienation. Everyday life was „in a sense residual, defined by what is left over‟, so is therefore a 
form of abundance in itself; a form which can „pierce through all alienation and establish 
disalienation‟ (2008 [1947]:97). Interestingly, although volume one was most directly concerned 
with alienation in comparison to the other two volumes, Lefebvre explicitly states in it that it will 
be the following volume which will concern itself specifically with „an attempt at a theory of 
needs‟ (2008 [1947]: 99).  
One gets a sense that for Lefebvre these needs are, in a sense, running away with themselves. He 
describes money as the only way in which the individual can gain contact with the world of 
objects and says, „the vaster this world of objects becomes, the greater the need for money‟ 
(2008 [1947]: 161). So need is linked to abundance as part of an ever-increasing emphasis on 
quantity of money available to the individual. For the £1 commodity chain this provides not only 
a general truism in regard to the ever-increasing amount of things produced and „needs‟ created, 
but also an understanding of the way in which quantity can be interpreted as turn-over as well as 
sheer amount. To paraphrase: the frequency of the occasion/interactions where money is needed 
is becoming greater (especially in regard to replacing inexpensive, non-durable items), as well as 
the amount of money needed more generally. This has the impact of speeding up needs.  
However, the speeding up of needs on the consumption side runs parallel to, and is part of a joint 
process with, the speeding up of needs on the production side. The necessity for an abundance of 
product units, due to the low profit margins made on each one, means producers need consumers 
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to re-consume in ever faster cycles. As the chapter on disposability explored, this is why waste is 
so crucial to the success of the £1 commodity chain. The speeding of the gap between 
consumption and re-consumption feeds off waste, and as Lefebvre says, „a social group is 
characterized just as much by what it rejects as by what it consumes and assimilates. The more 
economically developed a country is, the more gets thrown away, and the faster it gets thrown 
away …. [my emphasis] In underdeveloped countries, nothing is thrown away. The smallest 
piece of paper or string, the smallest tin is of use…‟ (2008 [1962]: 43-44).  
This is of course precisely the story of China‟s development; the creation of waste, through 
policy-aided consumption, has had to be speeded up. However, as a nation now increasingly 
developed, but with large pockets of non-development, its relation to waste remains slightly 
schizoid – on one hand nothing goes to waste still, on the other waste must be created by 
consumption and vice versa. This schizophrenia has the unusual secondary effect of allowing 
China to forge a slightly different path through development; because it uses its own waste for 
manufacturing, it is becoming more „wasteful‟ contemporaneously to using every last scrap. 
Super-fast development has lead to both syndromes being played out at the same time.  
However, as well as creating and revolving around the creation of waste, this process of 
increased exchange interactions also embeds needs with the need for money. And this 
embedding of needs with money, according to Lefebvre, is part of the process by which „every 
other need is adjusted and revised according to the need for money‟. This leads to a situation in 
which „the need for money is an expression of the needs of money‟; the producer endeavours to 
create a need for his object (2008 [1947]: 161-162) so that this need can be transformed into 
profit. The £1 stores‟ products are not advertised; needs are not created in quite the way Lefebvre 
talks of. In many ways the £1 store is where the expression of the need for money has come to: it 
operates as a space of hyper-available goods, available to all, all the time (hence its comfort for 
many shoppers - the „good old reliable pound store‟), but this need for money is not even to 
satisfy „needs‟ created directly by advertising, but to satisfy the more general need of „spending‟ 
– a need which the last three to four decades have instilled in society. Money is needed in the 
pound store simply in order to be able to buy frequently and give the feeling of freedom to spend 
– precisely „the need for money is an expression of the needs for money‟. It is in this way that 
the pound store is the epitome of capitalist logic (it is absolutely about money reigning), albeit 
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one that masquerades very effectively as running contrary to that logic.  It is this insipid leakage 
of money into domains which convince us they are precisely not about money, that in the context 
of the £1 commodity chain constitutes the moral alienation that Lefebvre is concerned with. 
In volume two Lefebvre admits that the theory of needs as identified in volume one created a 
programme that proved difficult to achieve. So, here he adds to the theory, beginning with the 
basic presumption, „The god-like amazement of seeing the world for the first time and the marvel 
of first smiles are not enough. If he is to work and to create, man must experience want. Without 
the experience of want and need, without actual or potential privation and destruction, there can 
be no being – consciousness, and freedom will never spring forth.‟ He goes on to say, „… need 
defined as want is the starting point from which man begins to explore a world of possibilities, 
creating them, choosing between them and making them real‟ (1961: 5-6). To interpret this shift 
historically, is to realise that by volume two of CEL Lefebvre‟s concept of needs has become 
entwined with the debates of the time surrounding the creation of „false needs‟58 and the growing 
power of marketing. However, on a philosophical level, it is to recognise that man has a need to 
need (else a sense of freedom cannot be gained as he says), but that the emotions connected to 
these needs are becoming increasingly influenced by commercial interests.  
In fact, this subtle shift in his thought begins a complicated analysis of needs as desires and vice 
versa. Volume two defines Lefebvre‟s definition of needs as follows: 1) Desire is different from 
need - it can even struggle against need until it frees itself. 2) But, initially there is no desire 
without a need as its base/foundation (base/fondement in French). A desire without need is 
purely artificial and hard to create. 3) Sooner or later desire turns back towards need in order to 
regain itself. Through these three points Lefebvre explains how the dialectical relationship 
between desire and need happens in the everyday and is surrounded by complexities of consumer 
society. Even false needs (desires) are hard to create without genuine need underneath; but 
perhaps what Lefebvre is hinting at, and what I have argued in the chapter on the bargain, is that 
there is a need on the part of the individual to have agency and autonomy, which often comes in 
the form of being able to gain desires. Since the onset of consumer society, this gaining of 
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 The concept of „false needs‟ was at around this time picked up on by members of The Frankfurt School as 
indicative of the operations of the Culture Industries. However, it was, initially at least, used in reference to Herbert 
Marcuse‟s original differentiation of types of needs in Eros and Civilization. This was in itself, of course, a synopsis 
of Freud and Marx, and Marcuse‟s differentiation can be interpreted as largely springing from Marx‟s statements 
regarding the needs of the stomach vis-à-vis those of the imagination. 
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desires has frequently been interpreted as the ability to buy/spend; the ability to have (consumer) 
„freedom‟.  
It is in this way that Lefebvre‟s theory of needs relates directly to the £1 shopper who enjoys the 
„freedom‟ of the £1 store – the store satiates the need to feel agency and therefore relates to 
desire in that it plays upon the need to need (in order for desire to be present), rather than the 
need for objects to provoke desire. This is how the mundane £1 object has become an object of 
desire. This is perhaps how the process has become „déformé‟, continuing „its journey from „the 
vital to the social, from want to fullness, from privation to pleasure …‟ (1961: 10-11), but with 
desires no longer conforming to needs, and needs no longer metamorphosing into desire in the 
same ways. This remains connected to „the suggestions and the orders given to[the consumer] by 
advertising, sales agencies, or the demands of social prestige‟(1961: 10-11), but in the twenty 
first century this prestige has become subtly, but inextricably removed from the possession of the 
object itself. Rather, it is now embedded in the concept of the possession of „freedom‟ through 
spending and the familiar rhetoric of buying power (and what one does with it) as the last great 
political (!) vote. 
It is not until volume three however, that Lefebvre takes up the theme of abundance with a 
commitment to truly dissecting it. Here he says, „The problem has changed. It derives not from 
scarcity of material or ignorance of daily life but, on the contrary, from an abundance of material 
and a kind of excess of positive knowledge‟ (1981: 41). However, he goes on to explain that this 
abundance causes uneven development globally and, crucially, the emptiness of boredom, 
arguing (along Marx‟s original lines) that „…in their present form the world and planet derive, in 
the first instance, from the extension of the market and commodities to the entire earth, in an 
uneven process that has nevertheless swept aside all resistance‟ (1983: 53). This understanding 
of abundance as emptiness was clearly linked to Lefebvre‟s reading of Marx, through which he 
understands the state of non-having as a „state of very positive having – the having of hunger, 
cold, sickness, crime, degradation, stupor, every conceivable inhuman and anti-natural thing‟ 
(1972: 84). Thus Lefebvre has taken Marx‟s idea of not having as having and included the 
reverse within his thinking – having as not having. In fact in volume three of CEL he was to state 
explicitly that both having and not having were devoid in different ways and, as previously 
mentioned, for Lefebvre, to debate this was to miss the point, as it was to be primarily concerned 
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with possession, rather than entanglement. He goes on to say how life is full yet so empty, and 
that emptiness comes from boredom and privation: „On the horizon of the modern world dawns 
the black sun of boredom, and a critique of everyday life has a sociology of boredom as part of 
its agenda‟ (2002[1961]: 75). Privation for Lefebvre, is linked with „private life‟ etymologically 
and philosophically, with the „world‟ being there to „plug up the holes, fill in the cracks, 
camouflage frustrations, etc.‟ (2002[1961]: 90)  
In many ways Zygmunt Bauman says a similar thing when he states that „the word „too‟ is lying, 
when it says that were the „excessive‟ taken away, the norm would be restored. The truth is that 
were the excess out of the way, the void would yawn where the norms were supposed to reside 
…‟ (2001:86). For both Bauman and Lefebvre excess is more than simply being too much; rather 
it is a fundamental lack of the ability not to need in capitalistic ways. This is useful in that it aids 
and clarifies Lefebvre‟s understanding of needs as abundance – an abundance which has dis-
enabled people to utilise and live what is out there readily available. For Lefebvre during the 
1970s, and certainly by the time he was writing volume three of CEL, there was therefore a 
relevance, even a culprit, in the form of consumer society. For Bauman this was certainly the 
case. He steadfastly attributes the reliance upon excess, to the emergence of consumer society, 
seeing happiness and survival as fundamentally mis-aligned due to the former resenting limits, 
and the latter being all about abstention (p.86-87). I would add that this is perhaps only the case 
in capitalistic systems and is not an on-going truth. 
Happiness for Bauman, is (wrongly) kept alive by the dream of excess; it is the „trademark of 
modernity‟, but has no longer a finishing line, „no more a dream of arrival, but the urge to be 
forever on the move‟. And here he again connects with Lefebvre‟s interpretation of the void of 
abundance being caught up with a sociology of boredom, saying: „The image of happiness is 
shaped in the likeness of a road movie: a picaresque string of adventures, each new and exciting 
for its novelty… but each one wearing off quickly, shedding its charm the moment it has been 
tried and tasted.‟ (p. 88-89) Whilst happiness used to be „burdened with delay‟, reward is now 
instantaneous. Of course, Baudrillard also talks of this instantaneous culture of consumption in 
the section on credit in The System of Objects, as mentioned in the chapter on disposability. But 
if disposability is also key to understanding how boredom can be satiated; abundance is key to 
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understanding how needs have transformed themselves into the need for excess - the excess that 
creates the boredom.  
Heather Hopfl‟s comments help frame this cyclical relationship. She argues that the supply of the 
excess is the major concern of late-modern social life and coping with excess passes as 
individual freedom - „an oppressive drudgery masquerading as ever-extending choice. Matter 
fills up all space. Choice is bewildering illusion (1997: 236-237). These tactics – those of filling 
space and portraying drudgery of freedom, are precisely those of the £1 store and of its form of 
capitalism, just as they are the tactics of capitalism in general. Which returns us, of course, to 
Lefebvre‟s reasons for continuing to pursue alienation as his Marxist theme of choice, but also 
his insistence that it is a social rather than economic phenomenon – his „humanist Marxism‟ 
(Shields, 1998). 
However, there are fundamental differences between Bauman‟s interpretation of excess and 
Lefebvre‟s. Whilst both agree that it is what is thrown out that signifies most about a society and 
that is now the quintessential sign of an attempt to defy boredom; that it is transience of things 
that is an asset, for Bauman this transience suggests there is no attachment to things, whereas for 
Lefebvre it is indicative of inappropriate attachments to things as opposed to „entanglements‟. 
Surely, to follow Bauman‟s argument, a dis-attachment from things ought to lead to excess 
becoming an empty notion, but it does not. So, Lefebvre‟s notion is in many ways more useful as 
it does not suggest that the ability to throw away is indicative of a dispassionate relationship with 
having and excess. For Lefebvre the ability to throw away is more convincingly rooted in an 
argument which states that disposal is tied up with re-consumption. The jettisoning of a thing 
already has the promise of new novelty; of boredom momentarily banished once again. For him, 
the only answer is an appropriate entanglement with the thing.  
 
iii) Lefebvre: Master of the Spatial Turn? 
Although often erroneously associated with an emphasis on the spatial, largely due to the success 
of La Production d’Espace (LPE) in the English-speaking world, Lefebvre insisted throughout 
his work on the intricate link between time and space. In fact only a very un-nuanced reading of 
his work on rhythm analysis could miss the way in which it he argues it is precisely space and 
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time which make up rhythm -  „…all rhythms imply the relation of a time to a space, a localised 
time, or, if one prefers, a temporalised space‟ (1992: 89). Furthermore, LPE was not translated 
into English until 1991, 17 years after its original publication, so the „order‟ sometimes given to 
the development of Lefebvre‟s thinking is misleading. Even if we were to accept that LPE was 
more concerned with space, and previous works more concerned with time, Lefebvre‟s 
continuing themes throughout his life prove that he was thinking the two together from an early 
stage. Indeed in Les Temps de Méprises Lefebvre says of his „spatial turn‟: 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, he himself called his spatial perspective „transdisciplinary‟, specifically as a 
strategy to prevent spatial knowledge being fragmented and re-compartmentalized. For him, the 
spatiality of human life infused every discipline, largely because the production of space was 
inextricably linked with the power of globalised capital
59
. 
Indeed, although Lefebvre does see Marxism as having an inherent over-emphasis on the 
temporal, his concern is not with re-emphasising the spatial but with forcing the 
acknowledgement of the spatial and temporal as one. In La Production D’Espace Lefebvre 
contends that there are different levels of space, from crude natural space to „social space‟, which 
is socially produced by human relations playing out in time and space. For Lefebvre, space is a 
social product; a complex social construction, based on the social production of meanings, which 
affects spatial practices and perceptions. This social production of urban space is fundamental to 
the reproduction of society and hence of capitalism itself and this production is controlled by a 
hegemonic class. 
Both David Harvey and Edward Soja have explored the ways in which Lefebvre attempts to 
think time and space together; in fact they are the two key protagonists of the very few who have 
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 In fact in Les Temps de Méprises, Lefebvre explains that part of the reason he had dismissed the work of Guy 
Debord at the time, was because the latter seemed unaware of the increasing power of globalised capital.  Thus, his 
encounter with the SI actually became another source of his spatial turn. 
 
„… there was great surprise when I started to occupy myself with these questions, speaking of 
architecture, urbanism, the organization of space … But this research on space started for me in 
childhood. I could not comprehend the philosophical separation of subject and object, the body 
and the world. The boundary between them did not seem so clear and clean … In my sinuous line 
of development … through Marxist thought … I arrived at the questions concerning space (1975: 
217).  
 
173 
 
attempted to utilise Lefebvre‟s concept of space. (Perhaps Mark Gottdiener is worth mentioning 
in passing here too – see in particular his Social Production of Urban Space, 1985, a direct 
reference to Lefebvre‟s book.)  However, even for them, committed as they were to Lefebvre‟s 
notion, thinking the two together was not straightforward, although for different reasons. 
Soja, possibly because as a geographer essentially he was keen to promote an alternative to the 
historical view he felt had ruled philosophical thought up to the early 1980s, tends to emphasize 
the spatial elements of Lefebvre‟s work. For example, whilst acknowledging Lefebvre‟s concept 
of social space as made up of spatial planning and lived time, he interprets the „bureaucratic 
society of controlled consumption‟ as instrumentalised spatial planning by the capitalist state, 
emphasising the layout of shopping malls and town centres without including the ways in which 
time also came to be defined (Soja, 1989). Perhaps what is missed here is Lefebvre‟s notion of 
space as „second nature‟: transformed and socially concretised spatiality arising from human 
labour. Viewed as such, space becomes completely based in time-defined activity as well as 
spatially-defined activity, proving that space for Lefebvre is interactive and contains both 
physicality and time - „moments‟ and rhythms.  
Harvey, on the other hand, although capably resisting the temptation to bring space to the fore, 
and despite embracing Lefebvre‟s work on the whole, criticised him for being a „spatial 
separatist‟ and suggested he was fetishising space (1973). Along with Manuel Castells he heavily 
criticised Lefebvre‟s theoretical arguments, in many ways echoing the Structuralist school of 
Louis Althusser, of which Lefebvre was an early critic. Castells and Harvey began to establish 
certain boundaries beyond which radical spatial analysis must not reach. Whilst Soja himself 
argued that this lead to an unnecessarily limited conceptualisation of spatial relations, the 
acceptance of these critiques within the academic world can perhaps be seen as a motive for 
Lefebvre deferring his retirement in order to complete the long and theoretically dense La 
Production D’Espace. 
Understanding properly how Lefebvre was combining time and space in his conceptualising of 
„social space‟, also allows a better interpretation of his work on urbanism. Many have assumed 
that urbanism for Lefebvre is about cities, and taken his work The Right to the City (2009) rather 
literally. In contrast, when Lefebvre talks about urbanism it is not confined to cities, but rather is 
a summative metaphor for the spatialisation of modernity and strategic planning of everyday life. 
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For Lefebvre it is this which allowed capitalism to survive; in fact in The Survival of Capitalism 
(1976) he argues that capitalism‟s survival is built upon an increasingly embracing, instrumental 
and socially mystified spatiality. This mystification allows for, indeed creates, uneven 
development via tendencies towards homogenisation, fragmentation and hierarchisation
60
.   
 
iv) Moments and Rhythms 
Let us briefly chart the conceptual development of both „moments and rhythms. A future project 
of rhythm analysis is first mentioned by Lefebvre in volume two of CEL (1961); then comes 
LPE (1974), at the end of which Lefebvre notes that an analysis of rhythms would complete that 
of the production of space. The final volume of CEL follows up on the promise of volume two 
and provides the beginnings of rhythmanalysis; two short essays co-authored with his last wife 
Catherine Regulier follow this: The Rhythmanalytical Project‟ and „Attempt at the 
Rhythmanalysis of Mediterranean Cities‟. Then comes his book, Elements of Rhythmanalysis, 
which he considered to be the fourth volume of CEL in many ways.  It is these three works 
together which now make up the „book‟ we call „Rhythmanalysis‟(1992). 
Lefebvre began developing this theory of moments as early as the 1920s as a response to the 
popularity of Bergsonism. In his autobiographical work La Somme et la Reste (1989), Lefebvre 
pits his own notion of „moments‟ against Bergson‟s „duree‟, emphasising the spatial as part of 
these moments, whilst simultaneously underscoring his thinking on time as just as foundational 
for him as that on space. In fact Lefebvre seems to have connected his dislike for Bergson with 
that for the surrealists. Despite initially engaging with the surrealists, Lefebvre was to offer a 
vicious critique of their activities and philosophy as early as volume one of CEL, describing the 
surrealist project as a „game for aesthetes‟ and their idea of the „modern marvellous‟ as „a bit of 
metaphysics and a few myths in the last stages of decay … some psychoanalysis, some Bergson-
izing
61… an eclecticism, an impenetrable doctrinal confusion, together with a remorseless 
Parisianism…‟  (1947: 119). Lefebvre preferred to privilege the instant rather than the duree – 
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 Foucault said a similar thing about „heterotopias‟ and instrumental association of space, knowledge and power. 
 
61
 Lefebvre‟s dislike of Bergson‟s „durée‟ had been clear from as early as 1924 (in particular in the pages of the self-
published journal Philosophies) and was to remain with him to be crystalised in his work on the theory of moments 
– a direct opposite of Bergsonian thought. In fact Lefebvre and Georges Politzer had paraded to class a tortoise they 
named „Creative Evolution‟ in order to ridicule one of Bergson‟s key theories. 
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his greatest influence here being Nietzsche‟s „augenblick‟ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1969) - a 
moment where past and future collide presenting new opportunities. Importantly, this meant that 
Lefebvre‟s time/space was quintessentially non-linear. Furthermore, his understanding of time 
and space as interrelated – time with space – relies upon the notion of rhythms: hence 
„rhythmanalysis‟. 
Although the moment was a far earlier concept of Lefebvre‟s than Rhythmanalysis, the two 
seems to weave their way throughout his oeuvre, becoming ideologically connected as rhythms 
in life sometimes collided to create a „moment‟. Whilst Edward Soja and Mark Gottdiener have 
obliquely mentioned the moment, David Harvey is one of the few current thinkers who have 
engaged more fully with the concept. For him, Lefebvre‟s moments are to be understood as 
„revelatory of the totality of possibilities contained in daily existence … during their passage all 
manner of possibilities – often decisive and sometimes revolutionary – stood to be uncovered 
and achieved‟ (1991:429). Similarly, Shields describes a moment as „times when one recognises 
or has a sudden insight into a situation or an experience … a flash of the wider significance of 
some „thing‟ or event …‟ (1998: 58).  
Importantly, the moment was not defined by clock time. It could be a split second of insight, or a 
short period in history (Paris 68 being the obvious example) in which opportunities seemed to 
come to the fore. This rejection of clock time was part of Lefebvre‟s desire to understand time as 
experiential rather than linear. (It also has poetic resonance with the French Revolution and the 
attempt to create a new calendar, as well as Paris 68 and the cry to „shoot the clocks‟ in order 
that the workers would not leave the protests at 5pm.) It was this dislike of linear time that had 
always perturbed Lefebvre when it came to Bergson and the latter‟s notion of durée. Lefebvre 
detested the idea of time as progress along a teleological path; preferring instead the recognition 
of time as made up of instants, some clear, some blurred, some that pass quickly, others that 
linger, some lacking in potent, others with a potentially revolutionary clarity.  
Additionally, Lefebvre wanted to make time personal, to give it insight and feeling, to allow the 
experience of it passing to be variable – all of this was part and parcel of his wider Humanist 
Marxism. Time was lived: Lefebvre in writing the theory of moments in volume two of CEL 
returned to the notion of the vecu (lived) which had impressed him so many years earlier. (See 
La Pensée et l’Esprit, 1926.) Moments had the power to take one out of the everyday, even if 
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one must be returned to it. They were not, therefore, in themselves, the solution to the problem of 
banishing the alienation of the everyday; crucially, this was because Lefebvre did not see the 
everyday as the thing to banish, but the alienation within it. To see moments as straight-
forwardly banishing the everyday would have been un-dialectical for Lefebvre - the everyday 
must remain, but be transformed. Besides, moments come from the everyday and were inspired 
by it: a „bouquet of moments mixed into the banality of everyday life‟ (1989:235).  
It is arguable, therefore, that the „fullness‟ of time can be understood as making „moments‟ more 
difficult to experience. For moments to exist there must be a variation in the way time is 
experienced. When time is „full‟, its rhythm is regular, even automated, in order to fit the most in 
as efficiently as possible. It is therefore simultaneously empty of content and also of rhythm. An 
inability to have rhythm in time, can be seen, in a Lefebvrian sense, as creating less potential for 
moments. To relate this to the £1 commodity chain, if it must increasingly rely upon automating 
the gap between consumption and disposal - automated de-longation - the potential for people to 
find differing rhythms is lessened. In fact, „moments‟ can perhaps only come from situations 
where the rhythms of different parts of the chain clash, or, potentially, if the chain were to clash 
with that outside of it. (As mentioned in the introduction this is rare, as the tactics of the chain 
tend to be influenced by or appropriated by the needs of capitalism, rendering alternatives to 
capitalism actually useful to its continuation, as classic crisis theory suggests.) 
For Lefebvre, therefore, rhythm is specifically about changes in repetition. For there to be 
rhythm, there must be repetition, but not monotonous repetition – mechanical repetition is not 
rhythmical – rather „strong times and weak times‟, as well as „stops, silences, resumptions‟ 
(1992:26). Thus, rhythm is explained in relation to the concepts of polyrhythmia, eurythmia and 
arrhythmia; polyrhythmia meaning multiple rhythms, eurythmia meaning united rhythms, and 
arrhythmia meaning discordant rhythms (1992: 16). Lefebvre explains these further by arguing 
that everything has a rhythm - trees, people, cities, universes, etc; therefore there is always 
polyrhythmia which we can listen to „symphonically‟ (see 1992: 31). The issue is whether this 
symphony is harmonious or discordant, that is, arrhythmic or eurhythmic. Rhythm is created by 
this polyrhythmia, the linear and cyclical times together.  
Everyday time is thus the time of work, of watches and clocks, of linearity, but it is shot through 
with cyclical time – day, night, seasons, biological rhythms. Therefore, the everyday is the 
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theatre for „what is at stake in a conflict between great indestructible rhythms and the processes 
imposed by the socio-economic organisation of production, consumption, circulation and habitat‟ 
(1992: 73). The interaction between the cyclical and the linear - domination of one over the 
other, rebellion of one against the other - is complicated and intricate and causes an  
„antagonistic unity‟ between the two (1992:76). The cyclical and linear are clearly distinct, but 
„enter into perpetual interaction‟ (1992: 90). In fact, if we consider the dual meaning of 
„quotidian‟ in French – that of the mundane and everyday, but also of the repetitive - it is not 
surprising that a work on repetition and rhythm should naturally follow those on the everyday. 
Lefebvre attributes the phrase rhythm analysis to Gaston Bachelard, which may well explain the 
use of the word „elements‟ in the title of his book on rhythmanalysis. Bachelard had of course 
written on the psychoanalysis of the „elements‟ fire, water, dreams, and earth62 but it was 
probably his The Poetics of Space (1969) and The Dialectic of Duration (2000) which most 
informed Lefebvre‟s thinking. In the latter, which is essentially a critique of Bergson, Bachelard 
had contradicted Bergson‟s view of time in two key ways, both of which were to form 
Lefebvre‟s work on moments and rhythms. Firstly, in contrast to Bergson‟s notion of the „durée‟, 
Bachelard had posited time as fragmented and discontinuous. Secondly, he had insisted upon 
framing moments and memories within space. Let us explore each of these ideas in turn. 
Bachelard intentionally laid out his view of time in direct contrast to that of Bergson. Whereas 
for Bergson time continued as a flow between events, for Bachelard, it was to be understood as 
being made up of an infinite succession of momentary and discrete instants, which have no 
extension and are isolated from each other. As Ann Game asserts, in Bergson‟s duration „there is 
a complete permeation of moments: past, present, future melt into each other … There is, if you 
like, a process of referral. The present bears traces of the past, such that no element is ever 
simply present; with each new moment the whole changes, so that everything remains and yet 
changes – hence the principle of qualitative differentiation and an undoing of sameness‟ (1995: 
194). In other words there are memory traces (much as there are for Freud).  
Meanwhile, for Bachelard, duration is experienced through instants and is therefore  
discontinuous, having neither extension nor flow. Crucially, this means the instant is constantly 
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 Refers to Bachelard‟s works, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, Water and Dreams, Air and Dreams and Earth and 
Reveries of Will.  
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breaking with the past, the new does not have a history, and therefore the present is not inscribed 
in the past as Bergson suggested. In fact, past and future are empty and time is only the present 
instant, which never passes as we are constantly moving into a new instantaneous present (2000).  
However, Bachelard‟s presentism provided him with a problem. If, as he suggested, instants 
were static and there is no flow between them, what mediates between them in order to cause one 
instant to give way to another? Bachelard‟s answer was to posit a dialectical relationship 
between the instant and nothingness, in which being is defined in contrast to its opposite, 
nothingness, and is therefore seen as a movement to overcome nothingness.  Thus, and here we 
see the alignment with Lefebvre, what remains from the past is what begins again, and only that 
which starts over again has duration. This starting over again, a series of instants, creates a 
rhythm; thus „duration‟ for Bachelard is constructed by rhythms. 
 
Bachelard‟s insistence upon discrete moments creating rhythms was a clear influence on 
Lefebvre, as was his determination to situate time within space. For Bergson, time is the time of 
becoming. We mistakenly think of it in spatial terms, projecting it into space, as a line of time 
marked by discrete moments. For Bergson, this was abstract, static time, and as Game points out, 
in critiquing abstract space, he almost exclusively emphasizes time:  „If he does not precisely 
reduce space to time, Bergson nevertheless privileges time over space‟ (1995: 195). However, 
what lay behind Bergson‟s critique of this spatially oriented, abstract time, was a concern with 
understanding time as lived, sensuous, and characterised by qualitative differentiation (1950). 
Thus, despite their strong differences, Bachelard and Bergson were perhaps aiming at the same 
point, albeit from very different places – a conception of time as lived. 
 
Indeed, Bachelard‟s work can sound remarkably close to that of Bergson or Freud. In The 
Poetics of Space, he says, „various dwelling places in our lives co-penetrate and retain the 
treasures of the former days‟ (1969: 5). This sounds remarkably similar to Freud‟s „memory 
traces‟ and Bergson‟s account of the past entering the present, and certainly does not posit time 
as a sequence of discrete states. However, as Game points out, whereas Freud and Bergson talk 
of traces in time, Bachelard talks of „dwelling places‟ and so spatializes the temporal 
assumptions of Freud and Bergson. For him lived time is dependent upon spatial specificity – 
space is necessary to give quality to time and duration is dependent upon qualitative, lived space. 
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Bachelard is exploring space that has been lived in with all the partiality of the imagination
63
, 
rather than attempting to look at space in its positivity (1995: 200 -201). „Bergson‟s lived time of 
duration thus becomes abstract time unless there is space; it is space which quickens memory, 
gives time life. Otherwise we are merely left with dates‟ (1995: 201).   
 
The overly-simplistic tendency to posit Bachelard and Bergson as „opposite‟ thinkers on time, 
alongside Lefebvre‟s very public berating of Bergson and support of Bachelard, may well have 
fostered the tendency to posit Lefebvre as exclusively concerned with the spatial; even as 
orchestrating a „spatial turn‟. This said, it is certainly from Bachelard‟s version of the lived, 
rather than Bergson‟s, that Lefebvre began his own thinking on „le vécu‟. In fact, despite 
Bachelard‟s Dialectics of Space being effectively a critique of Bergson, Lefebvre‟s oeuvre as a 
whole sits in far greater opposition to him than Bachelard‟s theory ever did. Bergson‟s version of 
lived experience, because it was bounded in time not space, was existentialist in an 
individualistic sense: his lived time was that of the individual and her own memory. In contrast, 
Bachelard‟s lived time relied upon memories in space: space occupied by others and which may 
not always be our own. Therefore, Bachelard‟s memory traces came from past space-bound 
moments which could be public, and so Lefebvre was able to conceive of and posit the moment 
as potentially mutually experienced: a notion which was far more suited to his desire for the 
moment to be capable of inciting public revolution, rather than simply private, existential, 
„romantic‟ revolution. 
 
To return to the context of the £1 commodity chain, what is required is an understanding of 
„moments‟ as the fragmented continuity that Bachelard conceived, and as micro-catastrophes: a 
multiplicity of fractures which themselves, by interacting (in time and space) with other 
fractures, create the „rhythm‟ of the places along the £1 commodity chain, as well as the 
„rhythm‟ of the chain as a whole. Placing emphasis on micro-catastrophes, serves to highlight 
Lefebvre‟s notion of arrhythmia. For him rhythm was created by different repetitions falling at 
different points, rather like different time-signatures playing at the same time. If polyrhythmia 
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 This idea of lived-in space was to provide the inspiration for Yi Fu Tuan‟s appreciation of space and place (2005).  
For him, the identity of a place only becomes vividly real through the dramatising of aspirations, needs and 
functional rhythms of personal and group life‟ (2005: 178). 
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and eurythmia signify the multiple and the united respectively, arrhythmia represents clashing 
beats: arrhythmia is the lived equivalent of musical „flamming‟64. The £1 chain‟s rhythm flams: 
as global urges come up against local concerns (global ethics versus local developmental 
ambitions); as human endeavour strikes against the realities of nature (the urge to work versus 
decomposition of raw material and tiredness); as environmental aspirations are taken over by 
consumerist ones. The chain is intrinsically arrhythmic due to its schizoid nature.  
  
It must be acknowledged that even ideas as to how the rhythm of a city can be described are 
affected by differing cultural interpretations. For example, Yiwu is described as „harmonious‟, 
which in the Chinese context means having space and greenery to balance out industry; this 
balance is entirely different from the Western concept of  „work-life‟ balance. Yiwu‟s rhythm 
can be seen as „relaxed‟ due to spatial concepts of harmony and balance; the rhythms of Western 
cities are more likely to be described as „relaxed‟ based on temporal/lifestyle features.  
This acknowledgement of the influence of culture, or indeed political tide, on rhythm and its 
interpretation, relates to what Lefebvre meant when talking about „dressage‟. He defines 
dressage as the way a person bends and is bent to a group or society and its ways - „In the course 
of their being broken-in, animals work … The bodies of broken-in animals have a use-value. 
Their bodies modify themselves, are altered‟ (1992: 40). For him dressage determines the 
majority of rhythms; the surrounding culture and its ability to bend people (whether forcefully or 
because we allow ourselves to be bent) is determining. Lefebvre‟s thought here is perhaps at its 
most culturally deterministic. He goes on to argue that things are only seen as natural when they 
happen to conform perfectly to accepted models (1992: 40). Thus, a national aspect of culture 
could influence the way a behaviour is seen as natural (or not) and consequently the way a 
rhythm is seen.  
However, dressage need not necessarily be on a large cultural scale, such as national; it could 
also arise in micro situations. This is apparent when I speak to Tom, a young dock worker who 
says he started working at the dock around five months ago: 
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 Flamming in music is when two beats are so slightly out of sync that they create a kind of double beat which 
interrupts the rhythm and is experienced as unbearable to listen to. A DJ who has badly beat-matched will inevitably 
create a „flam‟. 
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„Well I was gutted at first… I couldn‟t handle getting up that early (others around him nod knowingly and 
smirk)… I was just knackered all the time and I thought, God, how am I gonna get used to this… I‟ve 
gotta find a different job. But then they put me on shift pattern, so I did like two weeks of earlies and then 
two weeks of lates, so when you‟re getting up early you know it‟s only for two weeks like, then the next 
two weeks you‟ll have a lie-in. Even then, at first I kept waking up early even on the weeks I was on lates, 
but after a while I even got used to that. Now it‟s like, I can tell my body when to sleep... I‟m used to it 
you know… and it‟s not so bad‟. 
Similarly, Joe relates how he felt when the port began to become heavily computerised: 
„Lots of operators were laid off, skilled people and all. They just didn‟t need „em. The computers could 
do it, you know, even control the cranes. Lots of people re-trained, or were forced to re-train really. I 
s‟pose in the end some of „em liked it once they got used to it, you know, being indoors more, and it don‟t 
take such a toll on your body like. It‟s a real change though, some people like being out and about you 
know, they don‟t wanna be in front of a screen, they like to see things happening and know that they did it 
with their own hands – directly. I just couldn‟t get used to it meself, couldn‟t get me head round the idea 
that I didn‟t need to go anywhere or talk to anyone to work out a problem you know, I just had to sit there 
and work with the screen. It was a real shock to the system I can tell you.‟ 
Dressage is also capable, according to Lefebvre, of creating total crisis. Here he formulates his 
argument around the terms „rhythms of the other‟ and „rhythms of the self‟, positing that when 
the other‟s rhythms make those of the self impossible, total crisis breaks out (1992: 99). For him 
all crises have their origins in rhythms (1992: 44). Certainly, rhythms are key to crises. However, 
„the other‟ is surely a cultural category in itself? Rhythms of the other are only „other‟ if we have 
not adopted them as our own; only biological rhythms are truly rhythms of the self. So, „other‟ 
rhythms, over time, are constantly becoming „self‟ rhythms. In fact this is part of the success and 
survival of capitalism, surely – that it makes „other‟ enforced rhythms feel „natural‟ to us? 
(Tom‟s words above stand testament to this surely?) Unusually, Lefebvre‟s thinking here is 
strangely un-dialectical. The kind of crises he is thinking could only emerge if there had been no 
tactical blending of rhythms between the self and the other; in other words, only if the „other‟ 
was suddenly enforced upon the „self‟. 
As Lefebvre argued, it is all too easy to confuse rhythm with movement, speed and a sequence of 
movements or objects. The key to understanding how he saw these as different, lies not only in 
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his conceptual appraisal of rhythm as „slow or lively only in relation to other rhythms‟(1992: 10), 
but also, probably in an etymological subtlety. Movement – mouvement in the French – can have 
more of a sense of gesture than in the English and therefore implies a greater intentionality to act. 
It would be simplistic to interpret the rhythms of the £1 commodity chain as having to do with 
speed. 
 
v) Rhythm Versus Speed: Down with the Fetishising of Whizzy Capitalism 
The café is small and basic, with plastic chairs which cannot be moved from the iron they are 
moulded to and formica-topped tables, some of whose edges are beginning to peel off. The walls 
are painted in a thick gloss paint which appears somehow greasy in the early summer heat. A 
constant waft of cigarette smoke is blown in through the open door. Nobody seems to mind. A 
huge blackboard with a vast array of combinations of all things fried adorns the wall, high above 
the counter. Behind it, a ruddy-faced woman looks at me expectantly. Groups of men sit at each 
table. I notice how very few of them are sitting up straight. The atmosphere is dour; pleasant 
enough, but dour. I am being watched by some of the men with curiosity. I order a tea. 
Len, a large man in his late forties, with huge hands and a rugged smile tells me „yes, things have 
certainly changed‟. He says in some ways there have been improvements: the work is not as 
physically demanding as it used to be. Some of the others disagree, but he waves them off saying 
they‟re young and don‟t know what it used to be like. However, he bemoans the way 
computerisation has made the job less sociable: „There‟s no spark now‟, he says, „you know, 
people don‟t have a laugh, there‟s not the old spirit there used to be, it‟s a job now, not a 
community.‟  The man beside him chimes in: „it‟s only a community when things go wrong‟, he 
says, „like when Dennis Burman65 died.‟ This causes much agreement and rousing of those 
surrounding us – the man has touched a nerve. „Things like that ... it‟s sad, says Len, they‟re the 
things that keep us together…. Shouldn‟t be … but they are.‟ I ask how, in this day and age, such 
a thing could have happened. „That‟s just it, isn‟t it? They think „cos it‟s all clean „n that now, 
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 Dennis Burman was a dock worker who fell 115 feet from a crane on June 17
th
 2003 and died shortly afterwards 
in Ipswich hospital, aged 51. He had only been working at the port for a few weeks and was undergoing training. 
Hutchinson Whampoa who operate Felixstowe port were fined £250,000 for breaching safety rules and failing to 
ensure workers were not exposed to risks. His death is marked every year with a memorial service by Felixstowe 
dock workers. 
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and people sit behind computer screens controlling where all the containers go, that there aren‟t 
some of us still out there, all weathers, doing lifting and carrying-type stuff. It looks neat on the 
screen don‟t it, but it‟s still pretty tough down there on the ground… and now it‟s busier than 
ever - stuff coming in all the time… we‟ve broken world records at Felixstowe y‟know.‟ I nod. I 
do know. 
„Would you say the work you do at the docks has sped up?‟ I ask. „I mean, do you think the 
whole dock is having to work faster and things are coming in and being unloaded faster?‟ Len 
shakes his head. „There‟s more coming in. That‟s a fact. But there are computers to help with 
that. Sometimes I think we‟re expected to work faster, but then, you think about the days when 
they hulked things around without cranes, you know, before big container ships and that - those 
guys were under much more pressure to work faster than us. It‟s still big, heavy work, there‟s a 
limit to how fast it can get… there‟s just more of it, that‟s all, and the port‟s grown so big.‟ He 
pauses. „Dennis didn‟t die „cos he was being rushed - he died „cos the cranes were in the wrong 
place.‟ 
In Len‟s relating of the way the dock works, how it has changed and what it is like to work there, 
there is clear distinction between the idea of the amount coming in to the port - its ability to 
process vast amounts due to its sheer scale, and the fact that the actual work on the ground is still 
slow, heavy and lumbering. In other words, there is a distinction between volume and speed: the 
filling up of time and space in Felixstowe does not simply translate into a rhetoric on speed as 
has become so common in discussions of globalisation (for example Robertson, 1992; Castells, 
2000; and Friedman, 2006).  Speed is often emphasised at the risk of neglecting rupture, 
stultification, apathy and the cumbersome nature of the labour of unseen others. The rhetoric has 
been particularly difficult to analyse and critique as it cuts across traditional political divides: 
speed as both a negative and positive impulse has been used by both the left and the right. In 
fact, as Tomlinson points out, Gramsci was an early admirer of the Futurists
66
 and Lenin 
enthusiastically embraced the speed-regulation of Taylorism (2007: 9). 
                                                          
66 Filippo Tommaso Marinetti announced the Futurist Manifesto in 1909, two years before Taylor‟s Scientific 
Management. The movement was very varied and often internally ruptured due to the differing takes on its aims by 
its various proponents. Most remembered however is Marinetti‟s proto-fascist prose which proclaimed the 
glorification of war and the fight against moralism, feminism, and „intellectualism‟(in the form of libraries, 
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Paul Virillio‟s account is perhaps the best example of the speed-as-bad rhetoric. He argues that 
the speed at which something happens has the ability to change its essential nature and that 
things which move with speed always quickly come to dominate that which is slower. Therefore, 
territory is first and foremost a matter of movement and circulation; possession of territory is 
about speed of contact (1977:47). For Virillio speed is an engine of destruction and it is speed, 
not class or wealth, which is the primary force shaping society. For example, he argues that 
Western man has only appeared superior and dominant because he is more rapid; he has survived 
due to being part of the most powerful dromology, as opposed to being part of either a 
„hopeful‟67 population who aspire to finally reach the speed they are accumulating, or a 
„despairing population‟ who are forced to live in a finite world due to the inferiority of their 
technology (1977:47). Despite this, he does not see speed as a potentially revolutionary factor, 
perhaps because he sees it as the norm; thus to break from the norm, to create revolution, we 
must slow down or stop: „The time has come it seems, to face the facts: revolution is movement, 
but movement is not a revolution. Politics is only a gear-shift, and revolution only its over-drive: 
war as continuation of politics by other means would be instead a police pursuit at greater speed, 
with other vehicles‟ (1977:18). 
Whilst this „slowing‟ has its merits as an argument, it does not take into consideration the ways 
in which we are immovable and apathetic already; it is caught up in its own rhetoric of 
dromology and assumes all in life is at a pace which guarantees „slower‟ as a force to be 
reckoned with. Virillio‟s concern with speed, is that it enforces intensive (quantitative) growth; 
thus he ends up at the same place as Lefebvre, but his journey has been one which largely 
considers only technology and speed as opposed to culture and the crushing of rhythms as 
Lefebvre‟s does. Furthermore, for Virillio speed is problematic as it negates space through the 
reduction of distances: the „strategic value of the non-place of speed has definitively supplanted 
that of place [original italics] and the question of possession of Time has revived that of 
territorial appropriation‟ (1977:133).  Thus for Virillio it is time itself being emphasised that is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
museums, etc. Surrealism in many ways was the exact opposite to Futurism. Lefebvre was immediately against the 
blind rationalism of the latter, and in time, deeply sceptical about the existentialism of the former. 
67 In fact Virillio applies this logic to China (way ahead of his time it must be said), arguing that „it is enough to hear 
the speeches of today‟s Chinese leaders about „consumer goods‟ to know that the old thinker [Mao] did no more 
than delay the institution in China of the West‟s fearsome system of intensive growth ...‟ (1977:67). 
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an issue, whereas for Lefebvre it is the crushing of different types of time (namely cyclical 
rhythms) by other types (linear rhythms) which represents the colonisation of the everyday. 
The emphasis on speed detracts from the rhythms genuinely at play and moves us further from 
counter-tactics. Lefebvre argues that „everywhere where there is interaction between a place, a 
time and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm‟ (1992: 15), but that rhythm is not always, in 
fact rarely, under the control of those most involved in its daily operations.  With the imprinting 
of rhythm comes power and as Lefebvre advocated,  „…for there to be change, a social group, a 
class or caste must intervene by imprinting a rhythm on an era, be it through force or in an 
insinuating manner‟ (1992: 14). Rhythms (and the question as to which ones are dominant) are 
political. The changing of them is not about speed, but about power.  
Other writers generally berating speed are Thomas Hylland Eriksen in his Tyranny of the 
Moment (2001) and James Gleick‟s Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything (1999). 
Eriksen‟s concern is that slow time – time when we are able to think without interruption – is 
becoming extinct as information technology permeates every area of our lives. Thus culture lacks 
a sense of its past and future and so is essentially static. Similarly Gleick is concerned with our 
biological, psychological and neurological limits and the extent to which technology pushes 
these to the extreme.  
Ben Agger‟s writing on „fast capitalism‟ is in much the same vein as the above two examples, 
but provides a more nuanced argument. In its first conception in the book Fast Capitalism 
(1989), Agger concentrated largely on an argument which posited the changed position of 
writing in society as indicative of an erosion of the mind and the ability to form a serious 
critique. He attributed this erosion as stemming from the fact we can no longer see how a book is 
independent from the world, and therefore how its contents could oppose the dominant world. 
For Agger, people were insufficiently distant from the world, lacked perspective to form critique, 
and were inculcated with conformist values due to the way in which the world appeared to have 
no outside and thus no exit. Most crucially, for Agger, fast capitalism was capable of speeding 
up the rate at which people lived out the historical possibilities presented to them (1989: 17-20). 
In his subsequent works (such as Speeding up Fast Capitalism, 2004), Agger has broadened his 
analysis to include the impact of information technologies, namely the Internet, on work, 
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families, childhood, schooling, food, the body, and fitness. He sees the Internet as having 
quickened the pace of everyday life and impacted upon consciousness, communication, culture 
and community, by making everything turn faster. Whilst in some senses this is a return to 
„whizzy capitalism‟ and the idea of information flows necessarily speeding up life somehow in a 
more general sense, Agger is not attempting to argue for a new era of capitalism or indeed a 
capitalism with as yet un-seen features. He fully acknowledges that „there is nothing new about 
fast capitalism other than the rate at which it happens‟ (1989: 6-7). His concern is that this faster 
rate is that of a society characterised by administration and that revolt against this is now 
subsumed within the everyday and is thus extremely difficult to access. Thus in some ways, 
Agger arrives at a very Lefebvrian point – that the issue is one of bureaucratisation of everyday 
life and the battle must be won from within the latter.  
In contrast to all the above, Thomas Friedman (2006) is of the ilk of writers who tend to see 
globalisation as an unproblematically positive force - an incredible, exciting, and most 
importantly (and erroneously) democratising phenomenon. The World is Flat cites countless 
examples of out-sourcing and flexibility in the tone of one entirely dazzled by the sheer scale and 
potential of the globalising tendency. It is perhaps typical of what Hutnyk sees as clichéd writing 
on speed; that which accentuates electronic flows and global linkages as if in a rapture of 
celebrating some enthralling novelty. For Hutnyk the acceptance that everything is a blur in 
capitalism bellies the non-happening of reality: „… it is not uncommon to find gee-whizz 
declarations of hyper-intensity of capital flows that seem only to lead to stasis and quietism‟ 
(2004:59). Hutnyk‟s comments here have much to say when considering the hyper-efficient 
computerised dock system, yet a system which still requires men of flesh and blood to haul 
things about slowly and with effort. Speed also tends to intentionally suggest a certain culture of 
„clean‟; fast things do not get dirty. Yet, in reality, they are supported still by grit and grime, 
sweat, and now and then, unfortunately, accidents and death. 
The problem with both the positive and negative rhetorics on speed is that they take speed as a 
constant, as an un-changing „thing‟ upon which to base a moral judgment, whereas, as 
Tomlinson (2007) points out, in reality there is ruly speed (regulated) and un-ruly speed. Yet 
even this acknowledgement does not capture the complicated nature of the myth of speed which 
comes in many forms, and which behaves differently and is perceived differently, depending 
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upon the effect it has in any given situation and /or environment. Indeed, ruly or un-ruly speed 
can be perceived differently by the same people, for example, laissez-faire neo-cons are 
proponents of un-ruly speed- speed which „clears out dead wood‟ and forces out those „not up to 
the job‟. Yet they are frequently also in favour of interfering in the running of other countries, in 
order to „regulate‟ them and stop them developing in certain ways. In other words, one can be in 
favour of un-ruly speed for oneself, but not for others who are, as yet, un-ready to be trusted with 
speed of the un-ruly variety. What lies behind these attitudes is the link between perceived speed 
and growth. 
 
vi) Quantitative (Pl)easing: quantitative expansion versus qualitative development 
As Stephen Kern points out, speed presents itself in its functional, developmental aspect, as the 
prime condition for economic growth and the material development of everyday life. Therefore, 
on the whole, the world has chosen speed time and time again (Kern, 2003: 129). Yet it has not 
realized that „speed‟ in and of itself is often simply an appearance and does not necessarily 
translate into growth of any sort. The plans for the regeneration of Shanghai in the run-up to the 
Expo 2010 provide a classic example of the idea of speed being used un-problematically to 
suggest „progress‟, „efficiency‟ and even „quality of life‟ (See figure 17.)  
Furthermore, even when speed translates into quantitative (i.e. financial) growth, it does not 
necessarily follow that development will occur in socially perceivable ways. As Tomlinson 
points out, speed is, after all, only linked to capitalism because it is the outcome of the pursuit of 
the maximization of profit (2007). When speed is normalised as part of a discourse on 
capitalism, it includes the assumption that being „speedy‟ constitutes an even process of 
quickening, which bears fruit for all. As Tomlinson says, „… there is a fundamental tacit 
consensus in modern societies that progress should be as swift as possible. If progress is defined 
as change for the better, then delay is always a matter for either apology or rationalization‟ 
(2007: 22). Of course in reality speed is uneven and cumbersome at times, creating disadvantage 
as well as advantage, and increasing inequality. For Tomlinson, the reason progress is so easily 
and wrongly melded with that of speed is due to a lack of long-term purpose:  „… the continued, 
gestural use of „progress‟ in political or economic discourse in a sense restricted to short-term 
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demands, agendas and goals. A public discourse which seems in fact … to have largely 
abandoned the attempt to define long-term collective purpose‟ (2007: 73). 
This long term purpose would inevitably require the addition of the concept of qualitative 
growth. For Lefebvre, this inability of capitalism to separate economic growth from 
mathematical growth, measured in barrels of oil or units of cars, goes hand in hand with its 
inherent need to destroy. If growth is quantitative, it is necessary that objects wear out, in order 
that more may be produced: „An obsolescence of objects is organised on all sides, that is to say, 
the lifespan of objects and industrial products is wilfully curtailed‟ (1976: 109).  
This concern with obsolescence is, however, only half the story, a symptom perhaps, rather than 
the crux of the issue. In fact, accepting it as the issue in its entirety has led to well-meaning, but 
largely ineffectual, movements such as the Slow movement and Quakernomics. The former 
gained strength around the turn of this century and is less a united front, than a patchwork of 
small movements. Some of them are grassroots, but many spawned from well-established bases 
within capitalist society such as the food industry and municipal councils; CittaSlow, 
SlowLondon, Slow Food are examples.  As Tomlinson points out, they can therefore be seen as 
defending enclaves of interests (2007: 147), and tend to be about personal change, rather than 
battling large forces.  
Lefebvre‟s concern with promoting entanglement rather than possession is mirrored in his 
concern with qualitative growth rather than quantitative. For him this emphasis on the qualitative 
is allied to a Marxism which understands Marx to have referred to economic growth only as part 
of the means necessary for man to achieve total-ness. Again, Lefebvre is refusing to see Marx as 
economically determinist, even in Das Kapital, arguing that the clue is in the sub-title: Kritik der 
Politschen Oekonomie – „a critique of political economy (1972: 15-16). Lefebvre argues there 
two types of growth in Marx: industrial expansion, which is quantitative, and development, 
which is qualitative. Whilst the former is continuous and therefore easy to predict, the latter is 
discontinuous, proceeding by leaps and involving unforeseeable accidents and the sudden 
emergence of new qualities (1972: 29). 
 „The two aspects, though never completely separate, do not necessarily go hand in hand. Quantitative 
growth (the forces of production) may unfold gradually over a certain period and only later be followed 
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by a qualitative leap forward. Economic growth is possible without the intervention of the working class, 
social development is not‟ (1972: 162-163). 
In capitalism, quantitative growth is dominant: „We have seen that this society is undergoing a 
remarkable expansion (economic, quantitative, measured in tons and kilometres) and a limited 
development’ [original emphasis] (1968: 80). Therefore, for Lefebvre, there is an inherent tearing 
which is at its maximum in capitalist society; it comes about due to man‟s increasing fulfillment 
on one hand (through qualitative growth), and his increasing alienation on the other. Part of this 
alienation, as we have already seen, is as a result of mystification, which in turn causes needs and 
desires to be re-created more quickly. Consequently, the consumption–re-consumption gap is de-
longated and objects become pure possessions not even in themselves, but in their symbolic 
ability to be bought. 
Quantitative expansion for Lefebvre operates through abundance, denying certain goods and 
services to some whilst proliferating the, amongst others in a process of uneven development. 
For Lefebvre therefore, „political economy is merely the science of scarcity‟ (1972: 15). 
Furthermore, expansion for him refers to the process of industrialisation, whilst development 
refers to that of urbanisation. In fact this is key to understanding his controversial argument put 
forward in many of his writings throughout the 1960s (The Right to the City, The Urban 
Revolution, etc.) that urbanisation is necessary for revolution and that it is urbanisation which 
creates industrialisation and not vice versa (1968: 81). This in itself is interesting, as it suggests 
that Lefebvre sees qualitative growth as triggering quantitative growth not vice versa. Yet, if this 
is the case, how is it that quantitative growth is dominant? 
Hannah Arendt too is sceptical about abundance, saying „We have almost succeeded in levelling 
all human activities to securing the necessities of life and making sure they are abundant. 
Everything we do is supposed to be part of „making a living‟ and those who oppose this are 
becoming fewer and fewer [therefore] all serious activities are called labour and every activity 
which is not necessary either for the life of the individual or for the life process of society is 
subsumed under playfulness‟ (1958: 126-127). Here, as with Lefebvre, we see a recognition of 
the importance of abundance, alongside dismay at the way in which securing it has become an 
activity under which men labour, yet which does not improve their lives – a fact they are unable 
to see: „The danger is that such a society, dazzled by the abundance of its growing fertility and 
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caught in the smooth functioning of a never-ending process, would no longer be able to 
recognize its own futility… (1958: 13). 
 
Labour is key here. Arendt, differentiates between „the labour of our body‟ (animal laborans) and 
„the work of our hands‟ (homo faber – the fabricator). Unlike for animal laborans, fabrication, 
the work of homo faber, consists in reification. Homo faber conducts himself as lord and master 
of the earth; his production is seen as that of a god; just as the watch-maker creates the inner 
workings of his watch, homo faber creates a micro-universe (1958: 139). Homo faber therefore 
has complete confidence in his tools and a conviction that every issue can be solved and every 
human motivation reduced to the principle of utility. Thus he equates intelligence with ingenuity 
and holds in contempt all thought which cannot be considered as part of the first step towards the 
fabrication of an artificial object. This matter-of-fact identification with fabrication and action 
leads him to reify the labour that went into creating the object. What Arendt questions is not so 
much homo faber himself, but the elevation of labouring to the highest position - the shift from 
the thing itself to the fabrication process (1958: 305-306).   
 
It is the fact that labouring is inherently processual that poses the problem here, as it emphasises 
the production process rather than the thing itself; it means that worldly things become no longer 
primarily considered in their usefulness but as more or less incidental results of the production 
process which brought them into being. Therefore the end product of the production process is 
no longer a true end and the produced thing is valued not for the sake of its predetermined usage 
but „for its production of something else‟. Use has lost out to utility, in the form of utilitarianism 
under Bentham‟s formula „the greatest happiness of the greatest number‟ (1958: 307-308). What 
man is now trying to produce is „happiness‟, so object things became bound up in the desire for, 
and pursuit of, happiness. 
 
This relates back to what has been previously said in earlier chapters here in regard to the £1 
shopper desiring the feeling of consuming, rather than the object itself, and enjoying the 
„freedom‟ to have the ability to consume. This is precisely the consumption of utility as opposed 
to use; an addiction which is not related to the object, but to the heady quest for the thrill of 
consuming. It is perhaps, a withering away of the thing. At the same moment as the thing 
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symbolically (in the economy of libidinal desire) reaches its highest peak yet, the thing itself 
melts away to nothing; becomes almost utterly disposable, useless, trinketized.  
 
What could counteract this trinketization of the thing - its transformation into a medium for the 
gaining of short-lived thrills based on novelty and mystified concepts of freedom? Perhaps it is 
useful to return to Lefebvre‟s conviction about man and his activity; his surety that, although 
men cannot see it, they are alone, and the world is their work, so they alone can change how that 
work is received (1947: 167). This is, in many ways, an incredibly hopeful statement. If man 
could acknowledge the world as his own creation, he could create desire differently. Currently, 
man makes desire, but he does not make it as he chooses. What if man could create objects 
which encourage or enforce a deeper entanglement; objects which will not go away, which have 
multiple uses, which demand being constructed and interacted with regularly? To speak 
tactically: man must make desire, but he could make it in a way that smuggled in entanglement 
by the back door. 
 
In many ways this would be the revolution of qualitative growth that Lefebvre asserts must 
replace the original notion of revolution. This shift happened because the growth which Marx 
spoke of as necessary had shown itself to be possible in the capitalist model as well as the 
socialist one, thus throwing the notion of revolution into crisis. However, this crisis occurred due 
to growth being interpreted as quantitative; its re-definition as qualitative serves to rescue the 
notion of revolution according to Lefebvre (1968: 29-30). What this means is that abundance 
must become qualitative and concerned with development, rather than continuing along its 
quantitative trajectory of continuous expansive growth. 
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What lies behind the insistence upon qualitative growth is the reasoning that quantitative growth 
is linked to uneven development. As Neil Smith makes clear, uneven development is a function 
of capitalism, rather than vice versa. Therefore, uneven development must not be viewed as in 
any way inevitable, „natural‟, or unavoidable. As he argues, 
As Smith acknowledges, this assertion of capitalism as the cause of uneven development is in 
direct contrast to the traditions of regional geography which were once dominant. This latter 
accounted for regional development (locally and globally) by the availability of resources and 
raw materials. However, as Smith points out, the under-development of certain areas cannot 
simply be explained by nature: „with the development of the productive forces under capitalism, 
the logic behind geographic location retreats more and more from such natural considerations‟ 
(2008: 141). What makes nature alone insufficient as an explanation is two-fold: previously 
economic development was tied to natural conditions by a) the difficulty of overcoming distance 
and b) the necessity of close proximity to raw materials. As Smith argues, „with the development 
of the means of transportation, the first natural obstacle (distance) diminishes in importance. 
With the general increase in the productive forces, the second also becomes less important, since 
raw materials today are the product of an ever increasing number of previous labour processes 
(2008: 141). (In fact Smith gives plastic as an example of a material that the rules of regional 
geography cannot apply to, making his argument particularly relevant to the £1 commodity 
chain.) Therefore, whilst the explanations of commercial geography may have been suitable for 
the age in which they were developed, economic and socio-political factors must now be 
considered. 
It is at this point that the spatial element of capitalism truly comes into play. In recognizing 
socio-political factors, it is impossible not to recognize the way in which under-developed spaces 
are put to the purposes of more developed ones. As Smith asserts: 
„… uneven development is the hallmark of the geography of capitalism. It is not just that 
capitalism fails to develop evenly, that due to accidental and random factors the 
geographical development of capitalism represents some stochastic deviation from a 
generally even process. The uneven development of capitalism is structural rather than 
statistical. The resulting geographical patterns are thoroughly determinate (as opposed to 
„determinist‟) and are thus unique to capitalism … uneven development is the systematic 
geographical expression of the contradictions inherent in the very constitution and 
structure of capital‟ (2008: 4). 
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Therefore, uneven development within capitalism is the exploitation of geographical unevenness, 
but also creates systemic inequality, as it works not only to find less developed areas, but also to 
guarantee that those areas always exist. Thus, as Smith says, uneven development is not simply a 
„gap‟ between more and less developed regions, but is the „systematic product of previous 
capitalist development and the fundamental premise of the future of capitalism‟ (2008: 207). 
Furthermore, this maintaining of the capitalist system requires certain specific myth-making (or 
mystification to use Lefebvre‟s term), in that, as David Harvey argues, scarcity must be socially 
constructed and organized in order to permit the market to function (1973: 114). This fits well 
with Lefebvre‟s turn to abundance, rather than scarcity, as being at the base of society‟s paucity 
of everyday life. It is also truly a mystification, as it has taken the (formerly abhorrent) idea of 
scarcity and, by a process of myth-making, managed to transform it into a (positive) „necessity‟ 
for the market. 
 
vii) Assessing quantitative versus qualitative growth in post-revolution China 
Growth is of course the key issue geo-politically when it comes to current discourse and policy 
surrounding China and its global relations. Indeed, China is constantly cited as the example par 
excellence of hyper-fast quantitative growth, and this assertion is rarely picked apart or 
questioned. What does „growth‟ mean in the Chinese context and which other elements of 
change have entered as a result? The period of economic growth that China has entered into 
since 1978 and the reform and opening up policies of Deng, has, of course, impacted in ways 
other than economic upon the nation. As Michael Dutton describes with rich detail in Policing 
Chinese Politics (2005), one of the main ways in which this has manifested itself is through the 
introduction of the Western-style „contract‟. This contract has effectively created a new form of 
„policing‟ which constitutes a replacement of the political form of policing that China had in the 
past – the „mass line‟ – thus de-linking politics and policing. 
For Dutton, the replacement of mass line with contract equates to the replacement of the friend-
enemy binary, by a legal-illegal binary. This friend-enemy binary evaporated quickly with the 
„With everything it can muster, this is what capital strives to do: it strives to move from developed 
to underdeveloped space, then back to developed space which, because of its interim deprivation 
of capital, is now underdeveloped, and so on‟ (2008: 199). 
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beginning of the reform era and in the wake of Deng‟s extreme pragmatism68. This transition 
transformed the single political question of friend-enemy into „a multitude of discrete and largely 
non– or even de-politicizing questions‟. Furthermore, „what slowly came to undergird all these 
disparate questions of the reform era was the single issue of profit and loss‟ (2005: 18). Thus, 
Dutton argues, the logic of profit promoted in the reform era saw political capital replaced with 
money, and the end of a long period of political intensity (2005: 18). 
The issue, for Dutton, is one of commitment politics. Whilst prior to reform the either-or choice 
of class struggle was reiterated in its simplest form, in the post reform period social questions 
have been condensed into monetary forms ordered around the contract. Therefore, „in each and 
every domain … the practices once undertaken out of passionate commitment to a political 
program were now to be underwritten and disciplined by the dominant economic distinction of 
profit and loss‟ (2005: 314-315). Dutton paints this transition as one which has created a „new, 
passionless world of the commodity society‟, in which „the excitement of revolution gave way to 
the faux [my emphasis] excitement of manufactured commodity desire‟ (2005: 315).  There is a 
similarity here to Marshall Berman‟s description in All That is Solid Melts into Air (1988): 
 
 
 
Similarly, Xiaobing Tang (2002) suggests there are two distinct responses to everyday life in 
China. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, it was something to be overcome by a heroic 
commitment to communal living, whereas, as China moved into the post-revolutionary period, 
emphasis was placed on transcending the everyday and ameliorating anxiety through the 
                                                          
68
 Deng made the great political rhetoric of Mao less grandiose and was concerned with functionality and achievable 
goals. In theory, Dengism does not reject Marxism or Mao thought, but seeks to adapt them to the existing socio-
economic conditions. One of his famous maxim‟s, that well illustrates his pragmatism, was „It doesn‟t matter 
whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice‟. 
„The desire to replace the Maoist-induced collective dependence upon the politicized state 
with a notion of rationally calculable individual obligation was central to Deng‟s reform 
campaign. It was the contractually based notion of individual obligation that fuelled 
China‟s economic reform program and, as a result, the development of a substantive legal 
code would, by necessity, become an essential component of this process‟ (2005: 263).  
 
„Old modes of honor and dignity do not die; instead, they get incorporated into the 
market, take on price tags, gain a new life as commodities. Thus, any imaginable mode of 
human conduct becomes morally permissible the moment it becomes economically 
possible, becomes „valuable‟; anything goes if it pays‟ (1988:111). 
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consumption of lifestyles and commodities. Tang sees these two strands as „related social 
discourses: an anxious affirmation of ordinary life and a continuous negotiation with the utopian 
impulse to reject everyday life‟ (2002: 129-130). It is difficult not to argue here that the Maoist 
vision of the everyday as something meaningful and vibrant in its simplicity, corresponds to 
Lefebvre‟s desire to celebrate the everyday in and of itself.  
Tang describes a revolutionary mass culture as emphasising „content over form, use value over 
exchange value, participatory communal action over heterogeneous everyday life… production 
oriented rather than consumption oriented‟ (2002:128). Hence, he argues, revolutionary mass 
culture is profoundly romantic in form and utopian in vision but may become compelling in 
hindsight: 
 
 
 
 
 
For Tang, Mao nostalgia
69
 in the current era in China is a good sign of the yearning for this past 
heroic culture and the collective anxiety that the market economy has given rise to. However, 
consumerism also works to contain and dissolve the anxiety of everyday life, by translating 
collective concerns into consumer desires (2002: 129). Whilst comfort is sought in past ideas by 
some, it is sought in things by certain others, and for Tang this typifies the difference between 
revolutionary mass culture and the new urban culture. Whilst the former needed to project a life 
that was wholesome but abstract, the latter needs to present a secular existence full of concrete 
expectations and fulfillments (2002: 130).   
Perhaps it is Dutton‟s use of the word faux that is important here, because the problem with 
setting up pre-reform politics in opposition to post-reform economism is that the binary does not 
acknowledge the current sense of „revolution‟ and „excitement‟. As Dutton says, „commitment 
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 See Wang Yanzhong‟s argument that Mao Zedong fever reflects a popular longing for the charismatic leader in an 
age of growing industrialization. (In Zhang Zhanbing and Song Yifu, Zhongguo: Mao Zedong. Taiyuan: Beiyue 
Wenyi, 1991. 275-76 and 280-81.) 
„Only in absentia does this revolutionary mass culture reveal itself to have 
been a heroic effort to overcome a deep anxiety over everyday life, often at the 
cost of impoverishing it. When everyday life is affirmed and accepted as the 
new hegemony, when commodification arrives to put a price tag on human 
relations and even on private sentiments, participatory communal action may 
offer itself as an oppositional discourse and expose a vacuity underlying the 
myriad of commodity forms‟ (2002: 128)  
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produces the ethic of the heroic ...‟ (2005: 313), but the current „commitment‟ on the part of 
China to play developmental catch-up is also played out heroically by many of its people. These 
two forms of heroism, the former with its strong political and conceptual base, the latter with its 
determination to improve lifestyle (note, not „lives‟), are precisely what is shaping current-day 
China and contemporary commentators tend to emphasise either one or the other. 
Thus the economic logic of profit and loss in China has been variously interpreted as either de-
politicising completely, or creating a new politics of the market alongside the older socialist 
allegiances. Whilst radical theorists such as Raymond Lotta
70
 are staunchly against the 
possibility that politics can exist vis-à-vis marketisation, Giovanni Arrighi tends towards the 
latter view. In Adam Smith in Beijing, he makes clear his conviction that „even if socialism has 
already lost out in China, capitalism ... has not yet won' (2007:24), saying 'Add as many 
capitalists as you like to a market economy, but unless the state has been subordinated to their 
class interest, the market economy remains non-capitalist‟ (2007:332).  
Charting a nuanced path between these two arguments is Wang Hui in the celebrated The End of 
the Revolution (2009). For him, whilst the forces of marketisation are a very real and powerful 
presence - probably the dominant one in today‟s China - their potency does not mean that China 
can be described as following a neo-liberal path in a simplistic or well-trodden sense. The reason 
for this lies in the historical trajectory of China‟s relationship with other communist powers. As 
Wang points out, China began supporting non-aligned movements in the mid-1950s and 
gradually shed its „suzerain‟71 relationship with the Soviet Union, establishing its own socialist 
system and achieving independent status on the international scene. Therefore, China is highly 
                                                          
70
 Lotta is a Marxist writer, closely affiliated to Bob Avakian, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Communist Party, 
USA. He has done extensive work in regard to the socialist revolutions of the 20th century and what he describes as 
the restoration of capitalism in the former Soviet Union
 
and China.  Lotta has attempted to uncover  Mao Zedong's 
actual thinking in guiding the Cultural Revolution, tackling what he sees as distortions of Mao's real views, in And 
Mao Makes 5(1978), a major collection of primary source documents and speeches from forces associated with 
Mao. His views on to extent to which capitalism has won out in China are most recently and best witnessed in his 
article, „China's Rise in the World Economy‟, in  Economic and Political Weekly, February 21, 2009. 
 
71
 The use of the word suzerain is interesting in the context of Chinese communism as previously in China‟s history 
it has been used to describe the relationship between the Emporor of China and all other world rulers. Chinese 
political theory recognized only one emperor and asserted that his authority was paramount throughout the entire 
world. This system broke down during the 17th century when the ethnically Manchu Qing dynasty justified their 
rule through theories different to traditional Han Chinese theories of the emperor as universal ruler. The system also 
broke down as China faced European powers whose theories of sovereignty were based on international law and 
relations between equal states. 
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self-reliant and its opening up reforms were self-directed and had an internal logic (2009: xix - 
xx). In particular, he cites Mao‟s works On the Ten Major Relationships and On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions Among the People as providing the foundations for the new state 
theory (2009: xxv). 
That said, Wang is far from romantic about the extent to which marketisation has come to 
dominate present-day China saying, „… notions such as modernisation, globalisation and growth 
can be seen as key concepts of a depoliticised or anti-political political ideology, whose 
widespread usage militates against a popular political understanding of the social and economic 
shifts at stake in marketisation‟ (2009: 13). For him this marketisation is linked to a two-fold 
process of de-politicisation involving the „de-theorisation‟ of the ideological sphere and the sole 
focus of party work becoming economic reform (2009: 7).  
 
Conclusion  
„Speed‟, in the context of the £1 commodity chain should not be viewed as a simplistic statement 
on pace, but rather understood as a „fullness‟ of time, reflected as a de-longation and automation 
of the gap between consumption and disposal. This „filling‟ of time decreases the opportunities 
for changing and challenging existing rhythms. This is precisely the way in which „speed‟ or 
fullness is bound up with power. As Lefebvre argued, change comes from the ability of a group 
to imprint their own rhythm on an area; rhythms are about power, not speed, and so are 
inherently political (1992: 14). 
The other major concern high-lighted by „speed‟ is the emphasis on quantitative growth. As Kern 
says, the world has not realised that speed in and of itself is often simply an appearance (2003: 
129).  Lefebvre goes much further, positing capitalism‟s inability to separate economic growth 
from mathematical growth as tied to an inherent need to destroy: obsolescence is required and 
capitalism cannot compromise on this. However, as Lefebvre argues, it is important not to begin 
„In the socialist era, we saw how the strength of the two or many social forces fluctuated in concert 
with one another, and how the „far left‟ and „far right‟ were overcome; but as marketization 
reforms become the predominant trend, the absence of checks and balances from socialist forces 
between the inner workings of the state, the inner workings of the party and the entire social 
sphere will quickly shorten the distance between the state and special interest groups‟ (2009: xxv). 
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treating obsolescence as the crux, rather than simply a symptom of capitalism‟s insistence on 
quantitative growth (1976: 109).  Qualitative growth is essential to a holistic view of society‟s 
needs (rather than one which sees economic success as „providing‟ for all). For Lefebvre, this 
equated to man‟s potential to achieve total-ness.  
Finally, qualitative growth is linked to a more even development. Owing to the way quantitative 
growth relies upon obsolescence and therefore upon constant consumption, it favours those who 
have the ability to spend and preys upon those who cannot. Quantitative growth thus requires by 
its very nature, pockets of under-development and is (and can only be) structurally unjust. It is in 
this way that entanglement defies its would-be critics who may attempt to accuse it of being 
simply a „romantic‟ or ascetic‟ movement, and emerges as a political strategy to counter 
quantitative growth and therefore structural inequalities. 
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Conclusion: tactics and counter-tactics 
Immediacy, disposability, agglomeration, abundance – operating with and through each other, 
these are the key tactics of the £1 trinket and its commodity chain. They feed into each other to 
create a way of operating which allows even those commodities at the raw-edge of capitalism the 
ability to survive the crises thrown at them. They characterise the chain whilst simultaneously 
emerging as features characterised by it. What emerges through the analysis of them, are a set of 
wider syndromes, through which to understand contemporary capitalism. What follows is an 
attempt to explain those syndromes in the light of the £1 commodity chain; in other words, to 
place the spaces and tactics of the chain back into a description of the everyday as it currently 
exists. 
 
i) Immediacy and the Negation of Entanglement 
The £1 trinket stakes its claim as a bargain par excellence amongst commodities. Its raison d‟etre 
is its buy-ability. It does not exist to last or to be admired as and for itself, but to give pleasure in 
the ability it gives to be bought, without thought, and hyper-spontaneously. This buy-ability also 
allows it to be disposed of without thought, of course, but this in itself is a form of possession. 
The subject controls each part of the subject-object relationship, deciding when to buy and when 
to dispose of; the object itself usually having little sway. Even in the cases where a £1 trinket 
becomes a prized possession, it is not one that survives generations or even eras within one 
person‟s lifetime, as it has no financial value. In other words, its bargain status over-rides its 
thing status. It is a possession, not an entanglement. Whilst it may be possible to be (briefly) 
entangled with a £1 trinket, this entanglement is more frequently with the connotations of 
bargain shopping. Even Helen‟s plastic flowers were not precious to her in themselves, as things, 
but because they represented an era of her life where she had learnt to enjoy her necessity and 
ability to „live cheaply‟ through bargains. 
Thus the tactic of immediacy operates to emphasise possession and ignore true engagement with 
the object in order to promote morals, either through a post-modern acknowledgement of the 
fetish (the „fun‟ of „going wild‟ in a pound store), or through the legitimising myth of the „good 
consumer‟. This emphasis on possession, whilst presented as a deep, historical or even „natural‟ 
human inclination is simply a myth thrown up by the market which requires the consumer to 
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desire possession rather than entanglement in order that the object can (and must) be replaced/re-
purchased. Possession allows for disposability; entanglement does not as it creates objects which 
are „irreplaceable‟ in the mind of the subject. 
Ironically, immediacy is precisely not spontaneous, as it is not breaking out of the repetition of 
life under capitalism; it does not break from the „immediacy‟ that has become the norm. In fact 
immediacy has become the handmaid of capitalism, allowing it to remain profitable. 
Baudrillard‟s point on the philosophy of credit: buying before one has the money and so actually 
living in reverse due to being forced to work „after the act of buying‟, as it were, is apposite here. 
Not only is the present not ours, but now the future is not either. A change in rhythm, a counter-
tactic, would involve re-grasping our own future, giving ourselves the ability to own our future 
hours and to decide what to do with them. 
For Lefebvre this grasping of the future may well involve ridding ourselves of the categories of 
work and leisure. As he argues, leisure is concerned with creating a break with the everyday, so 
has become distraction, (apparently) free from worry and necessity. It has enabled itself to 
appear to be outside of the everyday realm „and so purely artificial that it borders on the ideal‟ 
(2008 [1947]: 33). However, this break only reinforces the categories of work and leisure, 
causing people to „buy‟ leisure time with work time, when what ought to be had is „living‟ (2008 
[1948]: 33). With the advent of shopping as leisure this binary system gained the ultimate ability 
to retain itself, as not only had leisure been separated from work and something that must be 
bought off with work hours, but it had become time in which people spent money they then 
needed to work for. The way in which the £1 store gives guilt-free shopping to the consumer has 
enabled this syndrome to extend to even the poorest, colonising even most remnants of the idea 
of leisure as free, not to mention leisure as simply an integrated part of lived experience; or, as 
Lefebvre would call it, le vécu. 
 
ii) Disposability, Bricolage and Thrift 
The tactic of disposability is concerned with narrowing the gap between purchase and disposal, 
in order to secure the continued increase in the number of exchange interactions and thus 
maintain economic growth. A fast turn-around, that is, a high level of disposability, is crucial. 
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Therefore a £1 commodity is not built to last, and this non-lasting is not only a physical property 
of the nature of the „built-in obsolescence‟, but a more psychologically-rooted one, conferred 
upon the commodity by its price-tag, which allows it to be trashed even when it continues to 
function. Function is reduced to fad in the case of the £1 commodity. 
This narrowing of the gap between purchase and disposal has implications for use value. Re-
consumption is all important, so with the £1 commodity it is not so much that exchange has 
triumphed over use, but more that use is already embedded within exchange, because at the point 
of purchase the product is already perceived as leading to the next potential sale soon after it has 
proved its (brief) usefulness.  
The importance of disposability and the resulting (covert) emphasis on waste has seen the figure 
of the peddler emerge as the embodiment of the quandary between thrift and waste. He enables 
the transition from waste to product (and therefore profit), so is inextricably involved in 
capitalistic practices.  Yet, simultaneously, he defies the logic of the wider chain and that of 
capitalism in general by operating as a bricoleur who is the ultimate example of „thrift‟. He is in 
many ways the „reverse image‟ that Lefebvre saw as represented by Charlie Chaplin - a character 
who reflects the image of everyday, but which is simultaneously „exceptional, deviant, 
abnormal‟ (2008 [1947]: 12) Through him, the tactic of disposability is challenged, but how long 
this challenge can withstand the increasing pressure on places to show themselves as images of 
success remains to be seen.  
It is perhaps the case that we have become removed from the sense that we refashion things 
through processes of bricolage; removed from the operational values of the bricoleur. Re-
fashioning is all around us for us to consume, but the producer-bricoleur is harder to find. Buying 
re-fashioning from above, we are told, will enable us all to survive; she who patches and re-
styles from below will be to blame for all our downfalls. Meanwhile even the methodological 
bricoleur comes in for criticism from disciplines whose survival depends on them being neatly 
defined.  
The processes outlined in Chapters One and Two are also linked diametrically through the form 
of the bricoleur. In Chapter One possession is seen as opposed to entanglement with the object; 
in Chapter Two disposal (and disposability) is pitted against bricolage. Now we can see that the 
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conceptual realm in which only possession and non-possession exist is the same one in which 
disposal and consumption are key – possession and disposal form one cycle. Entanglement 
however is fundamentally aligned to bricolage – an object that is part of us is one that we repair, 
adapt, etc. Therefore the bricoleur not only negates disposal, but in doing so insists upon the 
irrelevance of the possession/non-possession conundrum in favour of everyday entanglement. 
The closing of the consumption-disposal gap is characteristic of a capitalism whose primary goal 
is growth. As Lefebvre says, „the important thing [for capitalism] is that human beings be 
profitable, not that their lives be changed‟. Therefore, until now „progress‟ has really only 
modified existing social realities as little as possible and according to capitalist profitability. 
Capitalism only brings about change grudgingly; it is in fact „en retard‟ - behind or retarded in 
the true sense. As Lefebvre says, „… constantly staring us in the face, mundane and therefore 
generally unnoticed – whereas in the future it will be seen as a characteristic and scandalous trait 
of our era, the era of the decadent bourgeoisie – is this fact: that life is lagging behind what is 
possible…‟ (2008 [1947]: 230).  
Applied to the £1 chain (as well as to capitalism more generally),this lagging behind is a more 
accurate way of interpreting the situation and relates back to Hutnyk‟s concerns with „speedy 
rhetoric‟ not acknowledging the lack of quick and effective action. The narrowing of the 
consumption-disposal gap (erroneously, or at least unsubtly, described as a speeding up) has 
created greater inequality along the chain as development brings wealth to certain pockets, but 
misery to others. Thus whilst „progress‟ in terms of economic growth has occurred, everyday life 
is lagging behind its potential. This is due to the emphasis on quantitative growth. The growth 
we speak of today is so embedded in current capitalism that the word itself is assumed to have 
quantitative meaning – to be quantitative – but it was not ever thus. 
Lefebvre argues that it was precisely this hi-jacking of the idea of growth by that of specifically 
quantitative growth which led to the crisis of the idea of revolution. His reasoning here is that the 
socialist promise is to provide for all through growth, as is the capitalist promise; but as growth 
becomes understood as quantitative only capitalism can be seen as successful in providing it. The 
socialist promise however, was based on qualitative growth (2008) [1947]: 30); a growth which 
does not have to come hand in hand with alienation.  
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Quantitative growth has meant the triumphing of the market and in many ways the success of the 
£1 trinket is most indicative of this. That the least profitable of things, when produced en masse 
and infiltrating everydayness, can fuel the growth of the largest nation on earth is testament to 
the dominance of quantitative growth. Market economy has become market society and the £1 
trinket is the trinketized (cute-ified) embodiment of this. 
 
iii) Agglomeration and the Ascension of the Image-Space 
A combination of historical and cultural factors saw a certain form of agglomerative 
manufacturing develop contemporaneously to the heightened importance (for capitalism) of the 
concepts of immediacy and disposability. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the 
commodity chain for whom these two latter are most important – that of the £1 object – should 
be pulled towards places such as Yiwu whose operations are suited to high turnover and 
unpredictable change. 
The tactic of agglomeration sees the relationship with risk reformulated in the light of a 
spontaneity which is itself a result of the low-end product chain‟s demand for the narrowing of 
the gap between consumption and disposal. This results precisely in a form of abundance which 
is not manifested in the standing reserve, but in sites where commodities are constantly being 
shifted through space. These spaces of agglomeration have, until recently, been un-visitable (in 
Bella Dicks sense); non-places of removal and storage. However, some of them, such as Yiwu, 
are now not only visitable as spectacles of the spectacle, but transportable across supra-national 
boundaries. Both their spectacle and their transportability have come about due to them carving 
themselves out as portrayals of historical trends and ideas – they have become image spaces. 
As highlighted by the chapter on the tactics of disposability, „failures‟ and collateral damage are 
intrinsic to the success of the £1 commodity chain. However, the tactics used within spaces of 
failure are, and will increasingly be, challenged by the growing importance of showing space. 
There is now a cycle at play which impacts even upon the least glamourous of commodity 
chains; this cycle maintains that success looks a certain way; this look then attracts investment, 
the investment leads to certain types of „success‟ (namely financial/business as opposed to 
social).  Success has become bound up with image. This happens partly in the way Bella Dicks 
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suggests; places, especially large cities, are forced to make themselves „visitable‟ in order to 
compete for „world city‟ status. However, the conceptual joining of success and image not only 
makes existing places „visitable‟, through structural changes or promotional campaigns, but also 
creates new spaces with no function other than offering images to the world. 
This image creation is part of a wider set of initiatives which, some intentionally, others almost 
unwittingly, allow for a strange side-stepping of ethics and awkward global political moments. 
Rather like carbon off-setting, this collateral damage off-setting allows companies, national 
governments and international bodies to buy their way out of taking responsibility for collateral 
damage by investing in spaces deemed to be „responsible/green/social/innovative/business-
generating‟, etc. Just like carbon off-setting it allows the largest „polluters‟ to maintain their 
usual operations as long as they can afford to create some images (for that is all they are) of 
responsibility. Hence, while urban bias in Shanghai continues to create problems for millions of 
rural Chinese, the city authorities can show the world how clean and prosperous it is; and whilst 
million of debt-ridden consumers feel the need to search in pound stores, the large chains are 
busy making „national treasures‟ of themselves by buying up empty stores and „bringing high 
streets back to life.‟ 
 
iv) Abundance and the Inertia of the Rhetoric on Speed 
Abundance for the £1 trinket and its commodity chain must be understood as the full-ness of 
time and space. Abundance has, however, been wrongly connected to a rhetoric on speed. 
Certainly what is at stake concerns the need for an elongation of the commodity life-cycle; a 
stemming of the tide which has begun to show itself as a dangerous answer to questions of local 
and global economies and cultures. But this stemming cannot realistically be the „galloping 
retreat‟ that Scanlon talks of in the quest to escape „an undifferentiated mass of things…that 
could otherwise swamp us.‟ (2005: 13)  
What is suggested here is that, strangely, a methodology of material geography, of following the 
thing, of concern with the places things occupy and relations embedded in space, has revealed 
that what is at stake is the rhythm of the thing, longevity, and material relations embedded in 
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time. Yet this time is not the chronological, rational time of everyday life, but rather the time 
embodied in people and things – lived time, le vécu. 
Abundance has an intrinsic relationship to quantitative and qualitative growth. Growth in itself, 
as used by economists, is a nonsensical concept as it does not acknowledge regular growth (i.e. 
growth at a constant same rate) as growth! Only exponential growth is growth; so growth is 
immediately bound up in the concept of mass expansion. Furthermore, when things grow, but at 
a lesser rate than they previously grew, this is called „negative growth‟(!), therefore,  growth is 
determined by what went immediately before it and is dictated to by this. It is always-imminent, 
riding a crest of quantitativity. 
The concept of growth must therefore be re-examined and re-defined in order to re-ignite the 
idea of revolution. The everyday is the realm through which qualitative growth can best come to 
the fore, thus the change in the culture of consumption must begin with the most mundane of 
objects. The £1 commodity is the death of use and the champion of (false) desire extended to the 
poorest in society – „freedom‟ to get high on the thrill of consumption embodied in the 
symbology of the „£‟ sign. 
The £1 chain is a rapacious capitalism; one that eats up and spits out raw materials, that narrows 
the gap between consumption and disposal to a mere glimmer, and which promotes only the 
ability to buy. The £1 trinket denies even the need for the object to satisfy (momentarily) desire, 
satisfaction resulting instead from the act of buying itself, safe in the knowledge that guilt-free 
disposal can follow. It is a capitalism which, under the name of „cheap‟, has smuggled in the 
permanent necessity to spend. In providing „spontaneity‟, it has created ever firmer enslavement 
to consumption and therefore to labour. The £1 trinket is the epitome of the trinketization of our 
relationship with things and thus with our own time and our own lives. It has made „freedom‟ the 
ability for all (even the poorest) to accept the logic of consumption.  
 
v) Towards a Manifesto for Entanglement 
In Bruno Latour‟s recent „Compositionist Manifesto‟ (2010, see web sources), he asserts that 
„the time of manifestos has long passed‟ because „the time of time has passed‟ (2010: 2). 
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According to him we can no longer place the manifesto within the context of the classic vision of 
a vast army moving forward as this was predicated on the idea that the flow of time had only one 
„inevitable and irreversible direction‟ [original emphasis] (2010: 2). Within this time-heavy 
vision, the war manifesto‟s declared would be won, regardless of the number of defeats, as the 
march forwards was the inevitable one of „progress‟. However, since progress lost its meaning a 
current day manifesto cannot define itself in terms of time (2010: 2-3). 
Whilst the inevitability of a long march forward to a given outcome, such as revolution, is 
difficult, I do not agree that the manifesto as form relies upon such time and is therefore 
outmoded. Neither does this ring true to Lefebvre‟s thought. For him, critique was not a tool to 
discovering the hidden, but rather part of a dialectical process, in which pieces are thrown away 
along the way and others picked up and re-shaped. Furthermore, this process was best 
understood as a cacophony of rhythms which created moments in lived time. It is in these 
moments that tacticians within the £1 chain can, briefly, see the whole and gain the power of a 
strategist. Perhaps more importantly, it is also in these moments that ruling strategy can be 
challenged, as the confluence of people and places forms a new strategic vision. 
 
Currently, in the case of the £1 chain, the tactics of the £1 trinket itself are those of current 
capitalism par excellence. Therefore, there is homology between its tactics and the greater 
strategy of both the £1 chain and current facets of capitalism. Despite this, the tactics of those 
people and places involved in the production (although rarely, if ever, the consumption) of the £1 
trinket display features which run contra to capitalistic strategy. However, currently, these contra 
tactics are in fact strengthening the £1 chain and denying their own potential as „moments‟. 
Initially, agglomeration may have worked against (Western) capitalism, but it is now proving 
itself invaluable and even being transported into Western capitalistic spaces. A counter-tactics 
will require nothing short of breaking the dialectical link between possession and disposal in 
favour of that between entanglement and (re-) elongation. This alone, in the context of the 
trinket, can bring a decrease in alienation and an enrichment of everyday life.  
For Levebvre the logic of accumulation runs contrary to everyday life, as the latter is not 
cumulative. Yet the non-cumulative nature of the everyday is being over-run by a culture of 
accumulation. However, the disparity between the nature of everyday life and the culture of 
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accumulation, is precisely the crack through which a process of change can be begun. And times 
of recession perhaps widen that crack and bring out its poignancy in a way that could aid change. 
A manifesto for entanglement would be no less than the cultural revolution Lefebvre spoke of. 
Like many manifesto‟s it is therefore utopian to a small extent – it has to be - although avowedly 
pragmatic on the whole.  
Entanglement is not ascetic, Luddite, or anti-„progress‟. It is simply specifically political and 
concerned with a more even development, a socialist development. It insists that things should be 
lived in, not alongside. Disposability is no longer the anti-establishment statement it was in the 
sixties. To jettison is no longer representative of empowerment. Similarly, „making-do‟ does not 
have to come with the same cultural connotations it used to, indeed it need not be seen as 
„making-do‟! There is currently a space for real cultural change, in which things are given 
different usages, not simply for themselves, but also in recognition of the (working) time they 
embody. 
 
The implications are far-reaching. Living in things disavows the trinket of its ability to tinketize. 
Experience has the possibility of emerging as something more satisfying, somehow fuller, and 
more individual to the person who lives it. The ability of the trinket to homogenise experience 
through emptying out everyday life is challenged. Life, in all its areas, can be lived more freely, 
rather than always in chasing the next amount of money for that already spent. Leisure can be re-
constituted as a genuine category, not separate from all others in life and not part of 
consumption. Only with this cultural change can the reign of quantitative growth be challenged 
and unequal exploitation of every under-developed corner of the world be seen for what it is – a 
false notion of improvement. 
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Illustrations                                                                             
 
Figure 1: Interior of independent pound store, Deptford, London  
 
 
Figure 2: Customers at opening of new pound store  
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Figure 3: 99p Stores Christmas carrier bag 
 
 
Figure 4: The Nestle sign from Suzhou river creek, Zhabei 
 
 
Figure 5: Boundary of the peddlers‟ quarter, Zhabei – boys playing cards in foreground 
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Figure 6: A typical waste peddlers cart – the limits to stockpiling 
 
 
Figure 7: Peddler on Nanjing road, Shanghai. 
 
 
Figure 8: Debating the re-distribution of bottles, Nanjing Road 
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Figure 9: Housing vision for 2010 Expo regeneration of Zhabei/Shanghai – Suzhou creek running through 
 
 
Figure 10: Carton mascot „haibao‟ and the Expo 2010 catchphrase 
 
 
Figure 11: Da‟ansi pagoda, Xiuhu Park, Yiwu 
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Figure 12: Faux-aged gateways, Xiuhu Park, Yiwu 
 
 
Figure 13: Xiuhu Park with Da‟ansi pagoda, Yiwu 
 
 
Figure 14: Monument to Maoist worker, Yiwu. 
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Figure 15: Atrium of Binwang Market 
 
 
Figure 16: Container ships at Port of Felixstowe 
 
 
Figure 17: The Shanghai authorities‟ vision for regeneration 
 
 
 
214 
 
Appendix i: £1 Trinkets 
 
215 
 
Bibliography 
 
A 
Agger, Ben (1989) Fast Capitalism: A Critical Theory of Significance. Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press    
- (2004) Speeding Up Fast Capitalism: Cultures, Jobs, Families, Schools, Bodies. Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers 
Alneng, Victor (2007) The Right Price: Local Bargains for Global Players (paper presented at Thinking 
Through Tourism, London Metropolitan University, UK 
 
Ang, Ien (2001) On not speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West. London: Routledge 
Appadurai, Arjun  (1986) The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: 
CUP 
 
Appelbaum, Richard P., and Henderson, Jeffrey, (eds) (1992) States and Development in the Asian 
Pacific Rim. Newbury Park, CA:Sage   
Aragon, Louis (1994) Paris Peasant. Boston: Exact Change 
 
Aristotle, (1962) The Politics. London: Penguin Books 
 
Arendt, Hannah (1998) The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Arrighi, Giovanni (2007) Adam Smith in Beijing : Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. New York: 
Verso  
 
Arvatov, Boris  (1997 [1925]) „Everyday Life and the Culture of the Thing (Towards a Formulation of the 
Question)‟. October, 81: 119-28 
 
Auge, Marc (1995) Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. London: Verso 
 
B 
Bachelard, Gaston (2000) [1936] The Dialectic of Duration. Clinamen Press Ltd 
- (1983) Water and Dreams: an essay on the imagination of matter. Dallas: Pegasus Foundation  
- (1969) The Poetics of Space. Boston: Beacon Press 
 
Back, Les (2007) The Art of Listening. London: Berg 
Barthes, Roland (1973) [1957] „Plastic‟ in Mythologies, London: Granada 
 
Bataille, Georges (1985) Visions of Excess: Selected Writing 1927-1939. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 
-(1991) „The Accursed Share‟. New York: Zone Books 
-(1997) [1934] „The Notion of Expenditure‟, in The Bataille Reader. London: Blackwell 
 
Baudelaire, Charles (1998) Les Fleurs du Mal (The Flowers of Evil) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Baudrillard, Jean (2005) The System of Objects. London: Verso  
-(1998) The Consumer Society. London: Sage 
Bauman, Zygmunt  (2007a) Liquid Modernity. London: Polity Press 
216 
 
- (2007b) „Collateral Casualties of Consumerism‟ in Journal of Consumer Culture. 7(25) London: Sage 
- ( 2005) Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity Press 
-(2001) ‘Excess: An Obituary’, in Parallax, 7 (1) London: Routledge  
Benjamin, Walter (2002) The Arcades Project. Cambridge, Mass: London: Harvard University Press 
-(1999) Illuminations. London: Pimlico  
-(1997) One-way Street and Other Writings. London: Verso 
-(1997) Charles Baudelaire: a Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. London: Verso 
 
Bennett, Jane (2001) The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. New York: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Bergson, Henri (1991) Matter and Memory. New York: Zone Books 
- (1950) Time and Free Will. London: George Allen and Unwin 
- (1913) Creative Evolution. London: MacMillan 
 
Berman, Marshall (1988) All That is Solid Melts into Air. New York: Viking Penguin  
Binkley, Sam (2000) „Kitsch as a Repetitive System: A Problem for the Theory of Taste Hierarchy‟, in 
Journal of Material Culture, vol 5, pages 131 – 152. London: Sage 
 
Blau, P (1964) Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Whiley 
Bloch, Maurice and Parry, Jonathan (1989) Money and the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 
 
Bowlby, Rachel (2000) Carried Away: The Invention of Modern Shopping. London: Faber and Faber 
 
Bray, David (2005) Social Space and Governance in Urban China. Stanford, Ca: Stanford Uni Press 
 
Brenner, Robert (2003) The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy. London: Verso 
 
Breton, Andre (1924) Manifesto of Surrealism. Michigan: University of Michigan Press 
 
Brown, Bill (2001) „Thing Theory‟ in Critical Inquiry. 28 (1) 
-(2004) Things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Bull, Michael (2004) „Sound connections: an aural epistemology of proximity and distance in urban 
culture‟, in Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22(1), p.103 – 116 
C 
Callon, Michel (2007) „An Essay on the Growing Contribution of Economic Markets to the Proliferation 
of the Social‟,in Theory, Culture and Society, 24:7-8, 139-163. 
-(1998) “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics” in M. Callon (ed.), The 
Laws of the Markets, Oxford: Blackwell, 1-57. 
 
Campbell, Colin (1983) „Romanticism and the Consumer Ethic: Intimations of a Weber-style Thesis‟, in 
Sociological Analysis, 44(4) 
217 
 
-(1987) The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
 
Cao, Jinqing (1993) „From the danwei system to the individual subject: The market economy and 
human socialization‟, in Probing and Contending, 5: 32-36 
 
Cao, Jinqing and Chen, Zhongya (1997) Leaving the ideal castle: Research on China’s danwei 
phenomenon. Shenzhen: Haitian Press 
 
Castells, Manuel (2000) The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers   
 
Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976) On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
-(1992) Historical and Political Writings. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Coonan, Clifford (2007) „Made in Britain: Dumped in China.‟ The Independent. 26th January 
Coase, R (1937) „The Nature of the Firm‟. Economica. Vol 4, p.386-405 
Confucious (1993) The Analects. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Cook, Ian and Harrison, Michelle (2007) „Follow the Thing: West Indian Hot Pepper Sauce‟, in Space 
and Culture. London: Sage 
Crogan, Patrick (2010) „Knowledge, care and Trans-Individuation: An interview with Bernard Stiegler‟, 
in Cultural Politics, 6 (2) 
 
D 
Davis, Mike (1992) City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles. New York: Vintage Books 
 
Debord, Guy (1995) [1967]Society of the Spectacle. New York: Zone Books 
De Certeau, Michel (1998)The Capture of Speech and Other Political Writings. University of Minnesota 
Press. 
-(1984) The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Dicken, Peter (1992) Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity. New York: The 
Guildford Press 
Dicks, Bella (2003) Culture on Display. Maidenhead: Open University Press 
Du Gay et al. (1997) Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman. Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press 
 
Dutton, Michael (2005) Policing Chinese Politics: A History. London: Duke University Press 
 
E 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (2001) Tyranny of the Moment. London: Pluto 
Gleick, James (1999) Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything. London: Little, Brown 
 
 
218 
 
F 
Feuerbach, Ludwig (1854) „The Essence of Christianity‟ in Baker (ed) Religion and Liberal Culture, vol. 
8 of University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Fiske, John (1989) Reading the Popular. Boston: Unwin Hyman 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1976 [1900]) The Interpretation of Dreams. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
Freidberg, Anna (1993) Window Shopping: Cinema and the Post-Modern. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Friedman, Thomas, L. (2006) The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century. 
London: Penguin 
Frow, John (1997) Time and Commodity Culture: Essays on Cultural Theory and Postmodernity. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
-(2001) „A Pebble, a Camera, a Man who turns into a Telegraph Pole‟, in Critical Inquiry 28. 
 
G 
Game, Ann (1995) „Time, Space, Memory, with Reference to Bachelard‟, in Featherstone, Lash and 
Robertson (eds) Global Modernities. London: Sage   
 
Gell, Alfred (1998) Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press  
Gereffi, Gary and Korzeniewicz, Miguel (1994) Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press 
 
Gleick, James (1999) Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything. London: Vintage 
 
Goffman (1972[1959]) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Goggin, Gerard (2006) Cell Phone Culture: Mobile Technology in Everyday Life. London: Routledge 
Goldmann, Lucien (1964) The Hidden God: A Study of Tragic Vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the 
Tragedies of Racine. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul  
Gottdiener , Mark (1985) Social Production of Urban Space. Texas: University of Texas Press 
Graeber, David (2001) Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value.  New York: Palgrave  
 
Granovetter, Mark (1973) „The Strength of Weak Ties‟, in American Journal of Sociology, 78:6, p-1360-
80.  
 
Grass, Gunter (1989) Show Your Tongue. CA: Harcourt Brace Javonovich. 
Grossberg, Lawrence, et al (1992) „Cultural Studies: An Introduction‟, in Cultural Studies Reader. New 
York: Routledge 
Gudeman, Stephen (2001) The Anthropology of Economy. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
 
 
219 
 
H 
Hall, Stuart (1996) Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. London; New York: Routledge 
Hanfi, Zawar (1972) „Introduction‟, in The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach. NY: 
Garden City: Doubleday & Company 
 
Harvey, David  (1992) „Afterword‟ in Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
-(1990) The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell  
-(1989) The Urban Experience. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 
-(1973) Social Justice and the City. London: Edward Arnold 
-(1999) The Limits to Capital. London: Verso 
Hawkins, Gay and Muecke, Stephen (2003) Culture and Waste: The Creation and Destruction of Value. 
Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield  
 
Heidegger, Martin (1962) Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell 
-(1967) What is a Thing? Indianapolis: Regnery/Gateway 
-(1977) The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York, London: Harper and Row 
 
Hess, Remi (1988) L’Aventure du Siecle. Paris: Editions A. M. Metailie 
Hetherington, Kevin (ed) (2008) Consuming the Entrepreneurial City: Image, Memory, Spectacle. New 
York: Routledge 
Highmore, Ben (2002) Everyday Life and Cultural Theory. London: Routledge 
 
Hirschman, Albert (1977) The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its 
Triumph. Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press  
 
Holmes and Marcus (2005) „Cultures of Expertise and the management of Globalisation‟ in Ong and 
Coller (eds) Global Assemblages. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Hopfl, Heather (1997) „The Melancholy of the Black Widow‟, in Hetherington and Rolland (eds), Ideas 
of Difference. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
 
Huang, Yasheng (2008) Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. Cambridge, MA: CUP 
 
Hunt, Tristam (2009) The Frock-coated Communist: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels. London: 
Penguin 
 
Hutnyk, John (2004) Bad Marxism : capitalism and cultural studies. London: Pluto Press 
-(1998) „Clifford‟s Ethnographica‟ in Critique of Anthropology. 18 (4)  
-(1996) Rumour of Calcutta: tourism, charity, and the poverty of representation. London, New 
Jersey: Zed Books 
 
Hutnyk, John and Kalra, Virinder S. (2005) Diaspora & Hybridity. London: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications 
-(1998)  „Brimful of agitation, authenticity and appropriation: Madonna's 'Asian Kool' in Postcolonial 
Studies, Vol 1(3) 
220 
 
Hutnyk, John and Kaur, Raminder (eds) (1999) Travel worlds: journeys in contemporary cultural 
politics. London: Zed 
Hwang, Kwang-kuo (1987) „Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game.‟ American Journal of Sociology 
92: 944-74 
Hylland Eriksen, Thomas (2001) Tyranny of the Moment. London: Pluto Press 
J 
Jansson, Hans et al, (2007) „The Chinese are Coming: Entry into Europe of Firms from the PRC‟, Paper 
presented at Swedish Network for European Studies in Economics and Business, Molle.   
 
Jullien, Francois (1995) The Propensity of Things: Towards a History of Efficacy in China. New York: 
Zone Books  
K 
Kern, Stephen (2003) The Culture of Time and Space 1800 – 1918. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 
Kerr, David (2007) The International Politics of EU-China Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kiaer, Christine (1997) „Boris Arvatov‟s Socialist Objects‟, in October. 81 
Knowles, Caroline (2009) Hong Kong: migrant lives, landscapes, and journeys. Chicago, 
London: University of Chicago Press 
Kopytoff, Igor (1986) „The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process‟, in Appadurai 
(ed.) The Social Life of Things: Commodities in a Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: CUP 
 
Kracauer, Siegfried  (1995) „The Mass Ornament‟ in The Mass Ornament. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 
L 
Laporte, Dominique (1993) The History of Shit. Cambridge: Mass and London: MIT Press 
Lasch, Christopher (1979) The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing 
Expectations. New York: Norton  
Law, John (2004) After method: mess in social science research. London, New York: Routledge 
Lefebvre, Henri (2009) [1989] La Somme et le Reste. Bélibaste, 4° éd. Paris, Anthropos, 
-(2008) [1947, 1961, 1981] Critique of Everyday Life, volumes 1, 2 and 3. London: Verso (in English) 
           -(1947) Critique de la Vie Quotidienne: Introduction. Paris: L‟Arche Editeur (in French) 
           -(1961) Critique de la Vie Quotidienne: Fondements d’une Sociologie de la Quotidiennete. Paris:   
             L‟Arche Editeur (in French) 
           -(1981) Critique de la Vie Quotidienne: De Modernite a Modernisme. Paris: L‟Arche Editeur (in      
             French) 
-(1999) [1936] La Conscience Mystifiée. Paris: Editions Syllepse   
-(1995) An Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes. New York: Verso 
-(1992) Rhythmanalysis. London: Continuum  
-(1991) The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell 
-(1988) „Towards a Leftist Cultural Politics: Remarks Occasioned by the Centenary of Marx‟s Death‟, in  
221 
 
  Nelson and Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London: MacMillan.  
-(1989) La Somme et le Reste. Paris: Meridiens Klincksieck 
-(1976) The Survival of Capitalism. London: Allison and Busby Limited 
-(1972) The Sociology of Marx. London: Harmondsworth/Penguin 
-(1971) Everyday Life and the Modern World. London: Continuum 
 
Levinson, Mark (2006) The Box: How the Shipping Container made the World Smaller and the World 
Economy Bigger. New York: Princeton University Press  
Levi-Strauss, Claude (1966) The Savage Mind. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
 
Lin, Nan (1999) „Building a Network Theory of Social Capital‟, in Connections 22 (1): 28-51 
Lipovetsky, Gilles (2005) Hypermodern Times. London: Polity Press 
Lotta, Raymond (1978) (Ed) And Mao Makes Five.  Chicago: Banner Press 
-(2009) „China's Rise in the World Economy‟, in Economic and Political Weekly. (Feb 21st) 
Lu, Feng (1998) „The Work Unit: A Unique form of Social Organisation‟, in Dutton (ed) Streetlife China. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.   
 
Luo, Y (1997) „Guanxi: principles, philosophies, and implications.‟ Human Systems Management, 16 (1) 
43 
M 
Mandeville, Bernard (1997) The Fable of the Bees. London: Hackett 
 
Marcus, George (1995) „Ethnography in/of the World System: The emergence of multi-sited 
Ethnography.‟ Annual Review of Anthropology 24, 95-117. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert (1964) One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 
Marinetti, Filippo Tommasso (1973) [1909] „The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism‟, in Umbro 
Apollonio (ed) Futurist Manifestos. London: Thames and Hudson   
Marx, Karl (1998) The German ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to The 
critique of Political Economy. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998 
-(1988) The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 . London: Prometheus 
-(1973) La Grundisse. London: Penguin 
-(1974 [1867]) Capital (vol.‟s 1, 2 and 3) London: Lawrence and Wishart 
 
Marx, Karl and Engels, Fredrich (1969) „Manifesto of the Communist Party‟, in Lewis S Feuer (ed) Marx 
and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy. London: Fontana. 
Mauss, Marcel (1990[1950]) The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. London: 
Routledge 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
 
Miller, Daniel (2008) The Comfort of Things. Cambridge: Polity 
222 
 
-(2006) „Consumption‟ in Handbook of Material Culture. Christopher Tilley et al (eds) London: Sage  
-(1998a) Material cultures: Why Some Things Matter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
-(1998b) A Theory of Shopping. Oxford: Polity 
-(1997) „Consumption and its Consequences‟ in Mackay(ed) Consumption and Everyday Life. London: 
Sage 
- (1987) Material Culture and Mass Consumption. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
-(1995) Acknowledging Consumption. London: Routledge 
 
Milmo, Cahal (2007) 'The Slow Boats to China Filled with our Refuse', In The Independent, 26th January. 
Mintz, Sidney Wilfred (1986) Sweetness and Power: the place of sugar in modern history. New York: 
Harmondsworth/Penguin  
 
Montesquieu (2002) The Spirit of the Laws. London: Prometheus Books 
 
Morin, Edgar (2001) La Méthode (Volume 5). Paris: Broche 
 
Mukhopadhyay, Bhaskar (2010)‟Taking Callon to Calcutta: Did Economist-administrators Make Markets 
in the Colony?‟ (working paper) 
 
N 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1969) Thus spoke Zarathustra. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
O 
Olalquiga, Celeste (2002) The Artificial Kingdom: on the Kitsch Experience. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 
P 
Packard, Vance (1960) The Waste Makers. London: Penguin 
 
Perec, George (1997 [1974]) Species of Space. London: Penguin 
-(2003[1978]) Life: A Users’ Manual. London: Vintage  
-(1999) Things: A Story of the Sixties. London: Harvill 
 
Peterson, Richard (1992) „Understanding Audience Segmentation: from Elite and Mass to Omnivore and 
Univore‟, in Poetics, 21, 243-258 
 
Podgorecki, Adam (1986) Law and Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Polanyi, Karl (2001) The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time. Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press 
 
Porter, Michael E. (2000) „Location, Competition and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global 
Economy‟, in Economic Development Quarterly, 14: 1, p.15-34 
 
Prentice, Rebecca (2008) 'Looping the Value Chain: Designer Copies in a Brand-Name Garment Factory', 
in Research in Economic Anthropology, vol 28:97-121. 
 
 
 
223 
 
R 
Rivoli: Pietra (2006) The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines the 
Markets, Power, and Politics of World Trade. London: John Wiley and Sons  
 
Robertson, Roland (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage 
S 
Sahlins, Marshall (1976) Culture and Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1993) Essays in Existentialism. London: Citadel Pr 
Serres, Michel (1982) The Parasite. London: John Hopkins University Press 
Scanlon, John (2005) On Garbage. London: Reaktion Books Ltd 
Scott, James (1985) Weapons of the Weak. New Haven; London: Yale University Press 
Shambaugh, David (2004) „China and Europe: the Emerging Axis‟, in Current History, September, 
p.243-248 
Shields, Rob (1999) Lefebvre, Love and Struggle. London: Routledge 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1954) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.  London: Allen & Unwin 
 
Simmel, Georg (2004) The Philosophy of Money. London, New York: Routledge 
-(1991) „The Berlin Trade Exhibition‟, in Theory, Culture and Society, 8(3) 
 
Simondon, Gilbert (1954) L’individu et sa Genese Physico-biologique, 2nd Edition. Paris: PUF 
Smith, Adam (1991) The Wealth of Nations. London: Everyman‟s Library 
Smith, Neil (2008) Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. Athens  
University of Georgia Press 
Soja , E. W. (1989) Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. 
London: Verso 
 
Stallybrass, Peter (1998) „Marx‟s Coat‟ in Spyger, Patricia (Ed), Border Fetishisms: Material Objects in 
Unstable Places. London: Routledge 
 
Stewart, Susan (1993) On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the 
Collection. Durham and London: Duke University Press 
 
Stiegler, Bernard (2004) Mécréance et Discrédit: Tome 1, La décadence des démocraties industrielles. 
Paris: Editions Galilée 
-(2006) Mécréance et Discrédit: Tome 2, Les sociétés incontrolables d'individus désaffectés. Paris: 
Editions Galilée 
-(2006) Mécréance et Discrédit: Tome 3, L'esprit perdu du capitalisme. Paris: Editions Galilée 
 
Strasser, Susan (1999) Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash. New York: Owl Books 
Strathern, Marilyn (1999) Property, Substance, and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and 
Things. New Brunswick, NJ: Athlone Press  
224 
 
T 
Tang, Xiaobing (2002) „The Anxiety of Everyday life in Post-Revolutionary China‟ in Ben Highmore 
(ed) The Everyday Life Reader. London/New York: Routledge 
 
Thomas, Nick (1991) Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture and Colonialism in the Pacific. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 
 
Thompson, M (1979) Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of Value. Oxford: OUP 
Thompson, Michael and Wildavsky, Aaron (1982) „A proposal to create a cultural theory of risk‟, in 
Kunreuther and Ley, The risk analysis controversy. Springer-Verlag       
Tilley, Chris et al (2006) (Ed) Handbook of Material Culture. London: Sage 
Tomlinson, John (2007) The Culture of Speed: The Coming of Immediacy. London: Sage  
 
Tsai, Kellee S. (2002) Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China. London: Cornell 
 
Tuan, Yi-Fu (2005) Space and Place. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
 
U 
Urry, John (2003) Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity Press/Blackwell 
-(2000) Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century. London: Routledge 
 
V 
Veblen, Thorstein (1994) [1899]. The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Penguin  
Virilio, Paul (1977) Speed and Politics. New York: Semiotext(e) 
 
 
W 
Wallerstein, Immanuel, (1999) The End of the World as we Know it. London: University of Minnesota 
Press 
-(1993) The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? London: Routledge 
 -(1974) The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-
economy in the Sixteenth Century. London: Academic Press 
 
Wang, Hui (2009) The End of the Revolution. London: Verso 
Wang, Yiwei, „The Dimensions of China‟s Peaceful Rise‟, Asia Times, 14th May 2004 
Watts, Jonathan (2006) 'The Thoughts of Chairman Ma'. The Guardian. 11th September. 
 
Wu, Fulong (2003) „The (Post-) Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's 
Reglobalisation in Question‟, in Urban Studies, vol 40, no 9. 
 
X 
Xiang, Biao (2005) Transcending Boundaries: Zhejiangcun: The Story of a Migrant Village in Beijing. 
Leiden: Brill  
 
 
225 
 
Z 
Zhang, Li (2001) Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within 
China’s Floating Population. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Uni Press.  
 
Zhang Zhanbing and Song Yifu (1991) Zhongguo: Mao Zedong. Taiyuan: Beiyue Wenyi 
 
Žižek, Slavoj (2002) Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism: Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a 
Notion. London: Verso 
-(1991) For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. London: Verso  
 
 
Web sources 
www.halesowennews.co.uk/news/local/ 
www.mofcom.gov.cn (statistics division of Ministry of Commerce in China) 
www.chinapeopledaily 
www.bruno-latour.fr/articles/index.html 
www.wri.org/publication/rattling-supply-chains  O‟Keefe , James (2008)   
www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0228/cover.ma.html „Crazy man Jack Ma goes for the Shrimps 
not the Whales‟ 
www.cnnic.net.cn/en/index/index.htm (China Internet Network Information Centre) 
www.thewholesaleforums.co.uk 
www.alibaba.com 
 
Visual Sources 
Baichwal, Jennifer (2007) Manufactured Landscapes (FILM) 
 
 
